Covid-19 and democracy, first cut policy analyses : country case studies by Finn, Peter et al.






Covid-19 and Democracy, First Cut Policy 







Editor: Dr Peter Finn 
 
Contributors: Associate Professor Radu Cinpoes, Dr Peter 
Finn, Associate Professor Atsuko Ichijo, Dr Robert Ledger, Dr 
Nevena Nancheva, Dr Robin Pettitt, Dr Ronald Ranta 
 








This report examines the intersection between political and policy responses to 
Covid-19 across 8 democracies (the UK, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Israel, Japan, 
Taiwan, and the US). In doing, it provides first-cut analyses of the early stages of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. This executive summary highlights 6 policy learning points and 3 
key findings (two empirical and one methodological).  
Policy Learning Points 
Politics Matters: There have been calls from some to 'keep politics out of' responses 
to the Covid-19 pandemic. Yet, such calls are impossible to implement. As this report 
details, politics can have both positive and negative effects on policy, but to avoid 
discussing it is foolhardy, and would leave one with an incomplete picture. 
Local, National and International Politics: The relationship between (democratic) 
politics and policy during the Covid-19 pandemic has played out at various levels. 
Locally, sub-par regional health management has contributed to poor responses in 
some instances, while coordination between elected officials has aided initially sound 
responses in others. At a national level, factors such as pre-existing political divisions, 
national prestige and geopolitics have also affected responses. 
Interconnectedness: The Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated how global health 
crises can become intertwined with complex and globally diffused operation and 
ownership structures. Such structures generate policy dilemmas stemming from 
opacity over responsibility. 
Prior Experience, Legislative and Bureaucratic Apparatus and Health Care 
Capacity: Several case studies illustrate the value of both experience in dealing with 
similar events and the presence of pre-existing legislative and bureaucratic 
apparatuses, as well as the benefit of additional health care capacity and forward 
planning. 
Pre-Existing Prejudices and Disparities: One aspect of the Covid-19 pandemic 
documented in some case studies is the formulation of policies based on, or that 
(deliberately or not) exacerbate, pre-existing prejudices and disparities. As 
importantly, infection and death rates have mirrored pre-existing social disparities. 
Moving forward, policymakers should avoid decisions and language that, deliberately 
or not, reflect existing prejudices. They also need to understand how and why pre-
existing disparities are reflected in transmission and death rates. 
Little room for complacency: Even where initial responses to the Covid-19 pandemic 
have been sound, there is little room for complacency. 
Key Findings 
Diversity of experience: Democracies have experienced Covid-19 in diverse ways. 
This diversity suggests the large death tolls that have arisen in some were not 
inevitable, but instead arose from particular policy choices and political dynamics. 
Curtailing free movement creates national level dilemmas: Numerous 
governments faced policy dilemmas as large numbers of cruise ship passengers and 
crews became quarantined, or otherwise trapped within the borders of single states, 
as free movement was curtailed. This suggests a trend requiring attention during the 
Covid-19 pandemic and future global health events. 
The value of comparison: This report has been written during the early stages of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. With events changing quickly locally, nationally, and 
internationally, the value of engaging in comparative analysis has been reinforced. 
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Since the beginning of the century, a yearly news item has been the 
announcement of a possible world-wide epidemic causing a huge number of deaths, 
and not only in the less developed parts of the planet. We have regularly heard about 
the different steps: transmission from animal to animal, then from animal to human, 
and finally from human to human. Except in a small number of cases, such as the 
2003 SARS outbreak and the 2009 avian flu, the news item has, however, been short-
lived, with perhaps many believing in the end that journalists were filling news vacuums 
or that the alleged viral threat was simply the latest mutation of some millenarian fear. 
From the end of 2019, the latest materialization of this news item has invaded 
everything, causing 0.6 million deaths as of mid-July 2020 and interacting with every 
possible dimension of human existence. Covid-19 has landed into a technologically 
and economically integrated world shaken by changes in the international balance of 
power, and increasingly hesitant about the usefulness of its current level of integration. 
In that sense, the odyssey of the Diamond Princess cruise ship, which operated across 
a sea of ambiguous jurisdictions and was quarantined in Japan in February 2020, 
began many years ago, with the Covid-19 crisis only now making it bluntly clear that 
our heavily integrated world is unlikely to survive with such political feet of clay. 
Although the appearance of the Covid-19 threat is common, the introduction 
and the chapters in this volume provide a clear and convincing account of the 
relevance of political factors in understanding the widely different health outcomes 
observed in eight countries (the UK, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Israel, Japan, 
Taiwan, and the US). Taiwan, for instance, was well prepared because of a pre-
existing need to have a full strategy for epidemic management resulting from its 
banning from international organizations; for Germany, a well-funded health system 
may have been crucial in securing a successful reaction so far, while Romania’s 
response was based on a stricter lockdown given weaker government funding; in the 
US, despite some states reacting promptly, the response at the Federal level was 
hesitant, and also aimed in part at Trump’s electoral campaign, with blame redirected 
to China and the World Health Organization. 
The authors have also to be commended for finding the time and the energy to 
contribute to our knowledge while under lockdown, in the midst of so many personal 
and professional readjustments associated with the pandemic. 
  
Javier Ortega, Interim Associate Dean for Research, Faculty of Business and Social 
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A Note on Method, Aims and Context 
This report on 8 democracies has been written by country experts as the Covid-
19 pandemic has driven change and uncertainty globally. As such, the statistics, 
discussion, and analysis it contains reflect a constantly changing picture at local, 
national, and international levels. It was commissioned in early-May 2020, with 
chapters drafted by early-June and revised following a data cut-off date of June 30, 
2020. The Introduction was written in June and revised in July. Proofreading, editing, 
formatting and harmonisation took place in July and August. 
Rather than provide a comprehensive documentation of events in these 8 
democracies, each chapter provides selective discussions of the intersection between 
democratic politics and policy in these democratic states. In short, this report is meant 
to provide a first-cut analysis that acts as a bridge between the reflective writing that 
develops from the academic peer review process and the more immediate analysis 
and information found in (the undoubtedly essential) media coverage of the pandemic. 
As such, it is hoped it provides important food for thought for those involved in the 
analysis of, and policy response to, the Covid-19 pandemic. 
To mitigate against very real concerns related to incomplete and quickly 
changing data sets, statistics have been taken from data sets widely recognised as 
providing the most up-to-date picture, such as The Critical Trends and World Map 
pages provided by John Hopkins University, the Coronavirus pages of the Washington 
Post and government datasets. 
For democracy to thrive, accountability is key. Core to this accountability is an 
understanding of how democratic states act to protect their citizens against a myriad 
of threats. In recent months, perhaps the largest of these threats has been the Covid-
19 pandemic. Among this report's 8 case studies, some states were more prepared 
for such an event, and acted with more forethought, than others. This report shows 
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Introduction: Dr Peter Finn 
This report examines the intersection between the political and policy 
responses to Covid-19 in 8 democracies (the UK, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Israel, 
Japan, Taiwan, and the US). Across 8 chapters it provides first-cut analyses of the 
Covid-19 pandemic. The report highlights the intersection between politics and policy, 
drawing policy learning points and key findings from comparative analysis. 
The democracies considered in this report vary significantly. Differences 
include population sizes, economic structures and outputs, cultures, histories, and 
electoral systems. Moreover, they have experienced the Covid-19 pandemic in 
different ways. Taiwan, for example, has suffered less than 10 deaths. Conversely, 
the US passed 100,000 confirmed deaths in late-May. 
 As this report shows, Covid-19 has affected democracies in many ways. To 
give just a few examples; elections have been disrupted and suspended (though some 
have still occurred); governments have fallen and been reappointed; opposition parties 
and politicians have, in turns, engaged constructively with governments and attempted 
to make political hay; leaders have contracted, become seriously ill, and recovered 
from, Covid-19; powers have been centralised within executives and heads of state to 
an extent normally only seen in wartime.  
Across seven sections, this introduction highlights policy learning points arising 
from these differing experiences. In Section 1, some comparative statistics related to 
Covid-19 in this report’s 8 case studies are presented, with a tentative discussion 
occurring. In Section 2, the importance of considering politics when thinking about the 
policy response to Covid-19 is demonstrated, while Section 3 illustrates how politics 
has been affected by, and fed into, the pandemic at local, national, and international 
levels. Next, Section 4 explores how global health crises can become intertwined with 
complex and interconnected operation and ownership structures. Thus, creating policy 
dilemmas generated by opacity over responsibility. Section 5 illustrates how 
experience in dealing with similar health events, the prior existence of legislative and 
bureaucratic apparatuses, additional health care capacity, and forward planning, can 
contribute to successful policy responses. Section 6 explores how existing prejudices 
and disparities have affected policy responses and been reflected in fatality figures. 
Section 7 highlights that, even when an initial response appears to have been 
relatively sound, or where outbreaks have been contained, little room for complacency 
exists. Sections 2-7 reflect the reports overarching policy learning points highlighted 
in the Executive Summary. Section 8 signposts the overall report structure. 
Three Key Findings of this report are also highlighted in this introduction. These 
findings, two empirical and one methodological, are: 
1) Democracies have experienced Covid-19 in diverse ways, with an analysis of 
the intersection between politics and policy key to understanding this diversity 
2) Curtailing free movement of people creates national level policy dilemmas 
3) Comparative analysis generates important insights for the analysis of a 
complex and moving picture 
Rather than purely ‘academic’, these findings have real-world implications. The 
first, for instance, suggests the large death tolls experienced in some countries were 
not inevitable, but instead reflect particular policy choices and political dynamics. The 
second, as seen in Section 4, highlights the need for policymakers to be aware of the 
dilemmas created by the curtailment of the free movement of people going forward. 
Finally, the third could aid those, in academia and beyond, seeking to develop 
methodologies for the analysis of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
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1. Comparative Table and Discussion 
 
 
Table 1: Comparative table with Key Covid-19 indicators and statistics for report case studies as of June 30th, 2020 
 










Deaths per 100,000 
1 UK 313,4832 461.73 43,906 14.0% 64.8 
2 US 2,575,0334 787.15 125,803 4.9% 38.45 
3 Germany 194,693 232.26 8,968 4.6% 10.81 
4 Romania 26,313 138.18 1,612 6.1% 8.28 
5 Israel 24,6887 2688 320 1.3% 3.5 
6 Bulgaria 4,691 67.51 219 4.7% 3.12 
7 Japan 18,615 14.75 972 5.3% 0.77 
8 Taiwan 447 1.92 7 1.6% 0.03 
 
Table 1 is ordered with relation to the number of confirmed deaths per 100,000 of population, which is shown on the far right, with 
the countries with the highest number of deaths at the top 
 
 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, information in this table is drawn from the John Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Centre on 30/06/20 
2 Washington Post, ‘Mapping the worldwide spread of the coronavirus’ Washington Post. 30 June 2020. Available online: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/mapping-spread-new-coronavirus/?itid=sn_coronavirus_3  [Accessed 30/06/2020]. 
3 Washington Post, ‘Mapping’. 
4 Washington Post, ‘Mapping’. 
5 Washington Post, ‘Mapping’. 
6 Washington Post, ‘Mapping’. 
7 Israel Ministry of Health, Coronavirus dashboard (2020). Available online: https://govextra.gov.il/ministry-of-health/corona/corona-virus/  [accessed 30/6/2020]. 
8 Israel Ministry of Health, Coronavirus dashboard. 
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Table 1 reinforces one of this report’s findings, namely that there has been a 
large disparity in the experience of the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Importantly, this report more broadly demonstrates that analysis of the politics and 
policy responses to the pandemic provide an effective frame for understanding these 
disparities. Put another way, the high death tolls experienced by countries such as the 
US and the UK were not inevitable, but the outcome of particular policy choices and 
political dynamics. Indeed, the political and policy responses of Japan, Taiwan, and 
Bulgaria, for example, demonstrate that controlling the transmission of the SARS-CoV-
2 virus, which causes Covid-19, is possible. As importantly, they show it is possible 
while democratic accountability is broadly adhered to.  
Before moving onto a tentative discussion of Table 1, some caveats are 
needed. All the statistics in the table are snapshots of a moving picture, with the 
likelihood many will be revised upwards (or downwards)9 as governments and 
researchers come to better understand events and/or alter their statistical models. 
Crucial in this regard, the picture in different countries is changing at different rates. 
The United States of America (US), for instance, is currently recording tens of 
thousands of new cases daily, while new cases in Taiwan have remained in the single 
digits per week since April. Moreover, there is a need to caution against drawing too 
many conclusions from statistics collected across states with divergent 
methodologies. Likewise, testing infrastructure is organised differently within and 
between countries, while, as we shall see, the numbers of confirmed cases likely 
significantly understate the actual numbers of those infected with the SARS-CoV-2 
virus. As such, any conclusions drawn from Table 1 should be considered tentative 
and subject to revision.  
The aforementioned caveats accepted, Table 1 does provide some insights 
into the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic in the featured democracies. Organised 
with relation to the number of confirmed deaths per 100,000 of population, which is 
shown on the far right, with the countries with the highest number of deaths at the top, 
this table helps illustrate the variety of experience across these case studies.  
Moving from top to bottom, Line 1 is particularly notable because of the high 
numbers of deaths per 100,000 it shows have occurred in the UK. At 64.8, this figure 
is almost double that of the US (38.45), the next highest. Another statistic of note on 
Line 1 is the high percentage of UK case fatalities, which stands at 14%. This is more 
than double the next highest case study on this metric, with Romania having a case 
fatality rate of 6.1%. What caused the disparity between the UK and other case studies 
on this metric cannot be fully known.10  
 
9 In mid-August 2020, for example, the UK government revised fatality figures downward by 5,377 
because of a change in counting methodology in England. According to the UK Department of Health 
and Social Care this change occurred to ensure a ‘single, consistent measure is adopted for daily 
reporting of deaths across the UK’. 
L. Hughes, ‘UK Covid death toll revised down by 5,377 after data review’ The Financial Times. 12 
August 2020. Available online: https://www.ft.com/content/f51d161d-86c7-40cd-a5f6-cb72ab52b026 
[Accessed 21/08/2020].; UK Department of Health and Social Care, New UK-wide methodology 
agreed to record COVID-19 deaths (12 August 2020). Available online: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-uk-wide-methodology-agreed-to-record-covid-19-deaths 
[Accessed 24/08/20]. 
10 One explanation could be that those catching the SARS-CoV-2 virus in the UK were more likely to 
be elderly, or part of another at risk group. Another explanation could be that a lack of testing has left 
many more cases undetected than elsewhere, with those cases that were serious enough to lead to 
death making up a larger proportion of confirmed cases. 
The Covid-19 and Democracy Project: Kingston University 
9 
 
The US, listed on Line 2, is particularly noteworthy because it currently has, at 
over 125,000, the world's highest number of confirmed Covid-19 deaths. It also has 
both the highest number of confirmed cases worldwide and the highest number of 
confirmed cases per 100,000 of this report’s case studies. As of June 30, 2020, new 
confirmed cases in the US were running at a seven-day average of around 40,000 per 
day. Suggesting confirmed cases (absolute and per 100,000) and deaths (absolute 
and per 100,000) will continue to rise in the coming weeks. 
Next, on Line 3, is Germany. However, it should be noted there are significant 
differences between the US and Germany. As of the time of writing (mid-July 2020), 
for instance, the number of new confirmed cases of Covid-19 in the US was 
accelerating more on a weekly basis than Germany suffered in total up to June 30. 
Likewise, the US has suffered more than triple the number of confirmed Covid-19 
related fatalities per 100,000 than Germany. Similar to Germany, which is shown to 
have suffered 10.81 confirmed deaths per 100,000, is Romania, which, as Line 4 
documents, has suffered 8.28 confirmed fatalities per 100,000. That said, there are 
big differences in confirmed cases per 100,000, with Romania having just 138.18 as 
opposed to Germany's 232.2. As already mentioned, bar the UK, Romania has the 
highest case fatality percentage of this report’s case studies (6.1% compared with 
4.6% in Germany), which helps explain the smaller difference in the deaths per 
100,000 between Romania and Germany despite a big disparity in cases per 100,000. 
Israel is listed on Line 5. It is the first case study with a confirmed death rate 
per 100,000 of less than 4. Of particular interest is that, while confirmed Israeli cases 
per 100,000 are most comparable with Germany, the Israeli case fatality rate (1.3%), 
is the lowest of all the case studies and almost one-third of the German rate of 4.6%. 
As a result, Israel has a much lower death toll in both absolute and comparative terms. 
Listed on Line 6, Bulgaria has a much higher case fatality rate then Israel (4.7%), but 
a much lower number of confirmed cases per 100,000 (67.15 as opposed to 268). 
Together, these statistical differences triangulate to give Israel and Bulgaria similar 
numbers of confirmed deaths per 100,000; 3.5 in Israel and 3.12 in Bulgaria.  
 Japan occupies Line 7. On every measure bar case fatality percentage, it has 
much better statistics than all case studies except Taiwan. Reflecting this is the fact 
the number of cases in Japan per 100,000 is less than a quarter of that in Bulgaria, 
while numbers of confirmed Covid-19 deaths per 100,000 is, at 0.77, also around a 
quarter of the Bulgarian figure. Finally, Taiwan, listed in Line 8, stands apart from even 
Japan in the positive picture painted by its statistics. It has less than 450 confirmed 
cases, translating to just 1.92 confirmed cases per 100,000. Whilst it has managed 
thus far to keep deaths in single figures, at just 7. Translating to just 0.03 confirmed 
Covid-19 deaths per 100,000. In short, while accepting the above caveats about the 
tentative nature of the statistics in Table 1 and the likelihood of upward revision, the 
statistics for Taiwan reflect an undoubted success story. Especially as Taiwan is just 
a short plane ride from Wuhan, China, the initial epicentre of the Covid-19 pandemic. 
 Rather than providing a complete picture of the way democracies have 
experienced the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic, Table 1 provides some detail 
on the experience of a subset. Yet, even this subset illustrates diversity of experience. 
To highlight, perhaps, the most obvious example, Taiwan’s 447 confirmed cases 
would exist as a blip in the hundreds of thousands of cases recorded in the UK and 
Germany, and little more than a rounding error in the millions of confirmed US cases. 
In fact, on current trends it would actually be surprising if the US had not reached well 
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over 6 million confirmed cases by the time this report is published.11 Crucially, similar 
comparisons could be made between the low comparative and absolute death counts 
in Japan and Taiwan and the comparative and absolute death counts in the US and 
the UK. With these disparities in mind, this introduction now turns to illustrate how the 
intersection between politics and policy and the Covid-19 pandemic have fed into 
some of them. This process begins with a brief discussion of why politics needs to be 
considered when exploring policy responses to the pandemic. 
2. Politics Matters 
 There have been calls from some to 'keep politics out of' responses to the 
Covid-19 pandemic, sometimes paired with claims scientists are doing just that.12 
Such calls and claims, however, do not stand scrutiny. US President Donald Trump, 
for instance, has engaged in explicitly political criticism of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), while, as David Salisbury of the Global Health Programme at 
Chatham House notes, if a vaccine is successfully developed ‘‘then we’re into a 
political world’’.13 
The Covid-19 pandemic has wrought havoc globally in 6 short months. To name 
but a few effects, whole countries and continents have ground to a halt and entered 
periods of lockdown, entire economies have been wound down (many of which are 
now attempting to restart), institutions integral to the long-term functioning of societies 
have been shuttered and billions of lives have been disrupted. As of June 30, 2020, 
confirmed deaths were over half a million.14 Responses to any of these effects would 
likely have been significant and decidedly political. However, as the case studies 
examined in this report demonstrate, the need to deal with them all concurrently has 
kept politics centre stage. 
In short, this report demonstrates that, rather than causing a pause in 
partisanship, the pandemic has fed into democratic politics. As seen in Chapter 3, for 
example, the Romanian government fell and was reinstated as opposition politicians 
appeared content to let their opponents handle tough pandemic related decisions. In 
Chapter 2, meanwhile, we see how the German experience under Angela Merkel 
appears to demonstrate the value of a seasoned leader, with prior crisis management 
experience, charting a course through uncertainty. By way of example, in the time lag 
between the emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and any serious outbreaks in 
Germany, German healthcare providers, laboratories and the federal government 
developed and stockpiled tests, which have been key to its generally successful 
response thus far. Conversely, the UK body politic, already consumed by Brexit, 
appears to have been particularly ill-suited to deal with Covid-19. Indeed, rather than 
develop and stockpile testing, in the early stages of the pandemic the UK delayed 
implementing a lockdown because key actors were both distracted by Brexit and 
reluctant to wield such state power. This delay saw SARS-CoV-2 quickly spread. As 
 
11 On September 1 2020, the US had over 6 million confirmed cases and 180,000 confirmed deaths. 
12 M. El-Faizy, ‘Covid-19: How scientists are keeping politics out of the global race for a vaccine’ France 
24. 29 April 2020. Available online: https://www.france24.com/en/20200429-will-trump-s-america-first-
affect-the-global-race-for-a-coronavirus-vaccine [Accessed 11/06/2020]. 
13 El-Faizy, M ‘Covid-19’. 
14 C. Cadell,; J. Wardell, ‘Global coronavirus deaths top half a million’ Reuters. 28 June 2020. 
Available online: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-health-coronavirus-deaths/global-coronavirus-
deaths-top-half-a-million-idUKKBN23Z0US [Accessed 02/07/2020]. 
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documented in Chapter 1, worrying features of the UK lockdown period include a 
concerning rise in both domestic violence and racially motivated hate crime, tragically 
high death rates in care homes and among Black, Asian, and minority ethnic (BAME) 
communities and one of the world’s highest comparative death tolls. 
Calls to 'keep politics out of' responses to Covid-19 tap into the tantalising, but 
ultimately illusory, idea one can halt partisanship and political considerations in a 
crisis. Yet, while not wanting to politicise any one individual or family's grief, structurally 
there is ‘[n]o avoiding politics’ when discussing Covid-19.15 Indeed, rather than remove 
politics from the consideration of, or attempts to develop policy with relation to, Covid-
19, politics must be considered. As highlighted above, and demonstrated in detail in 
this report, politics can have both positive and negative effects on policy, but to attempt 
to avoid discussing it is foolhardy, and would leave one with an incomplete picture.  
3. Local, National and International Politics 
The relationship between politics and policy during the Covid-19 pandemic has 
played out at various levels. As highlighted below, considering local, national, and 
international levels separately illuminates a variety of policy learning points.  
Local Politics 
Within some countries, large disparities have developed in the spread of, and 
the effectiveness of local responses to, Covid-19. Overall, for instance, Romania has 
a relatively low infection and death rate (though not compared with some neighbouring 
countries). Yet, as seen in Chapter 3, in early-April 2020 the town of Suceava (circa 
100,000 residents) became the centre of an outbreak that saw over 180 medical 
personnel become infected as a result of a lack of protective equipment stemming 
from poor hospital and local health management. This outbreak led to the quarantining 
of Suceava and surrounding towns and the hospital management’s removal.  
Similarly, Chapter 8 demonstrates big disparities between US states. As of May 
28, for instance, there had been 144.7 deaths per 100,000 in New York state. Yet, on 
May 28 California had suffered just 9.9 confirmed deaths per 100,000, and Texas just 
5.6. New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo has received criticism for not moving 
to shut his state down quickly enough; waiting, instead, until the state had over 15,000 
confirmed cases. Conversely, San Francisco Mayor London Breed issued a stay-at-
home order on March 16, when the city had under 40 confirmed cases and no deaths, 
with a Californian wide stay-at-home order issued three days later by Governor Gavin 
Newsom. Breed and Newsom cooperated, with Newsom supportive of the San 
Francisco stay-at-home order. In New York, meanwhile, the relationship between 
Cuomo and New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio was tense, with the former apparently 
rebuffing the latter's suggestion for a New York City stay-at-home order five days prior 
to Cuomo’s March 22 issuance of a statewide order.  
Policy wise, events in Romania and the US demonstrate the importance of local 
elected officials and health administrations working together closely, moving quickly 
to tackle local outbreaks. Politically, the effects are likely to feed into people's choices 
at the ballot box, but how this occurs will differ between localities. Breed, Newsom, 
Cuomo and de Blasio, for example, are all members of the Democratic party in states 
 
15 A. Ramsay, ‘There’s nothing so political as a pandemic’ Open Democracy. 17 March 2020. 
Available online: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/theres-nothing-so-political-as-
a-pandemic/ [Accessed 11/06/2020]. 
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where that party currently dominates. As such, rather than the high death rates in New 
York leading to Democrats being voted out of office in New York, one could see 
internal Democratic party challengers focusing on Cuomo's record during the 
pandemic. Turning to Romania, events such as the Suceava outbreak may feed into 
campaigns calling for higher and more transparent healthcare spending. At the 
outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, Romania had low healthcare spending when 
compared with other European Union member states. Suggesting it is ripe for such a 
campaign. 
National Politics 
The Covid-19 pandemic has become similarly intermingled with national 
politics, with the initial hesitancy of the Japanese government to act an illustrative 
example.  
Japan was scheduled to host the 2020 Summer Olympic Games. As Chapter 
6 shows, the Japanese government initially appeared reluctant to take drastic action 
to either stem the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus or to postpone the Olympic Games. 
However, after receiving assurances the games would not be cancelled, they were 
postponed. Once this postponement occurred, a combined response at prefecture and 
national levels has, as of late-June, kept deaths below 1,000. While this death toll is 
high regionally, it is low compared with some case studies, such as the US and the 
UK, examined in this report. The measures put in place in Japan are voluntary rather 
than relying on potential sanctions, with a so-called ‘Japan model’, based on a cluster 
focused approach and the avoidance of the so-called three Cs (confined and crowded 
spaces, and close human contact), emerging.  
 The Japanese experience illustrates how seemingly unrelated priorities have 
affected the response to Covid-19 in some instances. More positively, Japan's 
comparatively low death toll suggests the Japanese model could be of use to others 
looking to stem the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus moving forward. 
International Politics 
The Covid-19 pandemic has been affected by international politics in numerous 
ways. In the UK, for instance, the fact its body politic has been consumed by the Brexit 
process for over 3 years, something achieved in January 2020 (though it is in a 
transition period preserving the status quo until December 2020), appears to partly 
explain its laggard Covid-19 response.  
More positively, evidence presented in Chapter 7 suggests Taiwan’s 
geopolitics, which stem from Chinese claims Taiwan is part of China, appear to have 
left it well prepared to deal with Covid-19. This geopolitical situation prevents it from 
taking full part in some international bodies, including the WHO. As a result, during the 
2002-2004 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak (also caused by a 
coronavirus), Taiwan developed its response independently. This led to the creation 
of the Central Epidemic Command Centre. This centre was activated in January 2020 
and has taken the lead in Taiwan's, thus far, incredibly successful Covid-19 response. 
So successful has the Taiwanese response been, the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs now publicizes the 'Taiwan Model'. 
As such, the peculiarities of Taiwanese geopolitics have forced its government 
to develop the capacity to deal with health events such as the Covid-19 pandemic. 
Illustrating how prior investment in such capacity can contribute to successful policy 
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responses (a point returned to below). Moreover, the successful use of this capacity 
has also created a tool the Taiwanese state can draw on to augment its soft power. 
4. Interconnectedness 
 The Covid-19 pandemic has demonstrated how global health crises can 
become intertwined with complex and globally diffuse operation and ownership 
structures. Indeed, a key finding of this report, which has arisen from its focus on 8 
separate country case studies, is that the interconnected nature of societies, 
economies, and businesses creates policy dilemmas generated by opacity over 
responsibility. As we shall see below, this especially appears to be the case when free 
movement of people becomes curtailed. 
Demonstrating this are events surrounding the Diamond Princess cruise ship 
run by the Carnival Corporation that are discussed in Chapter 6. The Carnival 
Corporation is headquartered in the US, with the ship registered in the UK. A 
passenger who disembarked in Hong Kong on January 25 tested positive for Covid-
19 on February 1. On February 3 the ship, along with more than 3,500 passengers 
and crew, was placed in quarantine in Yokohama, Japan, which it originally sailed from 
on January 20. When disembarkation was completed on March 1, 706 people had 
become infected, with seven dying. The location of the quarantine, as well as its 
ownership and registration structure, caused confusion about who was ultimately 
responsible for the ship and its passengers. The Japanese government received 
criticism for an initially slow and muddled response, which appears to have spurred a 
concerted attempt to play a constructive role in the international response to Covid-19 
moving forward.  
On a more micro-level, the Diamond Princess had passengers and crew from 
at least 7 of the 8 countries considered in this report (the US,16 UK,17 Germany,18 
Israel,19 Japan, Taiwan,20 and Romania21). Likewise, as of mid-June there were 6 
ships owned by the company Cruise and Maritime Voyages anchored in the UK. More 
than 1,000 crew members from a variety of countries were onboard these 6 ships. 
There have been reports of a hunger strike on one of the vessels, with Indian crew 
 
16 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Diamond Princess Repatriation (15 February 2020). 
Available online: https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2020/s0215-Diamond-Princess-
Repatriation.html [Accessed 16/06/2020]. 
17 BBC ‘Coronavirus: British man who was on Diamond Princess ship dies in Japan’ BBC. 28 
February 2020. Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-51677846 [Accessed 16/06/2020]. 
18 I. Marcus, ‘Passengers from ‘Diamond Princess’ Arrive in Berlin’ Berlin Spectator. 22 February 
2020. Available online: https://berlinspectator.com/2020/02/22/passengers-from-diamond-princess-
arrive-in-berlin/ [Accessed 16/06/2020]. 
19 M. Jaffe-Hoffman, ‘Israeli who returned from coronavirus cruise ship tests positive’ Jerusalem Post. 
23 February 2020. Available online: https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/israelis-cleared-to-return-from-
diamond-princess-could-have-coronavirus-618328 [Accessed 16/06/2020]. 
20 CNN ‘These are the nationalities of the coronavirus patients on the Japan cruise’ CNN. 7  February 
2020. Available online: https://edition.cnn.com/asia/live-news/coronavirus-outbreak-02-07-20-intl-
hnk/h_77bcf50e331665b8fe0f3ba5597875d6 [Accessed 16/06/2020]. 
21 D. Salceanu, ‘Six Romanians From The ‘‘Diamond Princess’’ Cruise Ship, In Quarantine Due To 
Coronavirus, Repatriated From Japan’ Romania Journal. 21 February 2020. Available online: 
https://www.romaniajournal.ro/society-people/six-romanians-from-the-diamond-princess-cruise-ship-
in-quarantine-due-to-coronavirus-repatriated-from-japan/ [Accessed 16/06/2020]. 
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members seeking repatriation.22 In a similar vein, the Grand Princess cruise ship, and 
its diverse passengers and crew, was quarantined off the California coast in the US in 
March.23 
The confusion relating to who was ultimately responsible for the Diamond 
Princess, along with the diversity of passengers and crew on the Diamond Princess, 
the Grand Princess and the Cruise and Maritime Voyages crew members stranded in 
the UK, illustrate how the complexity of global businesses, especially those facilitated 
by the free movement of people, need to be factored into policy responses to Covid-
19 moving forward, as well as similar global health events in the future. Moreover, the 
similarities between events in Japan, the US and the UK suggest they foreshadow 
future events rather than being aberrations. 
5. Prior Experience, Legislative and Bureaucratic Apparatus 
and Health Care Capacity 
Several of this report’s case studies illustrate the value of both experience in 
dealing with similar health events and the presence of pre-existing legislative and 
bureaucratic apparatuses, as well as the benefit of additional health care capacity and 
forward planning.  
 As mentioned above, due to the SARS outbreak, Taiwan already had the 
Central Epidemic Command Centre, which was activated to coordinate a response to 
Covid-19. By chance, it was also in the privileged position of having a Vice President 
who was a renowned epidemiologist and a former health minister. Together these 
factors appear to have been key to successful policy formation. Similarly, after initial 
hesitation related to the 2020 Olympics, the Japanese response, based on voluntary 
cooperation rather than legally enforceable commands, has been largely coordinated 
by the Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters, which was activated under the 
pre-existing Act on Special Measures for Pandemic Influenza and New Infectious 
Diseases Preparedness and Response. As shown in Chapter 4, meanwhile, in 
Bulgaria the acceptance of lockdown by large parts of the population (especially as it 
relates to the closing of schools) appears to have been aided by regular school 
closures during the annual flu season. As importantly, this acceptance has fed into a 
broadly successful Bulgarian response that has kept deaths from Covid-19 in the low 
hundreds.  
 Relatedly, as highlighted above and in Chapter 2, it appears a concerted 
attempt in Germany to stockpile tests fed into a response that, when compared to 
other large European Nations such as Italy, Spain and the UK,24 has held down 
infection and death rates. Another factor appears to be additional capacity in a well-
funded healthcare system. When combined with the fact Germany did not suffer large 
numbers of cases early in the pandemic, this forethought and the existence of such 
additional capacity likely provide lessons for countries that have allowed a continual 
 
22 L. O'Carroll, ‘UK port authorities board cruise ships amid welfare fears for crew’ The Guardian. 19 
February 2020. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/19/uk-port-authorities-
board-cruise-ships-amid-welfare-fears-for-crew-coronavirus [Accessed 23/06/2020]. 
23 B. Borrell, ‘95,000 stranded at sea: What happens when a cruise ship becomes a hot zone’ 
National Geographic. 20 April 2020. Available online: 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/travel/2020/04/when-a-cruise-ship-becomes-a-hot-zone-
coronavirus/ [Accessed 13/07/2020]. 
24 John Hopkins University, Mortality Analyses. [Accessed 14/07/2020]. 
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search for efficiency to dilute the capacity of social safety nets, thus removing 
additional capacity that might be needed in a social or health emergency. 
Together, the experience of Taiwan and Bulgaria demonstrate how prior 
experience of similar health emergencies, and concurrent policies and practices, can 
feed into successful future responses. Whilst the willingness of the Japanese 
population to abide by non-enforceable guidelines appears to reflect a disposition 
within Japanese society to abide by such government guidelines. Finally, the German 
experience demonstrates the value of both forward planning and the maintaining of 
some spare capacity within healthcare systems.  
As northern hemisphere countries begin to prepare for an anticipated second 
spike of Covid-19 cases in the autumn and winter, the maintenance of additional 
capacity within health care systems and broader social safety nets (even if such 
capacity has only been developed in response to the Covid-19 pandemic) could help 
with the deployment of holistic policy responses. Finally, given that, in such countries, 
this second spike may coincide with the additional pressure arising from an annual flu 
season, the need for significant amounts of forward planning in the coming months 
appears acute. 
6. Pre-Existing Prejudices and Disparities  
 A particularly disturbing aspect of the Covid-19 pandemic shown in several of 
this report’s case studies is the formulation of policies based on, or that (deliberately 
or not) exacerbate, pre-existing prejudices and disparities. As importantly, infection 
and death rates have mirrored pre-existing social disparities. 
As seen in Chapter 5, for instance, in Israel, there was controversy over the 
potential of the Joint List party, comprised of several Arab-Palestinian parties, joining 
a governing coalition with the Blue and White party led by Benny Gantz following a 
March election. Ultimately, Gantz, following an agreement negotiated at the height of 
the pandemic, went into coalition with incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
in May. This maintained a status quo that no Arab-Palestinian party has joined an 
Israeli governing coalition. Additionally, several ultra-orthodox neighbourhoods in 
Israel were placed under stricter lockdown measures because of claims the 
community was flouting lockdown rules. In short, the pandemic and political deadlock 
have shed new light on existing prejudices and on religious and national cleavages 
present in Israeli society. Similarly, some Roma neighbourhoods in Bulgaria were 
subject to stricter quarantine measures than the general population. A senior Bulgarian 
official spoke of ‘a different way of life among the ethnic minorities’. Thus, feeding into 
discriminatory practices and intolerant narratives. 
 Turning to pre-existing disparities, a UK review of the disproportionately high 
effects of Covid-19 on BAME communities highlighted that ‘[p]eople of Chinese, 
Indian, Pakistani, Other Asian, Caribbean and Other Black ethnicity had between 10 
and 50% higher risk of death when compared to White British’. While its findings were 
tentative, the review found ‘clear evidence that COVID-19 does not affect all 
population groups equally’, with factors such as ‘older age, ethnicity, male sex and 
geographical area [...] associated with the risk of getting the infection, experiencing 
more severe symptoms and higher rates of death.’25  
 
25 Public Health England, Beyond the Data: Understanding the Impact of COVID-19 on BAME 
Communities (16 June 2020). Available online: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/89
2376/COVID_stakeholder_engagement_synthesis_beyond_the_data.pdf [Accessed 17/06/2020]. 
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The US has similar disparities, with official statistics demonstrating that, despite 
making up 13% of the US population, African Americans account for 22% of Covid-19 
cases and 23% of deaths. As discussed in Chapter 8, the politics and policy response 
to Covid-19 in the US became intermeshed with a large protest movement for racial 
equality that developed after footage emerged showing the death of George Floyd, 
who died after a police officer knelt on his neck on May 25 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
 Moving forward, policymakers need to avoid decisions and language that, 
deliberately or not, are based on existing prejudices or ideas about how already 
disadvantaged groups may act collectively. As importantly, there is an urgent need to 
understand how pre-existing disparities are reflected in the transmission and death 
rates experienced by specific communities and, in conjunction with such communities, 
to develop policies that address higher transmission and death rates in the short-term 
and structural disparities in the medium and long-term. 
7. Little room for complacency 
As shown above and in this report, democracies have experienced the Covid-
19 pandemic in different ways. Some, such as Taiwan, Bulgaria, Romania, Israel, and 
Japan, have kept death and transition rates relatively low, and, importantly, have 
largely done so within existing democratic structures. Others, such as the US and the 
UK, have fared worse, with, among other factors, slow decision-making and a lack of 
clear leadership appearing to feed into poorly managed responses in both instances. 
However, even in places where the initial response to the pandemic appears to have 
been relatively sound, there is little room for complacency.  
In Chapter 5, for example, questions are raised about Israel’s lockdown exit 
strategy. The initial Israeli strategy, which involved contact tracing, self-isolation, the 
restriction of arrivals, the declaration of a state of emergency, the closing of institutions 
such as schools and restrictions on gatherings and movement, was broadly 
successful, keeping transmission and death rates low. The country began exiting 
lockdown in May, but by early-June was seeing hundreds of new daily Covid-19 
infections. A case in the Knesset (the parliament) caused it to cease operations for a 
week, whilst there were outbreaks at newly opened schools. Moreover, there is a 
debate in Israel over how much authority the executive can have in a national 
emergency without parliamentary scrutiny. Finally, it has been questioned whether 
decisions taken during the crisis were done purely in the national interest or also, at 
least in part, to secure the position of the Prime Minister.   
Likewise, some US states with initially low numbers of Covid-19 cases have 
seen cases surge as they have reopened. As already stated, on May 28 California and 
Texas had confirmed Covid-19 death rates of 9.9 and 5.6 per 100,000 respectively, 
with the figure 144.7 for New York state. However, by June 30 the number of cases in 
California had risen from a 7-day rolling average of around 1,600 new cases per day 
on May 8, when the state began reopening, to around 6,000 new cases per day. 
Likewise, new cases in Texas rose from around 800 new cases per day when the state 
began reopening on April 20 to almost 6,000 new cases per day on June 30. These 
numbers did not yet reflect the daily counts of 10,000+ regularly reported by New York 
state in early-April (and probably also reflect better population knowledge and testing). 
However, they suggest Covid-19 related fatalities in Texas and California are likely to 
rise moving forward, as well as illustrating how quickly infection rates can rise if 
outbreaks are not contained quickly. 
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The experience of Israel, US states such as California and Texas, and other 
countries, such as New Zealand,26 that have fared well initially during the Covid-19 
pandemic illustrate the need to be vigilant and for an adaptable, holistic approach to 
policy making. In short, policy makers and elected officials likely need to prepare 
populations for gradual easing and reimplementation of restrictions as and when 
needed, whether at a national, regional, or local level. Policies needed to manage such 
local and regional variations are inherently more complex than those required for a 
singular national lockdown. As is the messaging necessary to explain said policies 
and variations. As such, investment in preparing policies and messaging prior to the 
reimplementation of any restrictions is likely to pay dividends. In short, having the 
general public think about responses to Covid-19 as a spectrum rather than a linear 
journey with a singular endpoint may help with the acceptance of the reimplementation 
of restrictions. 
8. Report structure 
This report contains eight chapters, each considering the intersection between 
the political and policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in a different democracy. 
In Chapter 1, Robin Pettitt examines the UK, one of the hardest hit countries both in 
terms of deaths per capita and absolute numbers of deaths. Moreover, in early-June 
a report from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development suggested 
the UK would, at 11.5%, likely suffer the biggest fall in economic output of any 
developed economy as a result of the pandemic.27 Ultimately, Pettitt concludes that, 
‘[s]imply looking at the raw numbers it would be difficult to conclude that the UK 
government got their Covid-19 response right. There have been too many deaths for 
that [...] conclusion.’ Next, in Chapter 2 Robert Ledger considers Germany. In short, 
this chapter documents how the German government's response appears to have 
benefited from the fact that, in Angela Merkel, it had a leader with significant 
experience dealing with crises. With a comparatively low death toll and an economy 
predicted to do comparatively well in the medium-term, Ledger argues that ‘Germany’s 
response to the coronavirus can be considered relatively successful, particularly when 
compared with other European countries.’ Providing a note of caution, however, he 
highlights that the ‘next phase of the crisis will further test the country’s institutions and 
economic structures’, in particular due to Germany's vulnerability to a slump in global 
trade. 
Staying in mainland Europe, Chapter 3 sees Radu Cinpoes examine the 
Romanian response. Thus far, he argues the Romanian response has been relatively 
sound, with ‘early escalation to a state of emergency and total lockdown’ that have 
generally contained the pandemic. This success, however, has been ‘marred by 
clientelism, negligence, incompetence, and hypocrisy by authorities, a weak and 
underfunded health system and localised pressures from the return of large numbers 
of Romanians working abroad in critically affected areas’. Next, in Chapter 4 Nevena 
Nancheva, examines Romania's southern neighbour Bulgaria. Though she identifies 
 
26 C. Graham-McLay, ‘From celebration to dismay: the week Covid-19 re-emerged in New Zealand’ 
The Guardian. 19 June 2020. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/19/from-
celebration-to-dismay-the-week-covid-19-re-emerged-in-new-
zealand?CMP=Share_AndroidApp_Gmail [Accessed 24/06/2020]. 
27 P. Inman, ‘UK economy likely to suffer worst Covid-19 damage, says OECD’ The Guardian. 10 June 
2020. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jun/10/uk-economy-likely-to-
suffer-worst-covid-19-damage-says-oecd [Accessed 10/06/2020]. 
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instances where ‘intolerant public narratives towards’ the ‘Romani minority’ reflecting 
long-term prejudice fed into policy, overall, the Bulgarian response is shown to have 
been ‘widely effective’, with the number of confirmed deaths kept in the low hundreds.  
In Chapter 5, Ronald Ranta looks at the Israeli management of Covid-19. 
Despite the fact that ‘[h]eading into the pandemic, Israel was governed by a transition 
government, without a popular mandate, and headed by a Prime Minister facing 
prosecution’, and notwithstanding a concerning lockdown exit strategy, Ranta 
highlights that ‘hospitalisation and mortality rates have been low in Israel’. Yet, 
reflecting Bulgaria’s treatment of its Romani population, this success is tinged by 
‘several Ultra-Orthodox neighbourhoods and towns’ being ‘put under curfew and 
special measures’, thus reflecting ‘Israel’s secular-religious divide’. Moreover, there 
was outcry over the potential of the Joint List party, comprised of several Arab-
Palestinian parties, joining a governing coalition. Ultimately, this did not occur, 
maintaining a status quo that no Arab-Palestinian party has ever been part of an Israeli 
governing coalition. On another note, there is a fear that, with cases rising steadily in 
the second-half of July, that Israel may suffer from a much larger outbreak in the 
coming weeks and months than it suffered in spring and early-summer.  
In chapters 6 and 7, Atsuko Ichijo looks at Japan and Taiwan. In the case of 
Japan, Ichijo demonstrates that, initially, Japanese government thinking was 
dominated by a focus on the Olympics planned for July and August 2020. However, 
once Japan was assured the games would be suspended rather than cancelled, its 
response was sound. Ichijo argues Japan is a paradoxical case study, ‘it is a success 
story […] in comparison to other developed economies’ such as the US and the UK, 
but not when compared to neighbours such as Taiwan and Hong Kong. Turning to 
Taiwan, which has managed to keep deaths in single digits, Ichijo argues it is a clear 
‘success story’, especially as it ‘has not resorted to authoritarian measures such as 
lockdown’. As such, Ichijo believes Taiwan ‘constitutes proof that democracy can deal 
with a pandemic effectively without suspending citizens’ rights’. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 I examine the US. Despite some bright spots, such as the 
swift initial response of California, the overall US political and policy response to Covid-
19 has been problematic at best. The US currently has the highest death toll of any 
state, passing 100,000 confirmed deaths in late-May and 2 million confirmed cases in 






To close this introduction, some reflection on the third key finding of this report 
is in order. In short, this finding, which is methodological in nature, is that the 
comparative analysis this report has utilised is capable of generating important 
insights, and providing greater clarity, for those attempting to analyse the complex and 
moving picture created by the Covid-19 pandemic. If examined individually, for 
instance, the responses of Taiwan and Bulgaria would have likely generated a sense 
that prior experience of similar health events had fed into comparatively successful 
responses. However, when considered alongside each other, and with relation to 
countries that have fared much worse in the early stages of the pandemic, the 
importance of this prior experience is clear. Similarly, the value of the planning 
engaged in by Germany, and the lack of it carried out by other states, appears 
obvious.  
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Crucially, this report's other two key findings, that democracies have 
experienced the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic in diverse ways and that the 
curtailing of free movement of people generates national level dilemmas, are a direct 
result of this report's comparative methodology. An understanding of the diverse ways 
democracies have experienced and dealt with the pandemic would not have been 
possible without the consideration of a broad range of such countries. Similarly, the 
insight into the policy dilemmas generated by the curtailment of the free movement of 
people within globalised industries that rely on relatively unconstrained movements 
across borders arose from the fact that the majority of this report's case studies have 
been affected by such curtailments. 
As academics, governments and others attempt to grapple with understanding 
the Covid-19 pandemic, whether in terms of documenting what has happened, dealing 
with current events or planning for the future, the methodology adopted for this report 
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Chapter 1: United Kingdom, Dr Robin Pettitt 
1.Key Facts 
Key Fact Data 
GDP per capita (prior to the pandemic) UK£46,867.9 (US$43,343.3), 2018 
Money spent on health-care per capita 
(prior to the pandemic) 
UK£3,227, 2018 
Population (prior to the pandemic) 67,891,996 
Life expectancy (prior to the pandemic) 81.15 
Date of first recorded case January 31 2020 
Date of first recorded death March 2 2020 
Date of 100th recorded death March 18 2020  
Date lockdown entered March 23 2020 
Number of confirmed cases (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
313,483 (461.7 per 100,000) 
Number of confirmed deaths (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
43,906 (64.8 per 100,000) 
 
When/if lockdown measures were 
significantly eased 
May 10 2020 
2. Executive Summary 
● An inattentive government reacted too slowly at the beginning of the crisis 
leading to late lockdown 
● Prime Minister’s personality possibly influenced late lockdown 
● Slow reaction led the UK to become second worst affected country in the world 
● Early rally to the flag support has rapidly dissipated 
● Need for track and trace system has gone unanswered 
● Covid-19 infected, usually dominant, leader hampered decision making 
● Massive government intervention in the economy alleviated some of the worst 
effects of the lockdown on individual finances 
● Reduction of government intervention in the economy could spell trouble 
● Ethnic minorities hit particularly badly by Covid-19 for not fully understood 
reasons 
3. Country Intro 
The United Kingdom (UK) is a parliamentary democracy with a bicameral 
legislature,28 and a figure head monarch.29 Lacking a codified constitution UK politics 
 
28 Parliament.uk, What is the role of Parliament? (2020). Available online: 
https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/ [Accessed 01/07/2020]. 
29 Parliament.uk, Parliament and the Crown (2020). Available online: 
 https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/relations-with-other-institutions/parliament-crown/ [Accessed 
01/07/2020]. 
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is heavily reliant on tradition and precedence. Formally speaking all power lies with 
Parliament, which can undo any previous decision by a simple majority.30 
Significant powers have been devolved to regional assemblies in Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland,31 which have increasingly started to deviate from 
England and each other, especially in the case of Scotland. The Scottish government, 
led by the leader of the Scottish National Party Nicola Sturgeon, is committed to 
achieving independence for Scotland, a topic that is likely to come to a head in the 
next Scottish Parliament election in 2021. 
The head of government is currently (July 2020) Prime Minister Boris Johnson, 
who leads a single party majority government with a majority of 80 in a 650 seat House 
of Commons.32 The most recent election was in December 2019, and the Fixed Term 
Parliament Act dictates that the next scheduled election will take place in May 2024.33 
Single party majority governments have been the norm and leave the 
legislature relatively weak. Recent exceptions to the norm have been a coalition 
government between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats 2010-15, and 
a Conservative Party minority government 2017-19. 
Significant regional economic inequalities are in evidence with the north of 
England suffering much higher levels of deprivation than the south east of the 
country.34 
Key Dates 
January 24 2020: Government emergency response committee meets to discuss 
Covid-19 for the first time. The Prime Minister does not attend. Health Secretary 
declares risk to the UK as being ‘low’. 
January 25: Foreign and Commonwealth Office advises against travel to Hubai 
province 
January 31: First confirmed UK case 
March 2: First death confirmed as cases pass 100 
March 7: Confirmed cases pass 200 
March 10: Health Minister Nadine Dorris tests positive for Covid-19 
March 14: Confirmed cases pass 1,000 
March 23: First lockdown measures announced 
March 25: Prince Charles tests positive for Covid-19 
March 27: Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Health Secretary Matt Hancock test 
positive for Covid-19 
March 28: Total confirmed Covid-19 deaths pass 1,000 
April 4: Keir Starmer becomes leader of the Labour Party 
April 5: Prime Minister Boris Johnson is admitted to hospital 
 
30 Parliament.uk, Parliament’s authority (2020). Available online: 
https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/sovereignty/ [Accessed 01/07/2020]. 
31 Parliament.uk, Devolved Parliaments and Assemblies (2020) Available online: 
https://www.parliament.uk/about/how/role/relations-with-other-institutions/devolved/ [Accessed 
01/07/2020]. 
32 Parliament.uk, State of the parties (2020). Available online 
https://members.parliament.uk/parties/Commons [Accessed 01/07/2020]. 
33 Parliament.uk, State of the Parties. 
34 Sheffield University, UK has higher level of regional inequality than any other large wealthy country 
(2019) Available online: https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/news/nr/uk-higher-regional-inequality-large-wealthy-
country-1.862262 [Accessed 01/07/2020]. 
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April 6: Prime Minister Boris Johnson is taken to intensive care. Total Covid-19 death 
toll passes 5,000. 
April 9: Prime Minister Boris Johnson leaves intensive care, but remains in hospital 
April 12: Prime Minister Boris Johnson is discharged from hospital and moves to 
Chequers for recovery. Covid-19 death toll passes 10,000. 
April 21: Total Covid-19 related deaths passes 17,000 
April 27: Prime Minister Boris Johnson returns to work 
May 5: Number of Covid-19 related deaths pass 29,000, making the UK the worst 
affected country in Europe 
May 6: Number of Covid-19 related deaths pass 30,000 
May 11: Phased lifting of restrictions begin in England 
May 20: For the first time since March the number of people in hospital with Covid-19 
in the UK drops below 10,000 
May 26: For the first time since March 18 no Covid-19 related deaths are recorded in 
Norther Ireland 
May 29: Lockdown restrictions begin to be eased in Scotland 
June 2: Public Health England publishes a report into the high fatality rates among 
BAME people 
June 5: Covid-19 related deaths pass 50,000 
June 7: No new Covid-19 related deaths are reported in Scotland for the first time 
since March 
June 21: New Covid-19 related deaths increase by 15, the lowest increase since 
March 15 
June 26: No new cases or deaths recorded in Scotland in the previous 24 hours 
June 29: Local lockdown is announced for Leicester after a spike in cases in the city 
4. Political and Policy Responses 
The first confirmed cases of Covid-19 are generally regarded as having been 
identified around January 31,35 although it is possible that the virus had arrived in the 
UK as early as mid-December 2019.36 Total reported deaths associated with Covid-
19 crossed 100 by March 18.37 Extensive lockdown measures were announced on  
March 23.38 
The political response of the UK has been affected by a number of factors. One 
such factor was that the opposition Labour Party had a lame-duck leader for much of 
the early part of the crisis. After suffering his second general election defeat in 
December 2019, this time leaving the Labour Party with a historically low number of 
MPs, Jeremy Corbyn announced his intention to stand down as leader of the party 
 
35 T. Ball,; D. Brown,; C. Smyth,; C. Wace, ‘Hunt for contacts of coronavirus-stricken pair in York’ The 
Times. 31 January 2020. Available online: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/hunt-for-contacts-of-
coronavirus-stricken-pair-in-york-dh363qf8k [Accessed 30/06/2020]. 
36 W. John, ‘Coronavuris doctor’s diary: The strange case of the choir that coughed in January’ BBC. 
10 May 2020. Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-52589449 [Accessed 01/07/2020]. 
37 Gov.uk, Coronavirus (COVID_19) in the UK (2020) Available online: 
https://coronavirus.data.gov.uk/ [Accessed 01/07/2020]. 
38 D. T. Newton,; N. Clark, ‘House Arrest: Boris orders coronavirus-hit Brits to stay home unless they 
have one of four reasons – or be dined’ The Sun. 23 March 2020. Available online: 
https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/11238253/boris-johnson-coronavirus-lockdown-fines/ [Accessed 
01/07/2020]. 
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once a new leader had been selected by party members.39 Inexplicably the party’s 
national executive council decided that the process of choosing a new leader would 
take place over more than three months from early-January to early-April.40 This left 
the main opposition party effectively without proper leadership as the Covid-19 crisis 
escalated. 
In addition, the Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, had various distractions during 
the crisis. He was in the process of divorcing his second wife, which was completed 
by early-May; dealing with the birth of his sixth (possibly seventh, it is not entirely 
clear)41 child; and then contracting Covid-19 himself necessitating a spell in intensive 
care, and extended recovery period. This has inevitably meant that the Prime Minister 
has not always been able to be as attentive in handling the crisis as would have been 
ideal. 
 
Brexit, Political Capital and Falling Polling Numbers 
To complete the context of the political response there is the underlying 
distraction of the rapidly approaching end of the Brexit transition period during which 
the UK is supposed to be establishing its long-term relationship with the EU. Brexit 
has required huge political capital to manage, and dealing with two major crises at the 
same time has stretched the government’s capacity to deal properly with either issue.  
In terms of the public’s reaction to the political response, it started very well for 
the government, but over time the news became less positive. As the crisis started to 
escalate there was a definite ‘rally around the flag’ effect of supporting the government 
(See Figure 1). 
Support for the government’s handling reached an all-time high of 72 percent 
saying it was doing ‘very’ or ‘somewhat well’ on March 27. However, since then it has 
seen a steady decline dropping below 50 percent by mid-May and continuing to 
decline, albeit with a slight upward curve by late-June. 
 
39 K. Proctor,; H. Stewart, ‘Jeremy Corbyn says he will stay as Labour leader after election pounding’ 
The Guardian. 13 December 2019. Available online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/dec/13/devastating-exit-poll-triggers-bitter-blame-game-within-
labour [Accessed 01/07/2020]. 
40 C. Chaplain, ‘Labour leadership election: the timetable and how the contest to replace Jeremy 
Corbyn will work’ iNews. 7 January 2020. Available online: https://inews.co.uk/news/politics/labour-
leadership-timetable-result-april-382227 [Accessed 02/07/2020]. 
41 L. Buchan, ‘Boris Johnson refuses to say how many children he has in live radio interview’ The 
Independent. 29 November 2019. Available online: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/boris-johnson-children-single-mothers-general-
election-brexit-a9225756.html [Accessed 02/07/2020]. 
























This is also reflected in voting intentions. With a staggering lead over the Labour 
Party of 22 points in late-March-early-April, by late-June the lead was down to less 
























To what extent this decline in support for the Conservative Party government is 
down to crisis wariness, government mistakes or the arrival of a new Labour Party 
Figure 1: Percentage of the population saying government is doing ‘very’ 
or ‘somewhat well’ – Source YouGov 
 
 
Figure 2: Conservative lead over Labour – Source: Politico 
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leader is impossible to say, but as the crisis drags on these numbers are unlikely to 
improve for the Conservative Party. 
The government does benefit from the fact that there is a long time until the 
next General Election, so to some extent low approval ratings at this stage are less of 
a concern. However, the Conservative Party still runs the risk of the Covid-19 crisis, 
combined with the potential for massive economic disruption in early 2021 from a no-
deal end to the Brexit transition period, permanently damaging its standing with the 
electorate. 
 
Devolution, Divergence, and Differences 
The UK is also experiencing the effects of devolution. In Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland all domestic policy is effectively decided by regional parliaments and 
executives. Although all parts of the UK went into lockdown, the easing of lockdown 
has taken rather different paths. An example is the approach to reopening schools. In 
England the government allowed some year groups in primary schools to return 1 
June, although many local education authorities did not feel ready to do so. In 
Scotland, teachers were allowed to return to prepare for a partial return by August 11. 
In Wales schools are planned to return full-time by September.42 
In terms of the UK response to the outbreak, although the UK eventually did 
enter into lockdown, the government has been criticised for doing so far too late.43 
Possibly distracted by the government finally delivering its promise to leave the EU 
and with the Prime Minister missing several COBRA meetings, the government’s crisis 
management committee, it has been argued that the government did not take the 
threat seriously enough. When they did realise the danger it was already too late. 
 
UK Government Covid-19 Poster 
 
The numbers certainly would suggest that the government’s response was 
insufficient. As of July 1, the official number for Covid-19 related deaths stood at 
43,906. This is the third highest death toll in absolute numbers in the world after the 
USA and Brazil.44 
 
42 BBC, ‘Coronavirus: Pupils in Wales back in school full-time in September’ BBC. 9 July 2020. 
Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-53349005 [Accessed 09/07/2020]. 
43 C. Jonathan,; G. Arbuthnott,; J. Leake, ‘Coronavirus: 38 day when Britain sleepwalked into disaster’ 
The Times. 19 April 2020. Available online: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/coronavirus-38-days-
when-britain-sleepwalked-into-disaster-hq3b9tlgh [Accessed 02/07/2020]. 
44 Worldometer.info, COVID-19 Pandemic (2020) Available online: 
https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/?utm_campaign=homeAdvegas1?#countries [Accessed 
02/07/2020]. 
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In addition, the UK has also seen significantly higher fatality rates amongst 
ethnic minorities45, something which has been given extra poignancy by the rising race 
tensions in the USA which rippled into UK politics with ‘Black Lives Matter’ 
demonstrations across the country. Further, the Covid-19 crisis and the lockdown has 
seen a deeply worrying rise in domestic violence46 as well as a rise in racially motivated 
hate crime.47 The crisis has also hit care homes particularly severely.48 Finally, the 
government has faced extensive criticism for not providing sufficient quantities of 
personal protective equipment to frontline health staff49 and for failing to get a test and 
trace programme up and running.50 
On the economic side, the government’s intervention has been on a huge 
scale51 and one which received notable praise.52 However, despite the size of the 
intervention to support businesses and individuals, it has also been pointed out that in 
relation to other countries it is comparatively modest.53 In addition, according to the 
OECD the UK is projected to be one of the worst hit amongst leading economies.54 
This is partly because of the seriousness of the outbreak in the UK and because the 
UK’s large service sector has suffered particularly badly. 55 
5. Discussion 
A crisis on the scale of Covid-19 would challenge the capabilities of any 
government (except one led by Jacinda Ardern it would appear). However, even in 
that context the UK government seems to have particularly struggled. A refusal to take 
 
45 BBC, ‘Coronavirus: Risk of death is higher for ethnic minorities’ BBC. 2 June 2020. Available online: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-52889106 [Accessed 02/07/2020]. 
46 M. Townsend, ‘Revealed: surge in domestic violence during Covid-19 crisis’ The Guardian. 12 April 
2020. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/apr/12/domestic-violence-surges-
seven-hundred-per-cent-uk-coronavirus [Accessed 02/07/2020]. 
47 L. Fekete, ‘Race hate crimes – collateral damage of Covid-19’ Institute of Race Relations. 20 April 
2020. Available online: http://www.irr.org.uk/news/race-hate-crimes-collateral-damage-of-covid-19/ 
[Accessed 02/07/2020]. 
48 L. Holland, ‘Coronavirus: Govt facing legal action unless it admits to acting ‘‘unlawfully’’ over care 
homes’ Sky News. 4 June 2020. Available online: https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-govt-facing-
legal-action-unless-it-admits-to-acting-unlawfully-over-care-homes-12000159 [Accessed 03/07/2020]. 
49 BBC, ‘Coronavirus: UK failed to stockpile crucial PPE’ BBC. 28 April 2020. Available online: 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/newsbeat-52440641 [Accessed 03/07/2020]. 
50 S. Marsh, ‘NHS test-and-trace system ‘‘not fully operational until September’’’ The Guardian. 4 June 
2020. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2020/jun/04/nhs-track-and-trace-system-
not-expected-to-be-operating-fully-until-september-coronavirus [Accessed 03/07/2020]. 
51 House of Commons Library, Coronavirus: effect on the economy and public finances (2020) 
Available online: https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-8866/ [Accessed 
03/07/2020]. 
52 D, Goodman,; S. Kennedy, ‘Model UK economic aid wins Nobel praise with caveat on health’ 
Bloomberg. 28 March 2020. Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-
28/model-u-k-economic-aid-wins-praise-with-caveat-on-health-policy [Accessed on 04/07/2020]. 
53 C. Emmerson,; I. Stockton, How does the size of the UK’s response to coronavirus compare with 
other countries (14 May 2020) Available online: https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14845 [Accessed 
04/07/2020]. 
54 B. Chapman, ‘Coronavirus: UK faces deeper recession than any other country in the developed 
world, says OECD’ The Independent. 10 June 2020. Available online: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/coronavirus-uk-economy-recession-oecd-report-
a9558191.html [Accessed 04/07/2020]. 
55 A. Walker, ‘Coronavirus: UK economy could be among worst hit of leading nations, says OECD’ 
BBC. 10 June 2020. Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-52991913 [Accessed 
04/07/2020]. 
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the crisis seriously until it was well developed has arguably contributed to the very high 
number of deaths related to Covid-19. The reasons for the government’s initial hesitant 
and often faltering response is no doubt something that will be debated for a long time 
to come. However, a number of factors will have played in. 
One is probably that in Boris Johnson, the UK has a Prime Minister who has a 
career long reputation of not quite following ‘the rules’. Johnson is someone who 
almost revels in making mistakes.56 He has been described as ‘almost pathologically 
unwilling to follow other people’s rules, obligations, or impositions’57 and on March 3 
declared  ‘I was at a hospital the other night where I think there were actually a few 
coronavirus patients and I shook hands with everybody, you’ll be pleased to know, 
and I continue to shake hands.’58 Considering his character Johnson seems 
temperamentally disinclined to impose strict rules on others. 
 
Brexit 
In addition, the whole UK political system has been consumed by Brexit since 
the referendum in 2016. Having recently won a big majority and finally succeeded in 
‘getting Brexit done’ the government was arguably focused on its own success and 
the possibilities it raised for Johnson’s domestic agenda and an unwillingness to be 
side-lined by a health crisis. One senior Conservative is said to have admitted to a 
certain degree of overconfidence within the government,59 which is perhaps 
understandable given the circumstances. However, even if understandable, that 
overconfidence had serious consequences. 
 
The Boris Johnson Factor 
A final factor in the government’s problematic response as the crisis has 
continued to escalate is the fact that this is a government dominated by Boris Johnson. 
Many factors played into the Conservative victory in December 2019, but one was the 
appeal of ‘Boris’: ‘‘‘Time after time,’’ one Labour campaigner who worked for [former 
Labour MP Phil] Wilson60 told me, ‘‘we heard, ‘I’m lending my support to Boris.’’’ Boris, 
not the Tories.’61 The central force behind the government is clearly Boris Johnson 
and his very distinctive personality. However, when Boris Johnson himself was taken 
ill with Covid-19 on March 27, and then entered intensive care in hospital on April 6, 
that central force was missing. The government continued functioning, but Johnson’s 
absence was keenly felt. 
 
56 C. D. Hogg, Clare Dwyer ‘My greatest mistake: Boris Johnson MP for Henley and editor of ‘‘The 
Spectator’’’ The Independent. 21 May 2002. Available online: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/my-greatest-mistake-boris-johnson-mp-for-henley-and-
editor-of-the-spectator-189322.html [Accessed 04/07/2020]. 
57 T, McTague, ‘It’s Boris Johnson’s Britain now’ The Atlantic. 13 December 2019. Available online: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/12/boris-johnson-britain-uk-election/603466/ 
[Accessed 04/07/2020]. 
58 A. Woodcock, ‘Coronavirus: Scientists advised against handshakes on day Boris Johnson boasted 
of ‘‘shaking hands continuously’’’ The Independent. 5 June 2020. Available online: 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/coronavirus-boris-johnson-hand-shake-scientists-
a9499976.html [Accessed 04/07/2020]. 
59 T. Helm,; E. Graham-Harrison,; R. McKie, ‘How did Britain get its coronavirus response to wrong?’ 
The Guardian. 19 April 2020. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/18/how-
did-britain-get-its-response-to-coronavirus-so-wrong [Accessed 04/07/2020]. 
60 Former MP for Sedgefield, Tony Blair’s former seat, now held by the Conservatives.   
61 T, McTague, ‘It’s Boris Johnson’s Britain now’ The Atlantic. Available online: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/12/boris-johnson-britain-uk-election/603466/ 
[Accessed 04/07/2020]. 






UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Simply looking at the raw numbers it would be difficult to conclude that the UK 
government got their Covid-19 response right. There have been too many deaths for 
that to be the conclusion. It is difficult to disagree with the conclusion of the Financial 
Times that: 
  
ministers failed to take the pandemic seriously enough – and 
hence to prepare – early enough, then moved to lockdown too 
late. In the 10 weeks since then, the government has failed to 
get back on the front foot62 
 
The immediate consequences of government errors are easy to see in terms of 
the number of infected and dead. What the long-term political consequences will be is 
difficult to predict. There is a long way until the next election so there is seemingly 
plenty of time for the Conservative Party to recover their standing with the electorate. 
However, the last time the Conservative Party lost power in 1997 they were still 
struggling with their failed response to the Black Wednesday financial crisis in 
September 1992, after which no opinion poll showed a Conservative lead. The 
Conservative Party’s polling numbers are still ahead of Labour, but the 1992-7 period 
shows that one mismanaged crisis can cause permanent harm to a party’s standing. 
 
62 Financial Times View ‘Trust in the UK government has been badly dented’ Financial Times. 5 June 
2020. Available online: https://www.ft.com/content/2b5f0bb0-a668-11ea-92e2-cbd9b7e28ee6 
[Accessed 04/07/2020]. 
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Chapter 2: Germany, Dr Robert Ledger 
1.Key Facts 
Key Fact Data 
GDP per capita (prior to the pandemic) €41,474 (US$46,281), 2019 
 
Money spent on health-care per capita 
(prior to the pandemic) 
€4,712 (US$5,145) 
 
Population (prior to the pandemic) 83 million 
Life expectancy (prior to the pandemic) 81 years (2017) 
Date of first recorded case January 27 2020 
Date of first recorded death March 9 2020 
Date of 100th recorded death March 24 2020 
Date lockdown entered March 13-22 2020 
 
Number of confirmed cases (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
194,693 (232.5 per 100,000) 
 
Number of confirmed deaths (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
8,968 (10.81 per 100,000) 
When/if lockdown measures were 
significantly eased 
May 6 2020 
2. Executive Summary 
● Germany has experienced one of the world’s higher numbers of coronavirus 
cases but with significantly fewer fatalities than comparable countries 
● Key to Germany’s response has been high levels of testing, reaching more than 
300,000 tests per week by mid-March 
● Germany’s well-funded healthcare system has so far had sufficient capacity 
and resources to deal effectively with the pandemic 
● The government health agency, the Robert Koch Institute, has played a 
prominent informational role during the crisis 
● The country’s lockdown, introduced in mid-March, was only partial compared 
with its peers and was coordinated between federal and state-level leaders. 
These measures were eased in stages from late-April, then again in early and 
late-May. 
3. Country Intro 
Germany is a parliamentary democracy and federal republic. German 
democracy consists of a bicameral federal parliament in Berlin, comprising the 
Bundestag, the lower house directly elected every four years, and the Bundesrat, the 
upper house of state-level representatives. The most powerful politician is the 
Chancellor of the Bundestag, currently Angela Merkel, who has served in the position 
since 2005. The country’s federal system consists of 16 states. These states have 
significant powers, such as in healthcare policy and also have some discretion in tax-
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raising and spending. The 1949 constitution, the ‘Basic Law’,63 outlines clear 
separation of powers within a federal republic, meaning—among other things—
coalition governments (the federal government is currently a grand coalition between 
the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU)64 and Social Democrats (SPD)) and 
compromise are the norm rather than the exception, many powers are devolved to the 
states and the federal government is wary of exercising draconian measures.65 
The German economy, having been dubbed the ‘Sick Man of Europe’ in the 
late 1990s has boomed since the Schröder ‘Agenda 2010’ reforms and adoption of the 
Euro.66 A mixed economy powered by a dominant manufacturing sector, Germany is 
also well-known for its Mittelstand of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) 
producing high tech goods and services as well as large finance and pharma sectors. 
Germany has benefitted from the Euro in boosting its large export sector and therefore 
is vulnerable to shifts in global supply chains and suppression of global trade. The 
federal government is traditionally fiscally conservative, another hangover from history 
and post-WW1 hyperinflation, passing a constitutional amendment in 2009 forbidding 
budget deficits (the schwarze Null or ‘black zero’)67 and as a result has recently posted 
large budget surpluses and paid down government debt. Germany has a progressive 
tax code, and a mixed employee/employer health insurance scheme. Healthcare is 
operated by hundreds of local and state-level public and private providers. 
Key Dates 
January 27 2020: Date of first recorded case near Munich 
January-February: Testing developed and stockpiled 
March 9: Date of first recorded death 
Mid-March: Testing reaches 300,000 per day 
March 24: Date of 100th recorded death 
March 13-22: Lockdown entered 
April 20: Small shops allowed to reopen 
May 6: Further easing of restrictions 
May: Weekly anti-coronavirus measures protests across Germany 
May 20: Most lockdown measures removed or relaxed 
June: Lockdown further relaxed but some new clusters of the virus emerge 
4. Political and Policy Responses 
Germany’s first case of Covid-19 was recorded on January 27 near Munich 
and, similarly to other European countries, was followed by a lull in terms of policy 
 
63 The shadow of the Weimar and Nazi periods hang over German democracy. The 1949 constitution 
was written, under supervision of the US, in an attempt to avoid the crises of the 1918-45 period. 
64 The conservative bloc in Germany is known as the Union, an alliance between the Christian 
Democrats (CDU) and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU. Union candidates for Chancellor are usually 
chosen from the CDU rather than CSU. 
65 This is also linked to the experience of widespread surveillance during the Cold War in East 
Germany by the notorious Stasi, as well as the Nazi past. Germans are particularly sensitive to issues 
of data protection and observation by the state. 
66 The Economist, ‘The sick man of the euro’ The Economist. 3 June 1999. Available online: 
https://www.economist.com/special/1999/06/03/the-sick-man-of-the-euro, [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
67 The 2009 debt brake constitutional amendment meant German states are not allowed to run any 
structural deficits while at the federal level the government is permitted to run a maximum deficit of 
0.35% of GDP. 
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response. Health Minister Jens Spahn, a rising star in the CDU and an unsuccessful 
challenger to succeed Merkel in 2018, made a number of public appearances 
attempting to reassure Germans that the risks of coronavirus were low and in any case 
the country was well-prepared for a potential health challenge. 
 
Calm Before the Storm 
It subsequently emerged that German healthcare providers, labs and the 
federal government used this time in January and February to develop a Covid-19 test 
and stockpile testing reagents.68 A large number of Covid-19 cases arrived in Germany 
relatively late, compared to say Italy. In fact, it is thought that a significant number of 
cases were actually brought back from northern Italy by skiing holidaymakers during 
February. The first major cluster was recorded in Heinsberg, a district that borders the 




The German Bundestag (Parliament) in Berlin, Germany 
 
First Serious Concerns 
The first death from Covid-19 in Germany was recorded on March 9. During the 
first two weeks of March the federal government moved quickly from reassurance, to 
a state of alert and to something partially resembling panic. Spahn was joined and 
sometimes replaced at press conferences by Merkel, who in crisis-mode seemed back 
in her element after years of apparent decline. Both Merkel and Spahn, even in early-
March were ruling out border closures, EU-wide travel restrictions or curtailing of civil 
 
68 S. Stephen, ‘Inside Germany’s Covid-19 testing masterclass’ Prospect Magazine. 1 May 2020. 
Available online: https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/germany-covid-19-masterclass-
testing-tracing-uk [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
69 F. Gortana,; M. Klack,; A. Schröter,; J. Stahnke,; S. Stockrahm,; J. Tröger, ‘Wie das Coronavirus 
nach Deutschland kam’ (‘How the coronavirus came to Germany’) Die Zeit. 11 March 2020. Available 
online: https://www.zeit.de/wissen/gesundheit/2020-03/coronavirus-ausbreitung-zeitverlauf-
landkreise-staedte-karte [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
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liberties.70 Nevertheless, the federal government had to concede that something more 
intrusive was demanded by the German public by mid-March.71 
Public gatherings of ever smaller numbers were banned and social distancing 
measures encouraged in early-March.72 A partial lockdown at the federal level came 
into force on March 13, including school closures, and this was strengthened on March 
22.73 Bavaria was first to enact stricter lockdown measures during that week, followed 
by a set of restrictions coordinated between Merkel and the state premiers. The exact 
conditions, however, were decided and imposed at the state level. 
The number of Covid-19 cases soared in March and April, surpassing every 
European country apart from Italy and Spain. Germany recorded its 100th death on 
March 24, passing 100,000 cases on April 8 and by the end of May had recorded 
181,000 cases and 8,500 fatalities. The scientific response was led by the Robert Koch 
Institute (RKI), a government agency. Its head, Lothar Wieler, was ever present on 
German media during March and April, providing sober analysis of the situation.74 The 
RKI has been responsible for collating Germany’s data on the pandemic. It soon 
became clear, however, that Germany, despite the high number of recorded cases, 
was experiencing relatively lower numbers of fatalities compared to other countries.75 
 
Merkel Grips Crisis 
Angela Merkel initially came in for criticism for a sluggish response in Berlin but 
having gripped the situation in mid-March her approval ratings soared.76 State 
premiers received plaudits for their handling of the lockdown, most notably the CSU’s 
Markus Söder in Bavaria who is even being talked about as a possible CDU/CSU 
candidate for chancellor at the 2021 federal elections. As elsewhere, the crisis has 
caused a spike in voter support for the governing party.77 In Germany’s case the CDU 
has surged to almost 40% in opinion polls (translating to a 20-point lead), from around 
 
70 Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany rules out EU-wide coronavirus travel curbs’ Deutsche Welle. 6 March 
2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-rules-out-eu-wide-coronavirus-travel-curbs/a-
52661149 [Accessed 25/5/2020]. 
71 BBC, ‘Coronavirus: Up to 70% of Germany could become infected – Merkel’ BBC. 11 March 2020. 
Available online: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-51835856 [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
72 J. Posaner.; J. Mischke, ‘German minister calls for ban on events with over 1,000 people as 
coronavirus cases rise’ Politico. 8 March 2020. Available online: 
https://www.politico.eu/article/german-minister-calls-for-ban-on-events-with-over-1000-people-as-
coronavirus-cases-rise/ [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
73 Deutsche Welle, ‘What are Germany's new coronavirus social distancing rules?’ Deutsche Welle. 
22 March 2020. Available online:  https://www.dw.com/en/what-are-germanys-new-coronavirus-
social-distancing-rules/a-52881742 [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
74 Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany rules out EU-wide coronavirus travel curbs’ Deutsche Welle. 6 March 
2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-rules-out-eu-wide-coronavirus-travel-curbs/a-
52661149 [Accessed 1/6/2020].; S. Stalinski, ‘Lothar Wieler im Porträt: Plötzlich im Rampenlicht’ 
(Profile of Lothar Wieler: Suddenly in the Spotlight’) Tagesshau. 8 April 2020. Available online: 
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/portrait-wieler-101.html [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
75 By the end of May it had recorded 8,500 deaths from the disease, 10 per 100,000 inhabitants, 
compared to Netherlands with 34, France with 43, Italy with 55, and the UK with 58, per 100,000 
inhabitants, respectively. 
76 M. Bartsch,; A. Bruhns,; J. Dahlkamp,; M. Fröhlingsdorf,; H. Gude,; D. Hipp,; J. Jüttner,; V. Medick,; 
L. Rosenfelder,; J. Schaible,; C. Schmergal,; A. Siemens,; L. Stern,; S. Winter, ‘Inside Germany's 
Piecemeal Response to Corona’ Der Spiegel. 13 March 2020. Available online: 
https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-germany-s-piecemeal-response-to-corona-a-
f376b3f9-625f-4a6a-8e7d-04bd48be20b2 [Accessed 01/06/2020]. 
77 K. Scholz, ‘Germans rally behind Merkel government's coronavirus response’ Deutsche Welle. 8 
May 2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/germans-rally-behind-merkel-governments-
coronavirus-response/a-53366507 [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
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27% in January, coming at the expense of the opposition parties. Of these, the Free 
Democrats (FDP) have been particularly critical of the government response, falling to 
barely 5% in the polls for their troubles. The SPD, however, has remained around 15% 
despite its role as coalition partner. The Greens, in particular, have lost ground, having 
increased in popularity since the last federal election (overtaking the CDU in some 
polls in 2019) while the far right AfD faded from view until it became involved in anti-
coronavirus lockdown demonstrations, convened by a motley assortment of 
libertarians, far right populists and conspiracy theorists, in May.78 In general, however, 
support for the lockdown has remained strong and adherence to the rules high.79 
 
Partial Lockdown 
The federal lockdown guidance was less severe than many countries. All 
schools were closed and many businesses and factories were shut, but this was by 
no means a complete shutdown. There were no limits on how many times people could 
leave their homes and although social distancing was in place, monitored by local 
police, Germany’s measures can only be described as ‘partial lockdown’ and have 
been less severe than other European countries.80 Many of the measures to enter 
shops and supermarkets, for instance, were decided at local or business level. 
From April 20 small shops were allowed to open with social distancing guidance 
still in place. The lockdown was officially relaxed after eight weeks. Kindergartens and 
schools were also gradually reopened. From May 6 the federal government in Berlin 
essentially left all lockdown decisions to the states, who had received a public 
reprimand from Angela Merkel shortly beforehand for seeking to move too quickly.81 
The RKI was also initially sceptical about the pace of easing but has since been more 
supportive, and confident that Germany has the pandemic under control.82 Crucially, 
an agreement was made between federal and state governments that lockdown 
measures would be introduced if the number of cases in a particular district exceed 50 
per 100,000 inhabitants within a seven-day period.83 So far this limit has been reached 
only a handful of times and the respective numbers subsequently reduced below the 
50 threshold. There was further easing in May. Larger shops, restaurants and bars all 
reopened with social distancing in place and face masks encouraged. National media 
 
78  J. Kellgren,; C. Crowther, ‘Protesters take to the streets of Berlin over government's lockdown 
response’ Euronews. 25 May 2020. Available online: 
https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/25/protesters-take-to-the-streets-of-berlin-over-government-s-
lockdown-response [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
79 Deutsche Welle ‘Coronavirus latest: Angela Merkel says Germany has 'passed' COVID-19 test so 
far’ Deutsche Welle. 3 May 2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-latest-angela-
merkel-says-germany-has-passed-covid-19-test-so-far/a-53625312 [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
80 C. Hirsch, ‘Europe’s coronavirus lockdown measures compared’, Politico. 3 March 2020. Available 
online: https://www.politico.eu/article/europes-coronavirus-lockdown-measures-compared/ [Accessed 
1/6/2020]. 
81 J. Mischke, ‘Germany eases some lockdown measures, puts federal states in charge’ Politico. 6 
May 2020. Available online: https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-germany-eases-some-
coronavirus-covid19-lockdown-measures-puts-federal-states-in-charge/ [Accessed 1/6/2020].; J. 
Henley,; P. Oltermann,; J. Rankin, ‘Merkel issues warning over coronavirus lockdown exit’, The 
Guardian. 23 April 2020. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/23/german-
states-lifting-lockdowns-too-quickly-warns-merkel-coronavirus [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
82 Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany warns against easing coronavirus restrictions despite progress’ 
Deutsche Welle. 3 April 2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-warns-against-
easing-coronavirus-restrictions-despite-progress/a-53007861 [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
83 D. Schaefer, ‘Germany’s New Coronavirus Cases Rise the Most in a Week’ Bloomberg. 8 May 
2020. Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-08/germany-s-new-
coronavirus-cases-rise-the-most-in-a-week [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
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subsequently focused on the districts that have seen new clusters and required further 
lockdowns, most notably after more than 1,500 workers at the Tönnies meat-packing 
factory in Gütersloh in North Rhine Westphalia became infected in June.84 
Nevertheless, by the end of May the country’s economy was beginning to restart and 
social life settling into a ‘new normal’. 
 
Economic Crisis Measures 
The economic situation started to look very worrying soon after lockdown was 
introduced. The Kurzarbeit furlough scheme, established during the 2008-2009 
financial crisis, was reintroduced and extensive federal and state-level economic 
support injected to help ailing businesses.85 As a result, it was clear that Germany 
would need to scrap its ‘black zero’ rule and run a serious budget deficit. Fortunately 
for the federal finance ministry, due to its decade of fiscal prudence the country is in 
much better shape than its peers to fund economic support measures without tipping 
the public finances into critical levels of debt.86 Government spending is likely to be 
significant as the key pillars of Germany’s economy, manufacturing and exports, will 
see a collapse in output and demand over the course of 2020.  
5. Discussion 
The international press has praised Germany’s response to the pandemic, often 
using it as a counterpoint to the failings in other countries. The real picture is more 
mixed, despite overall competent handling of the crisis. The German media have 
identified points of criticism, particularly in the early phase of the crisis.87 Certainly 
Germany appears to have benefitted, in comparison with a number of other countries, 
from the rather more sober and technocratic nature of its leaders. 
 
Competence and Organisation 
It should be remembered that Chancellor Angela Merkel has 15 years’ 
experience as leader and has weathered numerous other storms.88 Merkel’s 
unflappable style has come into its own during the current crisis, some commentators 
juxtaposing her crisis management with her less inspiring record in normal times.89 
 
84 Deutsche Welle ‘Germany: Gütersloh slaughterhouse infections spread to community’ Deutsche 
Welle. 28 June 2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-g%C3%BCtersloh-
slaughterhouse-infections-spread-to-community/a-53971931 [Accessed 1/7/2020]. 
85 T. Escritt, ‘Coronavirus: Germany promises support to companies, urges public to stay home’ 
Reuters. 8 March 2020. Available online: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-
germany-spahn/coronavirus-germany-promises-support-to-companies-urges-public-to-stay-home-
idUSKBN20V0PK [Accessed 1/6/2020].; Deutsche Welle, ‘Germany: Record number of workers on 
reduced hours’ Deutsche Welle. 30 April 2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-
record-number-of-workers-on-reduced-hours/a-53289958 [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
86 Germany’s debt-to-GDP ratio was 61.9% in 2018, relatively low for other developed economies 
while the country registered a budget surplus of EUR 13.5 billion, or 1.4% of GDP, in 2019. Currently 
this is predicted to become a deficit of 5.5% in 2020. 
87 E. Schumacher, ‘Germany’s coronavirus response: Separating fact from fiction’ Deutsche Welle. 7 
April 2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/germanys-coronavirus-response-separating-fact-
from-fiction/a-53053822 [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
88 The 2008-09 global financial crisis, several eurozone debt crises and the 2015 refugee crisis to 
name the most high-profile. 
89 D. Kurbjuweit, ‘Die Merkel-Matrix’ (‘The Merkel Matrix’) Der Spiegel. 17 April 2020. Available online: 
https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/angela-merkel-im-krisenmodus-die-merkel-matrix-a-
00000000-0002-0001-0000-000170518560 [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
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Her extended explanation of the ‘R’ rate on April 16, for instance, was a triumph of 
political communication and a demonstration of the Merkel style par excellence.90 The 
coalition government is full of competent politicians who rarely set pulses racing. One 
of these, Jens Spahn, reflected on Germany’s ‘success’ during the coronavirus crisis 
by attributing the country’s effective response to the capacity and quality of its health-
care system, that Germany wasn’t the first country to be hit by the pandemic and the 
large number of labs available to carry out testing.91 Testing, in particular, seems to 
be the crucial component in Germany’s efforts to keep Covid-19 fatalities to a relatively 
low figure. In May, the RKI stated that over 300,000 tests had been performed per 
week since mid-March.92 
 
 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel 
 
Germany’s health care system has proved robust in coping with the pandemic. 
In addition, the country already had large numbers of ventilators before the crisis.93 
Others have pointed to Germany’s ‘luck’ during the crisis; as well as not being one of 
the first to experience the full impact of Covid-19, the demographic of early cases was, 
on average, younger.94 Allied to this has been the informational role of the RKI, which 
has produced detailed daily data, including new cases in each of Germany’s 401 
administrative districts. These figures have been crucial in easing the lockdown. The 
institute also monitored how many of the cases recovered, showing the progression 
of the disease across the country as a whole. A combination of these factors—high 
 
90 N. Kresge, ‘Merkel’s Covid-19 Math Resonates Thanks to Simple Explanation’ Bloomberg. 16 April 
2020. Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-04-16/merkel-s-covid-19-
math-goes-viral-thanks-to-simple-explanation [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
91 J. Spahn, ‘How Germany contained the coronavirus’ World Economic Forum. 23 May 2020. 
Available online: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/05/how-germany-contained-the-coronavirus/ 
[Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
92 A. Becker, ‘Coronavirus: Rush to develop rapid tests’ Deutsche Welle. 28 March 2020. Available 
online: https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-rush-to-develop-rapid-tests/a-52945588 [Accessed 
1/6/2020]. 
93 J. Bittner, ‘Germany Has More Than Enough Ventilators. It Should Share Them’ New York Times. 
17 March 2020. Available online: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/17/opinion/coronavirus-europe-
germany.html [Accessed 1/6/2020]. 
94 N. Kresge,; T. Loh, ‘Coronavirus Less Deadly in Germany Because of Youthful Patients’ 
Bloomberg. 24 March 2020. Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-03-
24/coronavirus-less-deadly-in-germany-because-of-youthful-patients [Accessed 01/06/2020]. 
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levels of testing, up to date information and some good fortune—have all contributed 
to Germany’s relatively low fatality rate. 
 
Robust Institutions 
Structurally Germany appears to have benefitted from its devolved governance 
arrangements. Initially there was some debate over whether the country’s federal 
system would be a help or a hindrance.95 Nevertheless, that states can make 
significant decisions without the approval of Berlin appears to have taken the pressure 
off central government and allowed for more decisive action at the local level. With 
several months of the crisis now behind us, federalism seems to be one of Germany’s 
key strengths in its approach to the pandemic.96 The country’s past has also played a 
part so far, as seen in the authorities’ reluctance to draw too much power to the centre 
or to initiate an overly draconian lockdown. With the crisis far from over only time will 
tell how Germany emerges from the Covid-19 pandemic but for now, its institutions 
have performed relatively well in keeping the worst of the virus’s impacts at bay. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Germany’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic can be considered relatively 
successful, particularly when compared with other European countries. Following 
weeks of apparent uncertainty in February and March, the country moved seamlessly 
into crisis mode, accelerating the testing it had developed since January, initiated 
lockdown measures coordinated between federal and state leaders and achieved 
wide-spread public consent at every stage. Germany’s structural strengths have 
played a major part in weathering the coronavirus storm: a federal system allowing for 
flexible local responses, a sophisticated industrial and pharma base, high levels of 
trust between the public and the authorities, and experienced technocratic leaders. On 
the flip side, Germany’s economy—reliant on exports, global trade and supply 
chains—is likely to be severely impacted by the worldwide lockdowns. The next phase 








95 Bartsch et al, ‘Inside Germany's Piecemeal Response to Corona’.; P. Oltermann, ‘Germany's 
devolved logic is helping it win the coronavirus race’ The Guardian. 5 April 2020. Available online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/05/germanys-devolved-logic-is-helping-it-win-the-
coronavirus-race [Accessed 01/06/2020].; O. Pieper, ‘Coronavirus: Is Germany doing enough to slow 
the outbreak?’ Deutsche Welle. 14 March 2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/coronavirus-
is-germany-doing-enough-to-slow-the-outbreak/a-52770782 [Accessed 01/06/2020]. 
96 Oltermann, ‘Germany's devolved logic’. 
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Chapter 3: Romania, Associate Professor Radu Cinpoes 
1. Key Facts 
Key Fact Data 
GDP (prior to the pandemic) ROM 1,059 billion overall (US$12.878 per 
capita), 2019 
Money spent on health-care (prior to the 
pandemic) 
US$14.5 billion, 2019 (5% of GDP) 
Population (prior to the pandemic) 19,405,000 in 2019 
Life expectancy (prior to the pandemic) 75.31 in 2017 
Date of first recorded case February 26 2020 
Date of first recorded death March 22 2020 
Date of 100th recorded death April 4 2020 
Date lockdown entered Full closure of schools and distancing 
measures for food shops on March 9, 
universities closed and further restrictions 
on outdoor events on March 10, state of 
emergency declared on March 16 for 30 
days, later extended for another 30 days. 
Number of confirmed cases (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
26,582 (138.18 per 100,000) 
Number of confirmed deaths (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
1,612 (8.28 per 100,000) 
When/if lockdown measures were 
significantly eased 
State of emergency replaced by state of alert 
on May 15 2020, further ease of restrictions 
on June 1, but the state of alert is maintained 
until July 15 2020. 
2. Executive Summary 
• As the Covid-19 pandemic spread globally, Romania stood out in Central and 
Eastern Europe with the largest comparative number of deaths and the largest 
number of infections per million people 
• The Covid-19 virus reached Romania at a time of political instability, with a PNL 
minority government having been toppled by a vote of no confidence 
• A virtually identical minority cabinet was sworn in under special conditions, to 
deal with the crisis 
• The Government policy response was decisive with early escalation to a state 
of emergency and total lockdown, and a militarised approach in place 
• Policy implementation was marred by clientelism, negligence, incompetence, 
and hypocrisy by authorities, a weak and underfunded health system and 
localised pressures from the return of large numbers of Romanians working 
abroad in critically affected areas 
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3. Country Intro 
Romania is a semi-presidential representative democracy, with the President 
(currently Klaus Werner Iohannis) as Head of State and the Prime Minister (currently 
Ludovic Orban) as the Head of Government. The legislature is bi-cameral, with 
members of the Chamber of Deputies and of the Senate elected on a four-year term 
using a mixed member proportional representation system. The president is elected 
through a two-round system and since 2004, the term has been extended to five years 
(a change from the post-1989 four-year system), which led to the de-coupling of 
parliamentary and presidential elections.97 The country was one of the late joiners of 
the European Union, acceding (alongside Bulgaria) in 2007. 
According to the Romanian National Institute for Statistics (INS), on January 1 
2019, the resident population was 19,405,000. It is difficult to estimate the total 
population, given that the INS figures refer to Romanian, foreign, and stateless people 
that normally reside for more than twelve months. Furthermore, government sources 
estimated that in 2019 there were approximately 9.7 million Romanians living abroad. 
The country also boasts a shameful ‘accolade’: 17 per cent (3.4 million) of the 
population left the country since it joined the EU – the largest exodus in peace time 
Europe. Only war-torn Syria topped this number over the same period of time.98 The 
main destination country is Italy, and nearly half of 1.2 million Romanians there reside 
in the Northern Italy regions affected by the Covid-19 pandemic (Lombardy, Piedmont, 
Emilia Romagna and Veneto). Also pertinent to the scope of this report, Romania has 
a deficient health system, ranked at the bottom of the EU table, with only Albania 
occupying a worse position in Europe.99 
Key Dates 
January 29 2020: The first significant action taken by the Romanian authorities with 
regards to the Covid-19 threat follows the January 29 2020 meeting of the Technic-
scientific group concerning the managing of highly contagious diseases across the 
territory of Romania. Joint representatives of the Ministries of Internal Affairs, Health 
and National Defence take decisions on the emergency acquisition of PPE and other 
relevant medical equipment, on the framework for constituting and managing 
emergency equipment stocks and for the allocation of emergency budgets for the 
relocation of Romanian citizens abroad affected by the developing health crisis. 
February 5: The first National Liberal Party (PNL) minority cabinet led by Ludovic 
Orban is brought down by a no-confidence vote. The cabinet remains in place until the 
new one is sworn in. 
 
97 Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, Romania (2020). Available online: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ro.html [Accessed 30/06/2020]. 
98 Ambasada României în Republica, Italiană Harta comunităţii româneşti din Italia (2020). Available 
online: https://roma.mae.ro/node/290 [Accessed 3/06/2020]; Institutul Naţional de Statistică, 
‘Comunicat de Presă’, No.212 (29 August 2019). Available online: 
https://insse.ro/cms/sites/default/files/com_presa/com_pdf/poprez_ian2019r.pdf [Accessed 
3/06/2020]; C. Turp-Balasz, ‘New Statistics Confirm Romania’s Demographic Catastrophe’ Emerging 
Europe. 2 March 2018. Available online: https://emerging-europe.com/news/new-statistics-confirm-
romanias-demographic-catastrophe/ [Accessed: 3/06/2020]. 
99 A. Björnberg,; A. Yung Phang, ‘Euro Health Consumer Index 2018’ Health Consumer Powerhouse. 
25 February 2019. 
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Throughout February: Quarantine is introduced for people returning from affected 
areas ahead of the first case being officially confirmed (February 1 for people returning 
from Hubei, China, and February 24 for people returning from Northern Italy) 
February 26: The first case of infection with the Covid-19 virus is officially confirmed 
March 14: The second PNL minority cabinet led by Ludovic Orban is sworn in under 
special conditions 
March 16: A state of emergency is introduced by President Klaus Iohannis 
March 18 Onwards: Authorities start making widespread use of military ordinances 
to pass decisions concerning the pandemic (twelve such ordinances are passed 
between March and May) 
March 30: The whole town of Suceava (an infection hotspot) and some neighbouring 
villages are placed under full quarantine through a military ordinance, followed by 
Țăndărei town on April 4 
May 15: The state of emergency is replaced with a state of alert 
4. Political Responses 
The Romanian Government has come under severe internal criticism for its 
response to the Covid-19 pandemic. This stems from the fact that the country appears 
as an outlier compared to other EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE) in regard to the spread and impact of the virus. As of June 30 2020, Romania 
has the highest number of Covid-19 related deaths (1612) as well as the highest 
mortality rate per one hundred thousand people (8.28) out of all eleven EU members 
in CEE.100 
The political context in Romania helps explain these poor comparative 
statistics, with a high level of volatility, polarisation and fierceness in public debates 
concerning the response to the pandemic. Following the May 2019 incarceration of 
Liviu Dragnea101  for corruption, the third PSD cabinet in as many years collapsed in 
October 2019, after a vote of non-confidence. Since then, the National Liberal Party 
(PNL) has been governing in minority on a confidence-and-supply basis. Prime 
Minister Ludovic Orban (PNL leader) has already seen the fall of his first, interim, 
cabinet that lasted for only three months (November 2019 to March 2020). His current 
cabinet was sworn in on March 14 under special conditions, in the context of the 
spread of the Covid-19 virus throughout the country.102  The first case of infection with 
the virus had officially been confirmed on February 26, suggesting that the cabinet 
was likely voted in by the parliament despite being virtually identical to the previous 
 
100 John Hopkins University, Mortality Analyses. [Accessed: 1/7/2020]. The EU members in CEE 
included in the comparison are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Poland is the only country in the group that has 
a higher number of confirmed cases (34,393) but a lower number and rate of deaths (1477 and 3.89 
respectively). 
101 Liviu Dragnea is the former leader of the Social Democrat Party (PSD) and the party éminence 
grise responsible for the replacement of two of his own prime-ministers and cabinets, while 
commanding a parliamentary majority in alliance with minor partner Alliance of Liberals and 
Democrats (ALDE). 
102 The Cabinet was voted and sworn in behind closed doors, in social distancing conditions, with one 
member having been confirmed Covid-19 positive and several other ministers in quarantine. 
See, for instance: 
D.G. ‘Guvernul Orban 2 a primit votul de învestire al Parlamentului / Miniștrii au depus jurământul în 
fața președintelui, cu ușile închise’ Hotnews. 14 March 2020. Available online: 
https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-23724330-breaking-news-guvernul-orban-2-primit-votul-investire-
parlamentului.htm [Accessed: 3/06/2020]. 
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one, due to the emergency created by the spread of the virus. With local elections 
meant to take place in June and parliamentary elections by the end of this year,103 it 
seems that, instead of seeking to form a majority government themselves (as the 
largest group in the Parliament), the PSD was happy to let the PNL deal with the 
developing pandemic crisis. This has enabled the PSD to criticise the government for 
its response to it in the hope that it could bank on any policy failures, while emphasizing 
their own achievements at local level in the fight against the spread of the virus.104 
5. Policy Responses 
Romanian authorities responded early to the pandemic and escalated the level 
of restrictions as information emerged internationally. On January 29 2020, the 
Department for Emergency Situations (DES) issued a decision concerning the urgent 
acquisition of PPE equipment, ventilators, and other medical equipment – a day before 
the WHO declared the Covid-19 outbreak a public health emergency of international 
concern – and on February 1 it introduced a fourteen day quarantine for people arriving 
from China. 
 
Measures Ramped up Early 
Measures were ramped up through a series of further decisions by the DES in 
the early stages: quarantine or self-isolation for people arriving from the Lombardy and 
Veneto regions (February 24) three days after the lockdown introduced by the Italian 
authorities there, closure of schools with confirmed cases and cancellation of events 
with more than 1,000 participants (March 6), suspension of flights to and from affected 
areas such as Italy, China, Iran and South Korea (March 7), full closure of schools, 
and disinfection and distancing measures imposed on food shops and restaurants 
(March 9) and restrictions on indoor events over 100 people and closure of universities 
(March 10).105 
 
A State of Emergency 
On March 16, five days after the WHO declared the spread of the virus a 
pandemic, President Klaus Iohannis instituted a thirty-day state of emergency, which 
was subsequently extended for another month. At that time, Romania only registered 
around 140 cases and no confirmed deaths (the first coronavirus death was registered 
 
103 At the time of writing, the Orban government proposed the end of September for the local ones 
and early-December for parliamentary ones, but this is a decision that according to a recent ruling by 
the Romanian Constitutional Court belongs to the Parliament. 
104 See, for instance: 
E. Apostu, ‘PSD: România rămâne oarbă în lupta cu COVID-19. Guvern incapabil’ De Ce News. 15 
April 2020. Available online: https://www.dcnews.ro/psd-romania-ramane-oarba-in-lupta-cu-covid-19-
guvern-incapabil_742812.html [Accessed 3/06/2020]; I. Ionescu, ‘PSD: Ascunderea situaţiei reale de 
către Guvern reprezintă un act incalificabil şi cu urmări grave asupra sănătăţii tuturor!’ PS News. 31 
March 2020. Available online: https://psnews.ro/psd-ascunderea-situatiei-reale-de-catre-guvern-
reprezinta-un-act-incalificabil-si-cu-urmari-grave-asupra-sanatatii-tuturor-371621/ [Accessed 
3/06/2020].; RomaniaTV.net ‘Marcel Ciolacu, despre cum PSD gestionează pandemia de 
coronavirus. "Nu am mai stat după acest Guvern, depăşit total de situaţie!"’ RomaniaTV.net. 21 April 
2020. Available online: https://www.romaniatv.net/marcel-ciolacu-despre-cum-psd-gestioneaza-
pandemia-de-coronavirus-nu-am-mai-stat-dupa-acest-guvern-depasit-total-de-situatie_518278.html 
[Accessed 3/06/2020]. 
105 A full list (including the text) of these official documents is publicly available on the Romanian 
Government website, see: Guvernul României, Măsuri (2020). Available online: 
https://gov.ro/ro/masuri [Accessed: 3/06/2020]. 
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on March 22). The presidential decree formally restricted the right to free movement, 
to family and private life, inviolability of domicile, the right to education, to freedom of 
assembly and to private property, the right to strike and economic freedom. Several 
government emergency ordinances followed, detailing fiscal and social protection 
measures that included additional funds for the healthcare system, delaying budgetary 
obligations of self-employed people and companies, partial coverage of wages to 
parents staying at home for childcare needs caused by school closures, (an initial, one 
month) payment to self-employed people and employees at risk of losing their jobs, 
deferral of payments of utility services for SMEs, as well as a number of loan 
guarantees and subsidies aimed at SMEs. 
 
 
Romanian President Klaus Iohannis 
 
Militarised Response 
In an escalating manner, military ordinances replaced the emergency ones, 
leading on March 24 to a total lockdown, with self-declaration forms required to leave 
the house, and hefty fines for non-compliance.106 The militarised response to the crisis 
became even more visible, when Suceava – a midsize town in Northern Romania – 
became a Covid-19 hotbed accounting by the end of March for over a quarter of the 
total number of cases in Romania. These were clustered around the local hospital, 
where around 181 medical workers including some 40 doctors got infected due to a 
lack of protective equipment and poor management by the hospital bosses and the 
local health administration. In order to tackle the crisis, the management was sacked, 
the military was put in charge of the hospital, and the town and some neighbouring 
areas were placed under quarantine.107 A full quarantine was also instituted in 
 
106 Guvernul României, Măsuri. 
107 See Holroyd, ‘The region with twice as many coronavirus cases as anywhere else in Romania’ 
Euronews. 10 April 2020. Available online: https://www.euronews.com/2020/04/10/the-region-with-
twice-as-many-coronavirus-cases-as-anywhere-else-in-romania [Accessed: 3/06/2020].; A. Mutler, 
‘Romania's ‘‘Lombardy’’: How A Small Romanian Region Got So Badly Infected By The Coronavirus’ 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 31 March 2020. Available online: https://www.rferl.org/a/romania-s-
lombardy-how-a-small-romanian-region-got-so-badly-infected-by-the-coronavirus/30520630.html 
[Accessed: 3/06/2020]. 
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Țăndărei – a small South-Eastern town with a large number of people that had 
returned from abroad. Notably, while the ordinances placed suspension on all flights 
to and from a large number of countries, charter flights for seasonal workers leaving 
Romania were exempted from the restrictions.108 This led to harsh criticism of the 
government for allowing for restrictions to be breached, as thousands of people 
travelled from various parts of the country (including Suceava) in packed buses to Cluj 
and Iași airports, in order to fly to Germany for seasonal agricultural work. A blame 
game ensued, with Prime Minister Ludovic Orban calling for an inquiry and the 
transport minister and local authorities laying the blame at the door of the employment 





On May 15, the state of emergency was replaced by a state of alert, and 
restrictions were gradually lifted. From June 1 a further wave of easing took place, 
allowing for unrestricted non-local travel, non-contact sport competitions, outdoor 
events with up to 500 participants, the opening of beaches and of outdoor restaurants 
and bars under social distancing conditions. Although various other measures were 
relaxed (some flight routes were re-opened, churches were opened for mass but with 
restricted numbers), in mid-June, the state of alert was extended for another thirty 
days. With the number of infections growing again, the government has already hinted 
that it is prepared to re-introduce the state of emergency if the situation requires it. 
6. Discussion 
By and large, in terms of policy, the Romanian government responded early to 
the escalating crisis, and aligned its measures to the advice coming from the WHO. 
 
108 Guvernul României, Măsuri. 
109 Further criticism followed, as information emerged of alleged exploitative conditions and flaunting 
of any distancing regulations that workers faced in Germany. Despite all this, further flights with 
seasonal workers were allowed to Germany, Austria, the UK, in what was labelled by critics an 
illustration of double standards in the EU. 
See, for instance: 
C. Gherasim, ‘Romanians Flood Airports Despite Virus Restrictions’ EU Observer. 15 April 2020. 
Available online: https://euobserver.com/coronavirus/148055 [Accessed 3/06/2020]. C. Rogozanu,; D. 
Gabor, ‘Are Western Europe’s Food Supplies Worth More Than East European Workers’ Health?’ 
The Guardian. 16 April 2020. Available online: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2020/apr/16/western-europe-food-east-european-
workers-coronavirus [Accessed: 3/06/2020]). 
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The measures were vigorous (with relatively early restrictions and lockdown, strongly 
controlled movement of people and full local quarantines in extreme cases). It is 
arguable that without such measures, the spread of the virus would have been much 
more severe. 
  
A Weak Health System burdened by Clientelism and Incompetence 
Despite such measures, Romania still saw a high number of infections. This is 
explained by a number of factors. Firstly, due to its extremely poor state, the health 
system was unable to cope with the implementation of the measures. In heavily 
affected areas, hospitals and health workers were overwhelmed by the sheer pressure 
and the lack of resources (staff, PPE and other medical equipment). A tradition of a 
politicised and clientelist approach to leadership appointments led to negligence and 
incompetence by hospital managers and local authorities,110 which made a bad 
situation much worse. This happened in the context of heightened pressures 
generated by the return of a large number of Romanian citizens working abroad, often 
from affected areas (such as Northern Italy). This led to chaotic scenes at the borders, 
with poor management of flow and lack of distancing measures. Early decisions 
concerning the acquisition of PPE and medical equipment were marred by further 
accusations of clientelism and corruption. The National Anticorruption Department 
(DNA) is so far investigating thirty-three criminal cases concerning public acquisition 
of equipment during the pandemic.111 
 
Authoritarian Reflexes 
The approach to dealing with the pandemic exposes an embedded 
authoritarian ‘reflex’ by the Romanian state, which becomes even more visible in crisis 
situations. Bypassing parliamentary scrutiny and governing through emergency 
ordinances has long been a feature of successive cabinets (irrespective of political 
colour). While, these could be somewhat justified in a state of emergency, the over-
militarised (through military ordinance, military take-over of some hospitals, etc.) 
approach is more problematic, as it provides an anti-democratic ‘shortcut’ through 
political failure. In this vein, the hard-line approach by the police to enforcing the 
lockdown through issuing fines has been extremely punitive, instead of opting for 
compliance through winning public trust.112 By contrast, there was a sense of 
hypocrisy from the authorities in deliberately exempting chartered flights for sessional 
workers from the travel cancellations (as the military ordinances show), and failing to 
take responsibility for the chaos and lockdown breaches that ensued (as well as 
 
110 Several examples of blunders and negligence were reported in the Suceava case, and have led to 
the sacking of the hospital director and manager and the launch of a criminal investigation. 
See, for instance: 
Radio Europa Liberă, ‘Managerul spitalului Suceava, demis de Gheorghe Flutur’ Radio Europa Liberă 
România. 25 March 2020. Available online: https://romania.europalibera.org/a/managerul-spitalului-
din-suceava-demis-de-gheorghe-flutur-diagnosticat-cu-covid-19/30509499.html [Accessed: 
3/06/2020]. 
111 M. Hera, ‘DNA a deschis 33 de dosare penale pentru achiziții publice în timpul pandemiei de 
coronavirus/Sunt vizate și "persoane cu funcții importante"’ HotNews. 21 May 2020. Available online: 
https://www.hotnews.ro/stiri-esential-24009603-dna-dosare-penale-achizitii-publice-pandemie-
coronavirus-unifarm.htm [Accessed: 3/06/2020]. 
112 200,000 fines totalling £69 million were issued in less than a month, during the March – April 
period. The steep fines ranged between 2000 and 10,000 lei (approx. £365 - £1840), in the context in 
which the average wage in Romanian is just under £1000. 
McGrath, S. ‘Coronavirus: Romania hands out steep lockdown fines’ BBC News. 22 April 2020. 
Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-52370421 [Accessed: 3/06/2020]. 
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creating a real threat of infections spiking again when seasonal workers return, given 
the poor working conditions and infection cases already emerging among those 
groups). While allowing seasonal workers to leave Romania, the authorities effectively 
abdicated from their responsibilities towards Romanian citizens working abroad. The 
President launched a public appeal to citizens abroad not to return home for the Easter 
holiday (without any apparent consideration for the precarious situation in which some 
found themselves, due to pandemic related job losses and lack of social welfare 
protection).113  
Finally, authoritarian tendencies led to conflict with rights groups and other state 
institutions, and the government response has not been reassuring in terms of its 
respect for the separation of powers. Human rights groups criticised the government 
approach to the state of emergency, stressing the threat to the transparency of public 
decisions, as well as to the right to information and knowledge. Some of these 
concerns were echoed by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s 
representative for press freedom.114 The Romanian Constitutional Court ruled that the 
fines imposed for lockdown breaches were unconstitutional. Later, on a different 
matter, it also ruled that the government did not have the remit to re-schedule the 
dates for the local and parliamentary elections (that task being the responsibility of the 
government), which led the Deputy Prime Minister to attack the decision as ‘madness’, 
claiming the Court was undermining the ability of the state to function.115 
7. Concluding Remarks 
All in all, the Romanian government response to the Covid-19 crisis was a case 
of ‘good intentions’ paving the ‘road to hell’ consisting of a pandemonium of 
negligence, corruption and implementation failure, in the context of a strained health 
system and a large influx of people returning from highly affected areas in Northern 
Italy. The declining rate of infections and the lifting of restrictions could bring political 
conflicts back into the open. On the other hand, given the sudden lifting of restrictions 
the risk of a second wave of infections is significant. It is likely that the opposition 
parties, and the PSD in particular, are going to be less inclined to prop the current PNL 
minority government. With elections approaching, the political battle is going to be on 
the dilemmas between public spending and austerity policies in dealing with the still 




113 A. Andrei, ‘Klaus Iohannis, mesaj pentru Diaspora: Să nu vină în acest an acasă de sărbatori’ 
România TV. 19 March 2020. Available online: https://www.romaniatv.net/klaus-iohannis-mesaj-
pentru-diaspora-sa-nu-vina-in-acest-an-acasa-de-sarbatori_513663.html [Accessed: 3/06/2020]. 
114 S. Fati, ‘Coronavirus în România. Anumite decizii ar putea să nu mai fie publicate în Monitorul 
Oficial și cum se restrâng drepturile pe furiș’ Radio Europa Liberă România. 4 April 2020. Available 
online: https://romania.europalibera.org/a/coronavirus-romania-decizii-sa-nu-mai-fie-publicate-
monitorul-oficial-pe-furis/30529005.html [Accessed: 3/06/2020]. 
115 Bonea, M, (ed.) ‘Raluca Turcan: Pentru a doua oară, în mai puțin de o lună, judecătorii CCR pun în 
pericol funcționarea statului român’ Digi 24. 3 June 2020. Available online: 
https://www.digi24.ro/stiri/actualitate/politica/raluca-turcan-pentru-a-doua-oara-in-mai-putin-de-o-luna-
judecatorii-ccr-pun-in-pericol-functionarea-statului-roman-1317405 [Accessed 3/06/2020].; A. 
Rădulescu, ‘CCR declară neconstituționale amenzile pentru încălcarea stării de urgență. Amenzile se 
pot șterge doar după o decizie a instanței’ Radio Europa Liberă România. 6 May 2020. Available 
online: https://romania.europalibera.org/a/amenzi-neconstitutionale-ccr-stergere-in-instanta-prin-
contestare/30597461.html [Accessed: 03/06/2020].  
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Chapter 4: Bulgaria, Dr Nevena Nancheva 
1.Key Facts 
Key Fact Data 
GDP per capita (prior to the pandemic) €8,678 per capita (BGN118.669 
billion/€60.7 billion overall), 2019 
Health-care spending (prior to the 
pandemic) 
5% of GDP for 2019 was spent on 
healthcare (the EU average is 9.8%). 
Bulgaria had 2,063 intensive care hospital 
beds and 1,463 assisted breathing 
machines. 
Population (prior to the pandemic) 6,951,482. 
Life expectancy (prior to the pandemic) 74.9 years. 
Date of first recorded case March 4 2020 
Date of first recorded death March 11 2020 
Date of 100th recorded death May 16 2020 
Date lockdown entered Lockdown rules in the form of National 
Emergency Situation declared from March 
13-April 13 2020, subsequently extended to 
May 13 2020.  
Number of confirmed cases (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
4,691/ 67.51 per 100,000 people 
Number of confirmed deaths (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
219 
When/if lockdown measures were 
significantly eased 
Beginning of May 2020 
2. Executive Summary 
• An early imposed stringent nation-wide lockdown, facilitated by contingent 
factors such as regular school closures during winter flu epidemics, enabled the 
containment of the virus and limited deaths 
• The response was muscular, dressed in military uniforms, but was gradually 
eased as the pandemic was seen to have peaked, and public fatigue escalated 
• Questions were raised of the transparency and accountability of the decision-
making during the pandemic but, within a general climate of political mistrust, 
those did not cause public protest 
3. Country Intro 
Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic and a unitary state. It embraced democracy 
and a market economy after the collapse of communism in 1989, and has undergone 
significant transformation since then to gradually become an upper-middle-income 
country.116 Official language is Bulgarian. Official religion is Orthodox Christianity. The 
 
116 World Bank, Databank Microdata, Upper Middle Income (2020). Available online: 
https://data.worldbank.org/income-level/upper-middle-income [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
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major ethnic minorities are Turkish (10%) and Romani (3%). Life expectancy at birth 
is 74 years. 
The head of state is the President, currently Rumen Radev elected in 2017, 
who has representative and some veto powers (Radev exercised these during the 
handling of the pandemic). The Prime Minister holds the executive power.117 The 
current Prime Minister, elected after a snap election in 2017, is Boyko Borisov. He first 
held this office in 2009 as leader of the new conservative party GERB. The current 
government is formed by a collation between Borisov’s party GERB and the United 
Patriots, a recently formed nationalist alliance. 
Since 2007 Bulgaria has been an EU member state and held the Presidency of 
the Council of the EU in the first half of 2018. Currently, Bulgaria is not a Schengen 
area or a Euro zone member, but has pledged to meet the conditions to become one.  
According to its own official statistics, Bulgaria’s population in 2019 was 6,951,482, 
the majority of which live in urban areas (5,125,407 people).118 The state is divided in 
28 provinces around regional town centres (including the capital Sofia) and the 
regional governors are appointed by the government. 
Bulgaria’s economy is centred around industry, trade, and public services. It 
exports and imports primarily within the EU. Its major exports outside the EU go to 
Turkey and China, and major imports come from Russia and Turkey. 
Key Dates: 
February 24 2020: National Security Council emergency sitting to discuss responses 
to the Covid-19 pandemic 
March 4: First recorded case in Bulgaria 
March 11: First recorded death 
March 12: Council of Ministers evening sitting decides on enforcing a state of 
emergency. 
March 13: Emergency situation declaring a national lockdown for a month and Bill on 
the relevant measures introduced into Parliament 
March 23: Emergency Law enacted 
April 3: Emergency situation continued for another month until May 13 
May 1: Lockdown measures begin to lift 
May 13: Emergency situation lockdown ends and epidemiological monitoring enacted 
4. Political Responses: 
In the early onslaught of the Covid-19 pandemic in Bulgaria, the Prime Minister 
Borisov called his cabinet for an emergency sitting of the National Security Council on 
February 24. Convinced that ‘people respond well to discipline’,119 he set up a 
dedicated muscular new body120 to coordinate the response: the National Operative 
 
117 Bulgarian Agency for Investments, Government and Governance Profile (2012). Available online: 
https://www.investbg.government.bg/bg/pages/government-and-administration-113.html [Accessed 
29/06/2020]. 
118 National Statistical Institute Bulgaria, Population Statistics 2019. 
119 Investor.BG, Economics and Politics Section (24 Feb 2020). Available online: 
https://www.investor.bg/ikonomika-i-politika/332/a/bylgariia-syzdava-nacionalen-krizizen-centyr-kym-vma-
zaradi-koronavirusa-299229/ [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
120 As per Order No R-37/26th Feb 2020 of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Bulgaria Boyko 
Borisov. 
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Headquarters (HQ). Representing the Military Medical Academy, the Ministry of 
Interior, Border Police, the Health Inspectorate, and the Ministry of Health, HQ was 
led by GenMaj Ventsislav Mutafchiyski (a surgeon and the head of the Military Medical 
Academy). GenMaj Mutafchiyski became the uniformed face of the response and the 
counsel behind all ministerial decisions (as well as the subject of countless social 
media memes). 
At HQ advice, and after the number of known Covid-19 cases in the country 
rose from 7 to 23 in a single day, a late evening sitting of the Council of Ministers was 
called on March 12, at which Borisov called for a National Emergency Situation to be 
declared by Parliament the next day. The provision for such a step is contained in the 
Constitution (Art. 84(12)) which gives the possibility of a martial or emergency situation 
to be proposed by the President or the Council of Ministers. 
The fact that the Prime Minister, and not the President, took the lead on the 
response is characteristic of Borisov’s government. The open feud between the head 
of state and the head of government has been public since Borisov resigned from his 
second mandate as Prime Minister following the socialists-backed election of Radev 
in 2017. In the weeks and months preceding the pandemic, the two had clashed in the 
media because of revelations of eavesdropping on the President by the security 
agency of the Ministry of Interior,121 whilst in 2019 they had clashed because of the 
appointment of Ivan Geshev as Chief Prosecutor122 and as a result of public funds 
being allegedly used for party election campaigns. 
A Bill on the Measures during the Emergency Situation prepared by Borisov’s 
party was introduced to Parliament on March 13 and was fiercely debated in the days 
that followed, through 19 proposals for amendments by different formations of MPs 
(mostly led by the opposition socialists in Bulgarian Socialist Party BSP).123 In the final 
stages of the parliamentary process, a successful presidential (partial) veto sent the 
Bill back to Parliament to amend disputed prison penalties for ‘spreading false 
information’, emergency policing powers the Bill planned for the military, the use of 
mobile traffic data by the security service, and a planned freeze on retail price rises. 
Ultimately, the President prevailed in this argument,124 and the law specifying the 
amended measures was promulgated on March 23 2020. 
 
 
121 See Discussion in: 
Mediapool, ‘Borisov: I agreed with Geshev to smear everything alive that stains (video)’ Mediapool. 14 
Feb 2020. Available online: https://www.mediapool.bg/borisov-razbrah-se-s-geshev-da-se-razmazhe-
vsichko-zhivo-koeto-tsapa-video-news303511.html [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
122 The role of Chief Prosecutor in Bulgaria has been identified by the Venice Commission on 
Democracy through Law of the Council of Europe as problematic (in the current constitutional 
arrangement, the chief prosecutor cannot be prosecuted for crimes). 
See, for instance: 
European Commission for Democracy through Law, Opinion No 968 on Bulgaria of 2019 (Strasbourg) 
(2019) Available online: https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD(2019)031-e [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
123 Bulgarian National Radio, ‘Horizon Programme’ Bulgarian National Radio. 19 March 2020. 
Available online: https://bnr.bg/post/101243061/komisiata-po-pravni-vaprosi-obsajda [Accessed 
30/05/2020]. 
124 Radio Free Europe, ‘After veto by Radev: GERB refuses to fix prices and punish for ‘‘false 
information’’’ Radio Free Europe. 22 March 2020. Available online: 
https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/30502582.html [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 





5. Policy Responses: 
The Law on the Emergency Situation resulting from the Covid-19 pandemic 
included measures of limiting character, as well as economic and social measures.  
 
Limiting Measures 
The early limiting measures, albeit stringent, were enforced somewhat 
gradually, which ensured the slow spread of the virus. The March 13 Emergency 
Situation was preceded by partial bans on public gatherings and business closures 
under amendments in the Law on Health, as well as by a general two-weeks’ school 
closure (March 6-11) enforced by the Ministry of Health because of the regular flu 
epidemic (a standard winter practice in Bulgarian schools). 
The Emergency Situation enforced a national lockdown. Schools remained 
closed, and universities followed. All public gatherings were banned, shopping malls, 
restaurants and cafes were closed (except for take away service), and visits to open 
public spaces (including playgrounds and parks) were prohibited, except to walk a pet. 
Banks, insurance businesses, food shops and chemists remained open (people over 
60 could only shop from 6.30 to 8.30am). 
Employees were to work from home, or under stricter anti-epidemiologic 
measures at the workplace (including airing, filters, disinfectants, and instructions on 
keeping a distance). 
Domestic travel for non-essential reasons was banned and enforced through 
Ministry of Interior control points at the entry and exit of regional town centres. Only 
signed declarations from work or personal identification documents proving a 
permanent address could permit travel. 
All travel to and from the country of third-country nationals was temporarily 
banned. A temporary ban for travel of EU member state nationals from a dynamic list 
of high-risk countries, updated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was enforced. 
One difference to the lockdown enforced elsewhere in Europe was permission 
for public worship within the churches of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church (including 
during the Orthodox Easter celebrations on April 19), although the Bulgarian Patriarch 
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did issue an order for extra hygienic measures.125 Muslim mosques were also open 
until the beginning of the Muslim fast, when the Chief Mufti explicitly cancelled public 
prayer (it was to be streamed online),126 and the Ministry of Health issued a travel ban 




The economic measures the government approved featured a flagship 
programme for support of employers (reducing their costs) and employees (ensuring 
their pay), called 60/40, where the state covers 60% of employees’ pay and health 
contributions if they could not continue working.127 
The economic measures also included zero-interest credits (total budget of 
BGN 200m) for those unable to work, as well as unsecured credit for small and middle-
sized businesses of up to BGN 300,000 (total budged BGN 500m). Micro- and small 
businesses could apply for grants of BGN 3-10,000 (budget BGN 173m). A series of 
measures also allowed postponing of interest payments and fines on credits, and 
facilitated administrative services for businesses. Agricultural producers, in particular 
Bulgarian local food producers (as per Art. 16a of the Emergency Measures Law), 
were protected by a separate list of measures. 
The Ministry of Health, separately, authorised an additional payment of BGN 
1,000 for all medical personnel actively involved in the care for Covid-19 patients 
(totalling BGN 4,900,000 for April).128  
 
Social Measures 
Finally, a series of so called social measures aimed at assisting vulnerable and 
disadvantaged groups during the emergency situation, among them a one-off payment 
of BGN 375 (€192) for disadvantaged parents with children who are not protected by 
the 60/40 scheme, food packs for 41,000 retired people, another food programme 
targeting around 50,000 people in food poverty, as well as easing the general rules on 
welfare and in-work pensions. One of the criticized measures from this set is a rule on 
extending the detention of in-residence-treatment of persons with mental health 
illnesses until the end of the month when the emergency situation ended, thus 
potentially breaching their human right not to be unnecessarily detained.129  
 
125 10 March 2020. Available online: https://clubz.bg/95435-
bpc_chovek_moje_da_se_zarazi_v_cyrkvata_samo_ako_vqrata_mu_e_slaba [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
126 Club Z, ‘Politics section’ Club Z. March 2020. Available online: https://clubz.bg/95743-
myuftijstvoto_djamiite_ne_zatvarqt_no_i_obshtite_molitvi_sa_nejelatelni [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
127 The 60/40 programme was widely criticised by employer organisations through the Chamber of 
Commerce for its ineffectiveness and discriminative character (equal pay for workers who work and 
those who do not work, for instance) as per: 




40/ [Accessed 30/05/2020].; 
 Ministry of Health Bulgaria, Minister Ananiev presented detailed information on all donations received 
in connection with the COVID-19 pandemic (2020). 30 April 2020. Available online: 
http://www.mh.government.bg/bg/novini/aktualno/ministr-ananiev-predstavi-podrobna-informaciya-za-/ 
[Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
129 I. Bregov, ‘Emergency Commentary on the Emergency Law’ Ime. 25 March 2020. Available online: 
https://ime.bg/bg/articles/izvynreden-komentar-po-izvynredniya-zakon/ [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 





The spread of the pandemic in Bulgaria has so far been visibly contained, as 
per the official figures: 219 deaths, 4,691 confirmed cases, 133,605 tested.130 In fact, 
the Office for National Statistics reports higher death rate for the same period last 
year,131 which has led many public figures to speculate on the proportionality of the 
government’s response.132 
 
Rigorous Response with Gradual Relaxation 
The response to the pandemic has been evaluated overall as rigorous, with the 
exception of the decision to allow public worship. Not coincidentally, perhaps, the peak 




St. Alexander Nevsky Orthodox Cathedral in Sofia, Bulgaria 
 
 
130 Unified Information Portal on Covid-19. Available online: https://coronavirus.bg/bg/merki/socialni 
[Accessed 30/06/2020]. 




%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B8 [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
132 Among them the rector of the Sofia University and a former minister. 
D. Valchev, ‘On the Virus, the Law and Other Important Things’ Legal Barometer Commentary. 2020. 





%D0%BD%D0%B5%D1%89%D0%B0 [Accessed 30/05/2020].  
133 Radio Free Europe, ‘Peak in Bulgaria in the week after Easter, then - decline. Those infected with 
COVID-19 are 1652’ Radio Free Europe. 4 May 2020. Available online: 
https://www.svobodnaevropa.bg/a/30591290.html [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
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Nevertheless, before the end of the extended emergency situation, the most 
restrictive of the measures were being relaxed: public park walks with children under 
12 were allowed from as early as April 26, mandatory wearing of face masks was lifted 
on May 1, individual exercise and attending public parks and spaces were permitted 
from May 3, while open-space cafes were opened and travel without explicit 
authorisation allowed from May 6 2020. 
This gradual relaxation of the lockdown was visible in the change of format and 
appearance of the regular HQ briefings: the uniformed head of HQ appeared in civil 
clothes (May 2 2020). It was presented as a response to public fatigue with the 
lockdown, as well as a reasonable policy reflecting a return to normality, even though 
schools were to remain closed until the end of the academic year. However, school 
closure in Bulgaria did not elicit the same public disruption as the closure of businesses 
and gatherings, as Bulgarian parents often rely on childcare from grandparents and 
their work schedules are not always severely affected. 
 
Criticisms 
The responsive behaviour of HQ was probably also a reaction to the criticisms 
related to a lack of transparency in the legal basis for this extremely powerful decision-
making body, as well as in its modus operandi: HQ was set up on the basis of a widely 
quoted ministerial order which could not be obtained publicly and had no website or 
public presence other than the televised briefings (neither did the Medical Council at 
the Council of Ministers, also set up within the emergency measures).134 
Accusations of the overreach of power were voiced early on in the pandemic,135 
especially after the proposals to introduce martial law instead of declaring an 
emergency situation, and to enact it indefinitely, instead of with a fixed deadline,136 
which were decided against as a result of the presidential veto and opposition debates 
in Parliament. 
Some of the particularly prohibitive measures were enacted and then amended 
as a result of public pressure, such as an exorbitant fine of BGN 5,000 for violating the 
rules of the emergency situation,137 which was later lowered to BGN 300. The rules on 
face mask wearing changed continuously, causing confusion and incurring significant 
fines.138 
 
134 Council of Ministers of Republic of Bulgaria Information, By order of Prime Minister Borissov, the 
Medical Council of the Council of Ministers began work (24 March 2020). Available online: 
https://www.gov.bg/bg/prestsentar/novini/sas-zapoved-na-premiera-borisov-zapochna-rabota-
meditsinskiyat-savet-kam-ministerskiya-savet [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
135 E. Daynov, ‘Coronavirus: what happens while Bulgaria is in a state of emergency’ Deutsche Welle 








136 E. Kotseva, ‘What does a state of emergency mean?’ Banker Daily. 16 March 2020. Available 
online: https://www.banker.bg/obshtestvo-i-politika/read/kakvo-oznachava-izvunredno-polojenie 
[Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
137 Average monthly salary for 2020 is BGN 1,500 as per official data. 
138 Ikonomist Bulgaria, ‘Police have drawn up more than 14,600 acts of non-wearing masks’ Ikonomist 
Bulgaria. 30 April 2020. Available online: https://iconomist.bg/103156-
%D0%9F%D0%BE%D0%BB%D0%B8%D1%86%D0%B8%D1%8F%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%B5-
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Other measures were introduced only temporarily, such as the blanket 
quarantine enforced on two whole neighbourhoods in the capital, Fakulteta and 
Filipovci, incidentally populated exclusively by Roma Bulgarian citizens. In an official 
interview, the head of HQ GenMaj Mutafchiyski spoke of ‘a different way of life among 
the ethnic minorities,’139 which may have raised eyebrows but was generally accepted 
as a fact. 
Yet another set of measures were discussed but never adopted, such as the 
derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), floated by the 
Justice Minister and entertained during the emergency situation, but never accepted.  
Ultimately, the decision was taken not to prolong the emergency situation 
beyond May 13 2020 but to retain some of the emergency measures within the remit 
of the Health Minister as needed.  
7. Concluding Remarks: 
Bulgarian democracy has often been criticized as flawed. The response to 
Covid-19 reflects some of these flaws, even as, in terms of containing the spread of 
the pandemic, it has been widely effective. 
The national lockdown was enforced on the basis of clear legislative measures 
and for a clearly stated limited period of time. However, discussions were ongoing for 
the introduction of martial law – a much more invasive constitutional tool – and for an 
indefinite period of time, which would have given the response a much less democratic 
tint. 
Importantly, even as human rights under the ECHR were necessarily restricted, 
the government did not derogate from the Convention. Nevertheless, a proposal to do 
so came from the Justice Minister, which indicates a political will within the cabinet for 
a much less democratic response. 
Finally, some of the problematic features of Bulgarian public and social life, 
such as discriminatory practices or intolerant public narratives towards the ethnic 
minorities (mostly the sizeable Romani minority, as the Turkish minority is currently 
overall well integrated), also surfaced during the Covid-19 response. The swift blanket 





%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8 [Accessed 30/05/2020]. 
139 E. Lilov, ‘Coronavirus in Bulgaria: an exclusive interview with Gen. Mutafchiiski’ Deutsche Welle. 







140 Although the measure was also imposed on other small villages – e.g. Panicherovo in Stara 
Zagora, or the mountain ski resort of Bansko. 
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Chapter 5: Israel, Dr Ronald Ranta 
1.Key Facts 
Key Fact Data 
GDP per capita (prior to the pandemic) $41678 (nominal), 2019 est 
Money spent on health-care per capita 
(prior to the pandemic) 
$2,780 (nominal), 2019 est. 
Population (prior to the pandemic) 9.176 million, March 2020 
Life expectancy (prior to the pandemic) 84.8 for women and 80.9 for men, 2018 
Date of first recorded case The first recorded case was a returnee from 
the Diamond Princess Cruise ship on 
February 21 2020; the first confirmed case 
in Israel was on February 27 2020, an 
Israeli citizen who returned from holiday in 
Italy.  
Date of first recorded death On the March 20 2020, an 88 year old 
resident of a Jerusalem care home became 
Israel’s first recorded fatality of Covid-19. 
Date of 100th recorded death April 11 2020 
Date lockdown entered The Israeli government officially 
implemented a lockdown, including severe 
movement restrictions, on March 19. 
However, several of the lockdown 
restrictions were already in place. 
Number of confirmed cases (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
24,688 (268 per 100,000) 
Number of confirmed deaths (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
320 (3.5 per 100,000) 
When/if lockdown measures were 
significantly eased 
On May 3 2020 the government began 
easing restrictions. 
2. Executive Summary 
● The Covid-19 pandemic caught Israel in a precarious political situation, with the 
country scheduled to have its third election in a year  
● Heading into the pandemic, Israel was governed by a transition government, 
without a popular mandate, and headed by a Prime Minister facing prosecution     
● It is a surprise, therefore, that hospitalisation and mortality rates were initially 
low in Israel 
● Even more surprising is that the pandemic helped consolidate the position of 
the Prime Minister and ushered in a national unity government   
● Despite the initial success of its pandemic response, questions remain 
regarding the viability and efficacy of Israel’s exit strategy, particularly given 
that numbers have been rising rapidly  
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3. Country Intro 
Israel is a multi-party parliamentary democracy with a president as the nominal 
head of state. Executive power, however, is exercised by the government, which is 
headed by the Prime Minister. Since Israel’s creation in 1948 all governments have 
been multi-party coalitions. 
At the beginning of the pandemic, the transitional government – comprising of 
the centre-right Likud party, headed by the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 
Israel’s longest serving prime minster, a smaller right-wing party, and two ultra-
orthodox religious parties – faced two political crises. First, Israel was heading into its 
third election in one year with the possibility that Benny Gantz, the head of the 
opposition and the centrist Blue and White party, could form a new coalition 
government.141 Second, Netanyahu’s trial for accepting bribery, breach of trust and 
corruption was scheduled to begin in mid-March. 
There were also concerns over how the government would respond given some 
of the social, economic and political issues the state faced. The resilience of the health 
care system, argued to be underfunded and poorly managed, and its preparedness 
for a pandemic, were questioned.142 While Israel is a developed free-market economy, 
it is also one of the most unequal among OECD countries.143 A move away from a 
social-welfare model in the 1980s resulted in an advanced economy with high growth 
rates, but also large pockets of deprivation, particularly among Ultra-Orthodox and 
Arab-Palestinian communities, which are around ten and twenty per cent of the 
population respectively.144 Arab-Palestinians are further disadvantaged due to their 
long-term marginalisation within the state, a situation that relates to Israel’s occupation 
of the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.145 
Key Dates: 
January 30 2020: With wide spread reports of the situation in China, Israel suspends 
all flights to and from the country 
February 21: The first confirmed case of an infected Israeli citizen on the Diamond 
Princess Cruise ship 
February 27: The first confirmed local case of Covid-19 
March 2: Israel holds its parliamentary election 
March 9: The government mandates a 14-day self-isolation to all arrivals from abroad  
March 19: The government declares a national state of emergency 
April 12:  Face masks become a legal requirement 
May 4: Israel begins to ease its lockdown restrictions 
May 17: The national unity government is sworn in 
 
141 Wikipedia, Opinion polling for the 2020 Israeli legislative election (2020). Available online: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Opinion_polling_for_the_2020_Israeli_legislative_election [Accessed 
17/5/2020]. 
142 J. Magid, ‘Comptroller report: Israel’s healthcare system cannot cope with a pandemic’ The Times 
of Israel. 23 March 2020. Available online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/comptroller-report-israels-
healthcare-system-cannot-cope-with-a-pandemic/ [Accessed 18/5/2020]. 
143 OECD, Economic Survey of Israel (2018). Available online: 
http://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Towards-a-more-inclusive-society-OECD-economic-survey-
Israel-2018.pdf [Accessed 19/5/2020]. 
144 OECD, Economic Survey of Israel. 
145 A, Ghanem,; M. Mustafa, Palestinians in Israel: The Politics of faith after Oslo, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2018).  
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May 14: The beginning of the Prime Minister’s court case 
4. Political and Policy Responses 
Israel’s pandemic response was bound to be viewed through a political and 
partisan lens. The first confirmed cases in late-February and early-March coincided 
with parliamentary elections and the beginning of the Prime Minister’s court case; the 
first domestic Covid-19 case was on February 27, an Israeli citizen returning from 
holiday in Italy. 
On the one hand, the initial response, spearheaded by Prime Minister 
Netanyahu, appears to have been decisive and effective. Policies to deal with the 
pandemic, which supported by the opposition, appear to have been implemented at 
the right time and in the right measure. Overall hospitalisation and death rates were 
initially low in comparison to other countries. On the other hand, Netanyahu’s 
leadership has been controversial with accusations of using the crisis to protect his 
own interests, trampling on basic human rights, and bypassing the Knesset (Israel’s 
parliament).146 
The government’s initial response in late-February centred on contact tracing 
and self-isolation of suspected cases alongside increased restrictions on arrivals, 
particularly from early hit countries. However, tensions emerged between the health 
ministry, which pushed for stronger measures, including closing Israel to foreign 
arrivals, and the foreign ministry, which worried about international reactions.147 By 
early-March, arrivals from multiple countries were barred and returning Israeli citizens 
were required to self-isolate for 14-days. Nevertheless, the government did manage 
to ensure the elections proceeded smoothly, using special voting booths for those 
infected.148 These actions coincided with the publication of the state’s comptroller’s 
report criticising the healthcare system and its state of pandemic preparedness due to 
policy neglect and long-term underfunding.149 
On March 19, with confirmed cases over 600, and before the first confirmed 
death, a state-of-emergency was declared. It included the shutdown of schools, public 
transport and all non-essential workplaces, and restrictions on gatherings and 
movement, in affect a lockdown. Israel’s infection peak came in early-April as the 
number of confirmed deaths approached 100.150 In order to ensure the success of its 
lockdown, the government banned all inter-city travel for 48 hours and placed the 
entire country under curfew during Passover Eve,151 which was followed a few days 
 
146 A. Bernard, ‘How Benjamin Netanyahu has managed the Pandemic for Political Gain’ The New 
Yorker. 29 April 2020. Available online: https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/how-
benjamin-netanyahu-has-managed-the-pandemic-for-political-gain [Accessed 19/5/2020]. 
147 The Times of Israel Staff, ‘Health Ministry briefly signals Israel could close borders over 
coronavirus’ The Times of Israel. 23 February 2020. Available online: 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/health-ministry-signals-israel-could-close-borders-over-coronavirus/ 
[Accessed 17/5/2020]. 
148 M. Jaffe-Hoffman, ‘Over 70% of ‘Coronavirus voters’ cast their ballots in special stations’ The 
Jerusalem Post. 2 March 2020. Available online: https://www.jpost.com/israel-elections/coronavirus-
polling-stations-prepare-for-voters-619473 [Accessed 18/5/2020]. 
149 J. Magid, ‘Comptroller report: Israel’s healthcare system’. 
150 I. Efrati,; A. Rabinowitz, ‘Israel Reverses the Trend’ Haaretz. 20 April 2020. Available online: 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-israel-coronavirus-in-first-more-recoveries-than-new-
cases-1.8783155 [Accessed 18/5/2020].                              
151 Bicom, ‘Israel Under Curfew for Passover Holiday’ Bicom. 8 April 2020. Available online: 
http://www.bicom.org.uk/news/israel-under-curfew-for-passover-holiday/ [Accessed 19/5/2020].  
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later, on April 12, by a requirement for face covering in public spaces.152 The 
government also vowed to ramp up testing, already among the highest per capita in 
the world, from less than a thousand in March to over ten thousand a day in late-
April.153 
The lockdown was strongly supported and the rules mostly observed by the 
public, but there were exceptions. Several leading politicians, including the President 
and Prime Minister Netanyahu met with family members on Passover eve despite the 
national curfew and restrictions on gatherings.154 Additionally, the lockdown 
highlighted Israel’s secular-religious divide, with claims that Ultra-Orthodox 
communities were disregarding the rules. As a result of high number of cases, several 
Ultra-Orthodox neighbourhoods and towns were put under curfew and special 
measures. The fact that the health minister, Ya’akov Litzman, of the Ultra-Orthodox 
United Torah party, and his wife contracted the virus, after been accused of flaunting 
the rules, increased suspicion of the community.155 However, Litzman’s self-isolation 
further enabled Netanyahu’s strategy of assuming direct control of the pandemic 





The lockdown had a dramatic economic impact with unemployment increasing 
from around 3% in March to over 20% in May, the highest rate on record.157 In order 
 
152 The Times of Israel Staff, ‘Israelis required to wear face masks when out in public’ The Times of 
Israel, 11 April 2020. Available online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/israelis-to-begin-wearing-face-
masks-outdoors-under-new-order/ [Accessed 18/5/2020].  
153 The Times of Israel Staff, ‘Israel sees sharp increase in coronavirus testing’ The Times of Israel. 
17 April 2020. Available online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-sees-sharp-increase-in-
coronavirus-testing-inks-deal-with-chinese-firm/ [Accessed 17/5/2020].  
154 The Times of Israel Staff, ‘Rivlin again apologizes for flouting virus ban’ The Times of Israel. 14 
April 2020. Available online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/rivlin-again-apologizes-for-flouting-virus-
ban-celebrates-second-holiday-alone/ [Accessed 17/5/2020]. 
155 S. Sokol, ‘Israel’s health minister has the coronavirus’ Jewish telegraph Agency. 7 April 2020. 
Available online: ’https://www.jta.org/2020/04/07/israel/israels-health-minister-has-the-coronavirus-
hes-also-under-fire-for-allegedly-defying-his-own-departments-orders [Accessed 17/5/2020]. 
156 I. Efrati,; O. Kashti, ‘Netanyahu Has Hijacked Israel’s Coronavirus Response’ Haaretz. 23 March 
2020. Available online: https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-netanyahu-has-hijacked-israel-
s-coronavirus-response-health-experts-say-1.8700250 [Accessed 17/5/2020]. 
157 G, Lior, ‘Israel faces biggest unemployment crisis in history due to coronavirus’ Ynetnews. 14 May 
2020. Available online: https://www.ynetnews.com/business/article/BJ3i11c9qL [Accessed 19/5/2020].  
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to stabilise the economy the government provided an economic package worth 6.1% 
of GDP. The package included grants and loans to businesses, extended 
unemployment benefits, including for self-employed, and one-off grants to families and 
vulnerable individuals. The Bank of Israel supported these measures by cutting 
interest rates to 0.1% (from 0.25%) and embarking on quantitative easing.158  
 
National Unity Government 
Politically, the parliamentary elections in March were inconclusive, but left 
Gantz, the leader of the opposition, as the most likely to form a government. This 
necessitated, however, a coalition with the Joint List party, which comprised of several 
Arab-Palestinian parties; an Arab-Palestinian party has never joined a coalition 
government. Netanyahu and his allies accused Gantz of risking Israel’s security by 
working with the Joint List, who they have labelled as terrorist sympathisers. They 
implored Gantz to join Netanyahu in a national unity government.159 
While publicly working towards a national unity government, Netanyahu took a 
number of controversial decisions, several of which affected his own interests. The 
transitional government gave itself the power to legislate and implement emergency 
measures without seeking Knesset approval. Using this power it shut down the courts 
and postponed all court cases in March, including that of Netanyahu; a decision some 
argued was tantamount to a coup;160 Netanyahu’s court case resumed on May 24. 
The transitional government also used the Intelligence and security services, 
including the army, to support pandemic response efforts. The Mossad, Israel’s 
national Intelligence service, was tasked with acquiring additional ventilators, PPE, 
and medical equipment. Through its efforts the government has claimed success in 
meeting PPE shortages.161 To support its track and trace efforts the government 
approved the use of anti-terrorism surveillance measures, by the Shin Bet, the internal 
security services. These measures, which have previously only been used in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, include accessing mobile phone networks and 
personal data. The Government claims these efforts have helped reduce infection 
rates.162 
Partisanship and divisiveness were rising in Israel prior to the pandemic, 
particularly over Netanyahu’s leadership and relations with Arab-Palestinians. 
However, the crisis led to a remarkable political agreement to form a national unity 
government. The new government, which was sworn in on May 17, includes the 
smaller centre-left Labour party and two ultra-Orthodox religious parties. Gantz, who 
vowed never to sit with Netanyahu, argued that this was done in the national 
 
158 IMF, Policy Responses to Covid-19 (2020). Available online: https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-
and-covid19/Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19#I [Accessed 1/6/2020].  
159 O. Homes, ‘Israel’s opposition head Benny Gantz wins support to form government’ The Guardian. 
15 March 2020. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/15/israels-opposition-
head-benny-gantz-wins-support-to-form-government [Accessed 17/5/2020]. 
160 G. Gorenberg, ‘With a pandemic as cover, Netanyahu is carrying out a coup in Israel’ The 
Washington Post. 19 March 2020. Available online: 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/03/19/with-pandemic-cover-netanyahu-is-carrying-
out-coup-israel/ [Accessed 19/5/2020].  
161 I. Eichner, ‘Mossad reveals full extent of its massive coronavirus gear haul’ Ynetnews. 26 May 
2020. Available online: https://www.ynetnews.com/article/HJtcQIqsL [Accessed 1/6/2020].  
162 T. Bateman, ‘Coronavirus: Israel turns surveillance tools on itself’ BBC. 12 May 2020. Available 
online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-52579475 [Accessed 22/5/2020].  
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interest.163 The agreement, which ensures that Netanyahu will remain Prime Minister 
for the next eighteen months, despite his on-going court case, and would then be 
replaced by Gantz, is supported by a majority of the Jewish population.164  
5. Discussion 
While there are different ways of analysing Israel’s political and epidemiological 
responses to the virus, one thing is clear, Prime Minister Netanyahu has had a good 
pandemic.165 At the start of the pandemic he was in a vulnerable position, heading a 
transitional government, without a popular mandate, with an underfunded and 
unprepared healthcare system, and facing up-coming elections and the beginning of 
his court case. As things stand, he has received broad public support for his 
stewardship of the pandemic response efforts; hospitalisation and death rates have 
been low in comparison to other countries. He has emerged more popular and 
politically stronger; polling suggests that if new elections were held he would win 
decisively; though it is important to note that his numbers have started to come down 




Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
 
There are a number of reasons for the initial success of Israel’s pandemic 
efforts. According to Government experts, Israel’s testing regime, the timing of the 
 
163 O. Homes, ‘Netanyahu and Gantz agree to form unity Israeli government’ The Guardian. 20 April 
2020. Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/20/netanyahu-and-gantz-agree-
to-form-unity-israeli-government [Accessed 18/5/2020].   
164 The Times of Israel Staff, ‘Poll: 62% of public support unity deal’ Times of Israel. 22 April 2020. 
Available online: https://www.timesofisrael.com/poll-62-of-public-support-unity-deal-only-31-think-pm-
will-honor-rotation/ [Accessed 18/5/2020].   
165 A. Bernard, ‘How Benjamin Netanyahu has managed’ 
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lockdown, before the first death, and the measures taken were appropriate and 
effective.167 The use of the Intelligence and security services, while controversial, has 
been seen as successful and has been supported by the population, particularly the 
majority Jewish population, which has a high degree of trust in them.168 The healthcare 
system was reorganised and supported sufficiently to ensure its ability to cope. 
Another reason cited for the low mortality rate is that most of those infected were 
relatively young, particularly among the Ultra-Orthodox community.169 Lastly, the 
economic measures implemented appear to have stabilised the economy and as a 
result the Bank of Israel is expecting a smaller and shorter recession than initially 
forecasted, with rapid growth returning in 2021.170 
  
Exit Strategy 
Despite the inauguration of the national unity government, the broad support it 
has received, and the apparent success of the pandemic response, a number of 
questions remain. In particular, questions have been asked regarding some of the 
measures the government has taken, its exit strategy and the timing of the lockdown 
easing. While the new unity government still enjoys high levels of public support, it is 
pushing ahead with a controversial bill known as the ‘coronavirus law’, which extends 
its special state-of-emergency powers. The law grants the government sweeping 
broad powers to gather personal information and data, enter private premises, detain 
people, and establish restricted zones, without normal Knesset scrutiny and safe 
guards.171 The new Justice Minister, from the centrist Blue and White party, has vowed 
that the new law would be implemented in a measured and responsible way, ensuring 
as minimal impact as possible.172 
Questions have also been raised with regard to Israel’s exit strategy and 
whether it had relaxed restrictions too soon. In May, after restrictions were significantly 
eased, it seemed as if the country had successfully exited the lockdown. However, 
and despite government assurances and projected confidence, the month of June saw 
hundreds of new infections per day, the highest numbers since April; there was even 
a confirmed case in the Knesset, forcing it to suspend all work for a week.173 New 
outbreaks and rising infection rates have occurred at a number of different areas. In 
 
167 A. Harel, ‘Israel’s Covid-19 Experts: The Lockdown Saved the Country, but Steps Are Needed to 
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response the government has vowed to bring in more restrictions, enforce the rules 
more rigidly and has placed several towns and neighbourhoods under localised 
lockdown, several of which have extensive Ultra-Orthodox populations.174 
6. Concluding Remarks: 
Politically, it is clear that the pandemic has reduced partisanship, at least 
among the majority Jewish population, and brought about a national unity government. 
Nevertheless, the pandemic has played into the hand of Prime Minister Netanyahu, 
who is a divisive and polarising figure. The crisis has solidified his position and 
provided him with sweeping powers, and given his political shrewdness, one would 
expect him to try and capitalise on them. 
Based on current hospitalisation and mortality figures, and even when taking 
into account the fact that many of those infected were relatively young, it is hard not 
to conclude that the government’s initial response to the pandemic was timely and 
effective. This would give confidence to the national unity government’s assertion that 
it will be able to deal effectively with a second wave of infections if one did materialise. 
However, the rapid increase in infections in June raises questions of whether Israel 
has indeed weathered the storm, whether the lockdown was eased too early, and 
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Chapter 6: Japan, Associate Professor Atsuko Ichijo 
1.Key Facts 
Key Fact Date 
GDP per capita (prior to the pandemic) US$39,289.958, 2018 
Money spent on health-care per capita 
(prior to the pandemic) 
US$ 4,168.99, 2017 
Population (prior to the pandemic) 126.5 million, 2018 
Life expectancy (prior to the pandemic) 84.1 years, 2017 
Date of first recorded case January 16; a Chinese national residing in 
Japan returning from Wuhan 
Date of first recorded death February 13 2020 
Date of 100th recorded death April 8 2020 
Date lockdown entered April 7, 2020: state of emergency declared 
for Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, 
Osaka, Hyogo and Fukuoka prefectures; 
April 16, 2020: extended to nation-wide 
Number of confirmed cases (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
18,615 (14.75 per 100,000) 
Number of confirmed deaths (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
972 (0.77 per 100,000) 
When/if lockdown measures were 
significantly eased 
May 14, 2020: state of emergency lifted in 
39 prefectures; May 21, 2020: lifted in 
Osaka, Kyoto and Hyogo prefectures; May 
25, 2020: lifted in Hokkaido, Tokyo, 
Kanagawa, Saitama Chiba. 
2. Executive Summary 
● Japan as a paradoxical case study: it is a success story in containing the spread 
of the SARS-CoV-2 virus in comparison to other developed economies (with a 
death toll of around 970), but not so in comparison to Taiwan and Hong Kong 
● The prospect of hosting the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games delayed the 
government from taking decisive measures early 
● Responses to the Covid-19 pandemic rely on voluntary restriction 
● A ‘Japan model’ combining the cluster-based approach, a unique social 
distancing measure and ‘Japanese behaviour’ emerging? 
3. Country Intro 
As Japan is a parliamentary constitutional monarchy, the nominal head of state 
is the Emperor (currently Naruhito). The effective head of state is the Prime Minister 
(currently Abe Shinzo).175 A parliamentary cabinet system is adopted in Japan in which 
the largest party (or a coalition that commands the majority) in the bi-camel parliament 
 
175 The Japanese government recently requested that Japanese names should be rendered surname 
first, given name second as in Japanese, in foreign languages, and the report follows this convention. 
Therefore, ‘Abe’ is the surname of the current prime minister and ‘Shinzo’ is his given name.  
The Covid-19 and Democracy Project: Kingston University 
62 
 
(the Diet) forms the government while the judiciary remains independent. As a way of 
keeping the executive in check, the legislature in the form of the House of 
Representatives (the lower house) can move a non-confidence motion. As for local 
autonomy, Japan is divided into 47 prefectures which are overseen by an elected 
governor, legislature and an administrative bureaucracy. Each prefecture is further 
divided into municipalities of different grades, each has an elected mayor, legislature 
and an administrative bureaucracy. Local governments have more functions than the 
central government.176 Chapter VIII of the Japanese Constitution (‘Local Self-
Government’) defines the status of local governments. The Local Authority Law of 
1947, after several rounds of reform, now stipulates that the central and local 
governments are equal partners in legal terms. It has been long argued that local 
autonomy in Japan is weak due to the heavy reliance on the central government for 
funding. However, recently it has been noted that some local governments were more 
proactive in responding to citizens’ needs than the central government.177 Japan is the 
third largest economy in the world and has been a staunch supporter of the capitalist 
system. The central government collects income tax, consumption tax and liquor, 
tobacco and gasoline taxes, prefectures collect resident tax, enterprise tax, vehicle 
related taxes and municipalities collect resident tax and property tax. The size of the 
informal (untaxed) economy is deemed to be small in Japan. While the gap between 
the rich and poor is said to be growing in line with other developed economies, Japan’s 
distribution of wealth is often seen as more equal than others.178 
Key Dates 
January 16 2020: The first confirmed case of Covid-19. A Chinese national who lives 
in Japan returning from Wuhan. 
January 27: Covid-19 designated as a special infectious disease 
January 28: The first case of domestic transmission of Covid-19 
January 31: The establishment of the Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters 
February 1: The first measure to tighten border control introduced 
February 3: About 3,700 people on board the Diamond Princess put in quarantine off 
the coast of Yokohama 
February 13: The first Covid-19 death 
February 27: Central government requests school closures from March 2 till the end 
of the spring break 
February 28: The governor of Hokkaido declared state of emergency  
March 1: All remaining on board the Diamond Princess disembarked 
March 5: Postponement of President Xi Jinping’s April visit announced 
March 13: An amendment on the Act on Special Measures for Pandemic Influenza 
and New Infectious Diseases Preparedness and Response relating to the novel 
coronavirus, (the Coronavirus Emergency Act) passed 
March 24: The postponement of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games announced 
 
176 Ministry of Internal Affairs, Communication of Japan (2009) Local Autonomy in Japan: The Current 
Situation and Future Shape (2009). Available online: 
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No. 2, pp. 42-68, (2018). Available online: 
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April 7: State of emergency declared in Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Osaka, 
Hyogo and Fukuoka prefectures 
April 16: State of emergency extended nation-wide until May 6 
April 27: An extra budget of ¥25.69 trillion to fight SARS-Cov-2 submitted  
May 4: State of emergency extended until May 31 
May 14: The state of emergency lifted in 39 prefectures (excluding Tokyo, Chiba, 
Saitama, Kanagawa, Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo and Hokkaido) 
May 21: The state of emergency lifted in Osaka, Hyogo and Kyoto prefectures 
May 25: The state of emergency lifted in Tokyo, Chiba, Saitama, Kangawa and 
Hokkaido prefectures 
 
Having reviewed how the Japanese government has responded to the pandemic, the 
report now moves onto some emerging points from the Japanese experience. 
4. Political and Policy Responses 
In this section, the ways in which Japan has responded to the Covid-19 
pandemic are examined through a qualitative investigation into various factors that 
have exerted influence. 
 
Changing Dynamics in the Central-Local Government Relationship? 
Japan’s responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have been mainly driven by the 
central government in the form of the Novel Coronavirus Response Headquarters 
established in accordance with the Act on Special Measures for Pandemic Influenza 
and New Infectious Diseases Preparedness and Response (amended on March 13 
2020 in order to make it applicable to novel coronavirus). Since its effective inception 
on January 31 2020 (the official institution was on March 26 2020), the Headquarters 
has met 39 times by June 29 2020, and the minutes of the meeting up to the 26 
meeting (held on April 6 2020) and materials circulated at all meetings are published 
on the Prime Minister’s and the cabinet’s official web page.179 
The legal framework for the government’s responses to the Covid-19 pandemic 
is provided by the Act on Special Measures for Pandemic Influenza and New Infectious 
Diseases Preparedness and Response of 2012, which enables the government to take 
emergency measures in order to protect citizens’ life and health and to minimise the 
impact on citizens’ life and the economy. The law was amended to be made applicable 
to Covid-19 (designated as a special infectious disease on January 27 2020) on March 
13, enabling the Prime Minister to declare the state of emergency. 
While, institutionally speaking, the central government is in the driving seat in 
co-ordinating responses to the pandemic, the majority of measures to be taken under 
the Act on Special Measures fall within prefectural competences including issuing a 
request/instruction to curb going out, to close entertainment venues, to suspend 
events, for businesses to temporarily shut or to reduce their opening hours and so on. 
It is mainly the prefectural authorities that implement these measures defined by the 
Act. Furthermore, as publicly funded schools come under the authority of different tiers 
of local government (many are under municipal jurisdiction and some are prefectural 
jurisdiction), the central government can only request their closure. This happened on 
 
179 See: 
New Coronavirus Infectious Disease Control Headquarters: 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/novel_coronavirus/taisaku_honbu.html [Accessed 12/07/2020]. 
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January 27 2020 when Prime Minister Abe requested schools to be closed from March 
2 till the spring break.180 
Given this legal set-up, the Japanese responses to the Covid-19 pandemic 
have shed light on the relationship between the central and local government in Japan. 
As the local government in Japan is largely seen as weak due to its heavy reliance on 
the central government for funding, the emergence of outspoken governors, in 
particular, those of Hokkaido, Tokyo and Osaka, have attracted much attention. For 
instance, the current Governor of Hokkaido, Suzuki Naomichi, declared the prefecture-
wide state of emergency on January 28 without any legal authority in order to combat 
the early surge of Covid-19 cases. The central government did not take any measures 
to obstruct the governor or intervene in his policy. Although without any legal authority, 
the state of emergency, consisting of request not to go out, to work from home, to 
close businesses and so on, was largely accepted by the residents of Hokkaido and 
the prefectural government managed to suppress the surge of infection. It is widely 
reported that in the run-up to the declaration of the state of emergency by Prime 
Minister Abe on April 7, the current Governor of Tokyo, Koike Yuriko, exerted 
considerable pressure on him; one of the determining factors for the decision to 
declare the state of emergency is believed to be Governor Koike’s press conference 
on March 23. At this occasion, she raised the prospect of imposing lockdown in Tokyo 
when a record number (at that time) of 16 new cases was reported.181 
The possible impact of the ‘rise’ of local government is reflected on the approval 
rating of the Abe government. According to NHK, which carries out a regular public 
opinion survey, the government’s approval rate fell from 44% in January 2020 to 37% 
in May 2020. 
 
Table 1: Approval rating of Abe Government 
 Jan. 2020 Feb. 2020 March 2020 Apr. 2020 May 2020 
Support 44 45 43 39 37 






180 S. Jackman,; G. Reidy, ‘Japan’s Abe to shut schools nationwide to fight coronavirus’ Bloomberg. 
27 February 2020. Available online: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-27/abe-calls-
for-all-japan-schools-to-close-to-combat-coronavirus [Accessed 25/05/2020]. 
181 NHK, ‘The declaration of the state of emergency: How has it be decided’ NHK Politics Magazine. 
15 April 2020. Available online: https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/feature/33665.html [Accessed 
25/05/2020]. 
182 NHK, ‘Approval rating of the government’ Election Web. 2020. Available online: 
https://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/shijiritsu/ [Accessed 26/05/2020]. 




Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
 
Furthermore, on May 24 2020, based on its own poll, Asahi Shimbun, a major 
quality newspaper in Japan, reported that the government’s approval rating 
plummeted to 29%, the lowest since the second Abe government came to power in 
December 2012. The non-approval rating was 52%.183  
 
Border Control 
The Japanese government has steadily strengthened its border control. This 
process began on February 1 2020, when foreign nationals who had stayed in Hubei 
Province within 14-days prior to the arrival in Japan and those who held a passport 
issued by Hubei Province were denied entry based on the Immigration Control and 
Refugee Recognition Act. As of June 29 2020, the number of country/region for which 
visas are suspended/the visa wavering scheme is suspended is 129.184 Japanese 
nationals (and those with certain resident status) returning from these 
countries/regions need to fill in a quarantine questionnaire, to have their temperature 
taken and to be tested upon arrival. They are required to wait for the result either at 
their home or the place designated by the Japanese government. After the test result 
is revealed, if it is positive, they are asked to seek admission in a medical facility; if it 
is negative they are required to self-isolate for 14-days.185 In this regard, the Japanese 
government has clearly given the priority to the protection of their citizens by restricting 
the entry of citizens of other countries. The practice, however, is in line with measures 
taken by other countries, and not divergent in the global scale. 
 
Neoliberal Orthodoxy in Economic Measures 
As noted above, the Japanese government cannot coerce businesses to 
temporarily close. What they can do is to request for a temporary shutdown of 
businesses, reduced opening hours of businesses and to request companies to allow 
and facilitate their employees to work from home if possible. Both the central and 
prefectural governments had been asking citizens to refrain from going out before the 
partial declaration of the state of emergency on April 7 2020, and as the border control 
was increasingly tightened, the number of inbound tourists plummeted to deal a severe 
 
183 Asahi Shimbun, ‘Approval rating at 29%, the lowest since coming to power’ Asahi Shimbun. 24 
May 2020. Available online: https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASN5S74LMN5SUZPS001.html 
[Accessed 26/05/2020]. 
184 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Strengthening border control in regards to the new coronavirus in Japan 
(new measures) (updated on 29 June 2020). Available online: 
https://www.anzen.mofa.go.jp/info/pcwideareaspecificinfo_2020C057.html [Accessed 29/06/2020]. 
185 Ibid. 
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blow to the aviation and tourism industries. The request for the temporary shutdown 
of businesses in order to curb the spread of the SARS-CoV2 virus which came with 
the declaration of the state of emergency led to job losses as well as significant 
pressure on small businesses. Recognising these impacts on the economy, the 
cabinet approved a policy document entitle the ‘emergency economic measures for 
the novel coronavirus infectious disease’186 on April 7 2020 (amended on April 20 
2020). 
The document acknowledges the pandemic would inflict the worst damage to 
the global economy since World War II and that the Japanese economy could not 
shield itself from the global impact. It then lists measures to be taken by the 
government in order to protect citizens’ life and livelihood and to revive the economy. 
The document identifies two phases in dealing with the impact of the pandemic on the 
economy: the emergency support phase and the V-shaped recovery phase, which is 
in line with what other advanced economies are generally advocating. It further 
identifies five pillars in economic policies: 1) To prevent the spread of infection, to 
enhance medical care provision and to develop new drug for treatment; 2) to further 
strengthen support for maintaining employment and business continuity; 3) to revive 
economic activities through the collaboration of the public and private sectors; 4) to 
build a robust economic structure for the future and 5) to prepare for future pandemics. 
In order to implement some of the measures for the emergency support phase listed 
in the document, an additional budged of ¥25.69 trillion was submitted to the Diet on 
April 27 2020. In dealing with the economic fall-out of the pandemic, the Japanese 
government has adopted measures which other countries in the world have also 
adopted, and there is no major diversion from the global norm in this regard. 
 
Two Additional Unique Factors 
There are two major factors that have shaped the Japanese government’s 
responses to the Covid-19 pandemic which are unique to Japan: the outbreak of 
infection on the passenger ship, the Diamond Princess, and the prospect of holding 
the Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo in July 2020. 
The Diamond Princess is a cruise ship run by Carnival Corporation & PLC, 
headquartered in the US, but registered in the UK. It left Yokohama on January 20 for 
a 16-day cruise visiting Kagoshima, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Vietnam and Naha to return 
to Yokohama. A passenger who disembarked in Hong Kong on January 25 was found 
to be infected with SARS-COV-2 on 1 February. The ship went back to Yokohama on 
February 3, where it was quarantined with about 3,700 passengers and crew on board. 
All on board disembarked by March 1, by which time there were 706 infected and 7 
deaths.187 
The Japanese government struggled to handle this case. First, the government 
underestimated the scale of the outbreak on board the Diamond Princess. Indeed, 
when the first test results came back on February 5 10 out of 31 were positive, 
suggesting the virus had probably already spread to 1,000 passengers, and the 
government was caught unprepared. Secondly, there was a degree of uncertainty 
where the ultimate responsibility to deal with the outbreak lay. The Japanese 
 
186 Cabinet Office, Emergency economic measures for the novel coronavirus infectious disease: To 
completely protect citizens’ life and livelihood and for the economic revival (2020). Available online: 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/novel_coronavirus/th_siryou/200407kinkyukeizaitaisaku.pdf [Accessed 
13/05/2020]. 
187 NHK, ‘What happened on the cruise ship?’ NHK Politics Magazine. 4 March 2020. Available 
online: https://www.nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/feature/31092.html [Accessed 26/05/2020]. 
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government put the Diamond Princess in its territorial waters in quarantine as a means 
of protecting Japan from the spread of the virus, but technically speaking it was not 
responsible for dealing with the outbreak of Covid-19 on board. The ship itself was in 
principle under the jurisdiction of the UK where the ship was registered but the US 
(where the owner is headquartered) could also be seen as responsible. There was a 
fair amount of confusion as to who should be ultimately responsible for the case. It is 
now known that while the Japanese government initially asked the US government to 
evacuate US citizens onboard, the US government rejected the request and asked the 
Japanese government to keep them in quarantine on board. However, as the days 
went by, governments across the world became more and more critical of the 
Japanese government’s handling of the case, and it was clearly stung by the level of 
criticism it received. One of the consequences of this is the Japanese government’s 
insistence on leading international/global co-operation in tackling the SARS-CoV-2 
virus and an additional budget earmarked to facilitate communication with the 
international community. 
When the SARS-CoV-2 virus started to come to light, by far, the largest concern 
for the Japanese government was the Summer Olympic Games to be held in July in 
Tokyo. It can be speculated that the Japanese government might have tried to play 
down the seriousness of the pandemic so as not to jeopardise the prospect of hosting 
the Summer Games. The postponement of the Games was not so much because of 
the size of the Covid-19 outbreak in Japan but rather in other countries, and both the 
central government and the Tokyo metropolitan government had maintained that the 
Games would go ahead until late-March. However, the Japanese government was 
introducing tighter border control, the People’s National Congress in China postponed, 
the state visit by President Xi Jinping postponed and with several national Olympic 
committees declaring they would not send athletes, the Japanese government was 
cornered into a position where it had no other choice than postponing the Games. As 
so much economic interest was tied to the Games, it was a very difficult decision for 
the government. It is reported that the government decided to postpone the Games 






Tokyo skyline with an Olympic sculpture in the foreground 
 
188 J. McCurry,; S. Ingle, ‘Tokyo Olympics postponed to 2021 due to coronavirus pandemic’ The 
Guardian. 24 March 2020, Available online: https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2020/mar/24/tokyo-
olympics-to-be-postponed-to-2021-due-to-coronavirus-pandemic [Accessed 26/05/2020]. 




There are a couple of points from the above that merit further discussion.  
 
The Use of Voluntary Restriction 
One of the features of the measures taken by the Japanese government in 
order to tackle the Covid-19 pandemic is that all of them are based on voluntary 
restriction. Even under the state of emergency, there was no penalty for not following 
the requests (not to go out, for instance) issued by the government. In other words, 
the implementation of countermeasures is solely dependent on ‘voluntary co-
operation’ of citizens and businesses. This strong aversion of affording the 
government of the authority to restrict citizens’ rights is said to be embedded in the 
post-war political culture in Japan as a reaction to the military-led regime during 
wartime. It is also plausible that the level of conformist pressure is such in Japanese 
society that the government does not have to resort to coercive means to get things 
done to the degree which could be the case in other countries. 
The state of emergency without enforcing penalties has been effective. The 
amount of people out and about in many cities went down by about 70% as many firms 
asked their employees to work from home and people refrained from going out. The 
prefectural governments resorted to ‘name and shame’ in dealing with businesses, in 
particular, pachinko parlours which did not comply with their request for closure as 
they could not fine these businesses. The government reasoned the state of 
emergency declared on April 7, and extended nation-wide on April 16, was effective 
enough to slow the spread of the virus and started to lift the state of emergency on 
May 14. The state of emergency was finally fully lifted on May 25.  
 
The Emergence of the Japan Model? 
As noted above, while the state of emergency was finally lifted across Japan 
on May 25 2020, and its total Covid-19 deaths remains in three digits, the approval 
rating of the Abe government has nose-dived. Its policy to distribute two reusable 
masks per household has been derided, and internationally, the Japanese 
government’s fumbling with the Diamond Princess case as well as its reluctance to 
agreeing to the postponement of the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games have created an 
impression that Japan was not coping with the pandemic well. In April, it was widely 
reported that the Japanese medical system was facing collapse given the sharp rise 
of the number of patients requiring hospital treatment.189 
The fact is that while the accuracy of infection rate is not certain due to a very 
small number of tests carried out in Japan, the mortality rate from Covid-19 in Japan 
remains very low compared to other advanced economies. Following this, voices 
applauding the success of the ‘Japan model’ in combating the pandemic have begun 
to emerge. In late-April, Professor Suzuki Kazuto of Hokkaido University tried to 
explain what the ‘Japan model’ was and why it had been successful in an article 
published in a journal, the Diplomat.190 Suzuki identified the cluster-based approach 
and avoidance of three Cs (confined and crowded spaces, and close human contact) 
 
189 BBC, ‘Coronavirus: Japan doctors warn of health system ‘‘break down’’ as cases surge’ BBC 
News. 18 April 2020. Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-52336388 [Accessed 
26/05/2020]. 
190 Suzuki, Kazuto ‘Covid-19 strategy: The Japan model: Has Japan found a viable long-term strategy 
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https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/covid-19-strategy-the-japan-model/ [Accessed 12/05/2020]. 
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as the key aspects of the Japan model, which, in interaction with geographical and 
social conditions, managed to contain the pandemic without completely shutting down 
the economy. 
International recognition of the ‘success’ of the Japanese government in 
containing the spread of disease came from Tedros Ghebreyesus, the WHO’s Director 
General, at a news conference held on May 25 2020.191 Although he cautioned against 
the possible second wave, an endorsement from an eminent international organisation 
such as the WHO means a lot in Japan, which craves international recognition. 
To what extent the government’s responses have contributed to the apparent 
success of the Japan model is, however, debated. As noted above, one of the peculiar 
features of the Japanese responses to the Covid-19 pandemic is the reliance on 
voluntary restriction. The government does not have the authority to coerce anyone to 
follow its guidelines such as avoiding three Cs. However, the number of people going 
out to socialise dramatically reduced, many businesses ‘voluntarily’ shut down 
temporarily or reduced their opening hours so as to avoid three Cs. In addition to 
governmental policies, Japanese success in tackling Covid-19 may also, in some way, 
relate to ‘Japanese behaviour’.192  
6. Concluding Remarks: 
The Japanese case study has highlighted the peculiar features of the case 
rather than pinpointing universally applicable aspects. The Japanese government’s 
response to the Covid-19 pandemic was initially heavily influenced by the prospect of 
hosting the Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo in July 2020. When its postponement 
was announced, the government moved to take more stringent measures including 
the state of emergency, which, however, relies on voluntary co-operation from citizens 
and businesses as there is no legal penalties for contravening the government’s 
guidelines. The evaluation of Japan’s response to the pandemic has also evolved: with 
a total Covid-19 death toll remaining in three digits, some voices started to advocate 
the Japan model. On the other hand, the Japanese case study has also highlighted 
that the pandemic has acted as a catalyst in changing power dynamics between the 
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Chapter 7: Taiwan, Associate Professor Atsuko Ichijo 
1.Key Facts 
Key Fact Data 
GDP per capita (prior to the pandemic) US$ 24,827, 2019 IMF estimate 
Money spent on health-care per capita 
(prior to the pandemic) 
US$3,047, 2017 
Population (prior to the pandemic) 23 million 
Life expectancy (prior to the pandemic) 80.19 yeas, 2018 
Date of first recorded case January 21, 2020: a Taiwanese teacher 
returning from Wuhan; first domestic case 
on January 28, 2020 
Date of first recorded death March 23 2020 
Date of 100th recorded death N/A 
Date lockdown entered N/A 
 
Number of confirmed cases (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
447 (1.92 per 100.000) 
 
Number of confirmed deaths (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
7 (0.03 per 100,000) 




2. Executive Summary 
● A success story in the fight against the pandemic which has not resorted to 
authoritarian measures such as lockdown 
● As of the end of June 2020, the number of confirmed cases is around 440 and 
that of confirmed Covid-19 deaths is 7 
● Taiwan’s advantages include lessons from the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak, the 
capacity to mobilise big data and public trust in government 
● The ‘Taiwan Model’ as a new weapon in its soft diplomacy 
● The pervasive influence of the geopolitical situation: its fraught relationship with 
mainland China 
3. Country Intro 
The Head of state of Taiwan (officially, the Republic of China, RoC) is the 
President of the Republic of China, currently, Tsai Ing-wen. Taiwan is a unitary semi-
presidential republic in which a popularly elected president co-exists with a prime 
minister and cabinet. The president has authority over five branches of government: 
the cabinet, the legislature, the judiciary, the audit agency and the civil service exam 
agency. The president appoints the cabinet including the prime minister. Taiwan is 
divided into 22 subnational divisions each with a local government led by an elected 
head and a local council. Matters for which local governments are responsible or 
partially responsible include social services, education, urban planning, public 
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construction, water management, environmental protection, transport and public 
safety. There are three types of subnational divisions: special municipalities, cities and 
counties. Taiwan is one of the most developed capitalist economies in the world and 
included in the advanced economies group by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and regarded as a high-income economy by the World Bank.193 As in many other 
advanced economy, economic inequality is deemed to have worsened in recent 
years.194 
Key Dates 
December 31 2019: Taiwan communicates its understanding of the newly emerging 
disease to the WHO via the International Health Regulations (IHR) focal point; 
enhanced border control and quarantine measures introduced including screening of 
passengers on flights from Wuhan before disembarkation.195 
January 20 2020: The Central Epidemic Command Centre (CECC) activated 
January 21: The first confirmed case of Covid-19, a Taiwanese teacher returning from 
Wuhan 
January 28: The first confirmed domestically transmitted case of Covid-19 
February 6: A name-based rationing system for purchases of masks launched 
February 25: The Special Act for Prevention, Relief and Revitalization Measures for 
Severe Pneumonia with Novel Pathogens passed 
March 19: Border control tightened: banning all foreign visitors and a mandatory 14-
day self-isolation for returning residents 
March 24: Ban on transit in Taiwan 
April 1: Masks became mandatory on public transport 
April 4: The first national alert via text messaging issued 
April 27: The mask donation scheme started 
May 8: Professional baseball games played in front of spectators 
May 18: Taiwan was not invited to the 73rd World Health Assembly 
May 19: Travel and entry ban extended till the end of June 
May 20: The inauguration of President Tsai’s second term 
 
The above shows how early Taiwan started to take measures against the emerging 
pandemic, which is one of the factors that have contributed to Taiwan being a success 
story. Below, we will qualitatively examine various factors that have shaped Taiwan’s 
response to the pandemic. 
4. Political and Policy Responses 
The ways in which Taiwan has responded to the Covid-19 pandemic is 
examined below, with factors that have shaped Taiwan’s response identified and 
discussed.  
 
193 Wikipedia, Economy of Taiwan (2020). Available online: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Taiwan [Accessed 26/05/2020]. 
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taiwan/ [Accessed 26/05/2020]. 
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An Undisputed Success Story: The Taiwan Model 
As the world continues to grapple with the Covid-19 pandemic, Taiwan has 
widely been touted as a success story with a number of confirmed cases in the 400s 
and that of confirmed Covid-19 death at 7 at the end of June 2020.196 The way Taiwan 
has dealt with the pandemic is now packaged as ‘the Taiwan Model’ and heavily 
publicised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as part of its soft power 
diplomacy.197 The Taiwanese government has achieved not only international 
recognition and praise but also solid domestic support due to its handling of the Covid-
19 pandemic. The approval rate of President Tsai, who was inaugurated for the 
second time on 20 May, reached 72.6% with the disapproval rate at 17.3%.198 How 
has this remarkable feat come about? There are a number of factors behind it. 
 
The Experience of the 2002-2004 SARS Outbreak 
Taiwan was one of the 29 countries/regions that was affected by SARS which 
originated from Guangdong Province, China, with a total of 73 deaths. The experience 
led to the formation of the Central Epidemic Command Centre (CECC) in 2004 which 
co-ordinates various government departments and mobilises resources across the 
government in an emergency such as a pandemic.199 Some also highlight that the 
experience of being excluded from the WHO at the time of the SARS outbreak has 
made the Taiwanese government more self-reliant in reference to disease.200 
As soon as they learned of a mysterious pneumonia spreading in Wuhan, 
assuming the worst case scenario, the Taiwanese government started to screen 
passengers on flights from Wuhan before they disembarked on December 31 2019, 
as well as writing to the WHO about the yet-to-be-identified disease. On January 20 
2020, the CECC was activated and has been taking the lead in combating the Covid-
19 pandemic in Taiwan.  
 
The Use of Big Data 
One of the key aspects of the Taiwan Model as described by the MOFA is the 
use of big data. Combining almost universal national health care coverage (99.9%)201 
with advanced IT, the Taiwanese government has devised and implemented policies 
that are effective in identifying those most at risk of infection and in dealing with the 
shortage of goods such as facial masks. As also seen in South Korea, the Taiwanese 
government has also deployed aggressive contract tracing based on big data it holds. 
In order to combat the shortage of masks, the government launched a name-
based rationing system for purchases of masks on February 6 which linked the right 
 
196 Taiwan Centers for Disease Control, Homepage (2020). Available online: 
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May 2020. Available online: https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/agile-governance-crushing-covid-19-
taiwan-and-south-korea/ [Accessed 26/05/2020]. 
201 Tu, Chang-Ching ‘Lessons from Taiwan’s experience with Covid-19’ New Atlanticist. 7 April 2020. 
Available online: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/lessons-from-taiwans-
experience-with-covid-19/ [Accessed 26/05/2020]. 
The Covid-19 and Democracy Project: Kingston University 
73 
 
to purchase a set number of masks at a designated outlet with the purchaser’s National 
Health Insurance card making the most of health data held by the government.202 At 
the same time, the government launched its ‘I’m OK, you take one first’ campaign and 
advised the public that a healthy person did not need to wear a mask. 
While introducing a rationing system for masks, the government invested 
US$6.8 million to expand the country’s mask production capacity with 60 new mask 
production lines. As a result, Taiwan’s daily mask production capacity expanded from 
1.8 million to 8 million masks.203 Once the domestic demand was fully met, the 
government started to donate excess masks around the world as part of a charm 
offensive.204  
 
Trust Building and Maintenance Through Transparency 
Recognising building and maintaining public trust in the government was crucial 
for successfully containing the virus, the Taiwanese government started to hold a daily 
press conference on January 23 to keep citizens informed. The CECC acted as an 
open and transparent portal about the epidemic and the government worked with 
LINE, a communication software popular in Taiwan, to provide information in real 
time.205 
The aggressive contact tracing system has led to a number of people placed in 
quarantine. Self-isolating is monitored by neighbourhood wardens, who check 
quarantine conditions are not being flouted. However, he/she also brings basic food 
supplies to those quarantined to ensure their welfare. The government later introduced 
a programme providing monetary compensation of US$456 (NT$14,000) per person 
who is in quarantine for 14-days.206 This support is credited with having provided an 
incentive to people to report their symptoms honestly.207  
 
Support for Business 
On February 13 2020, the government announced that it was to roll out a US$2 
billion (NT$60 billion) relief package for businesses affected by the Covid-19 pandemic 
targeting restaurants, retail, shopping districts, night markets, traditional markets, expo 
centers and other businesses that promote domestic demand. Agriculture, tourism and 
 
202 Taiwan Centers for Disease Control, Name-based rationing system for purchases of masks to be 
launched on February 6; public to buy masks with their (NHI) card, Press release (4 February 2020). 
Available online: https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/ZlJrIunqRjM49LIBn8p6eA?typeid=158 
[Accessed 26/05/2020]. 
203 W. Yang, ‘How Taiwan has kept its coronavirus infection rate so low? Deutsche Welle. 9 April 
2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/taiwan-coronavirus/a-52724523 [Accessed 
26/05/2020]. 
204 Lin, Chia-nan ‘Virus outbreak: Taiwan to donate 1.3 million masks to eight EU states’ The Taipei 
Times. 15 April 2020. Available online: 
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/04/15/2003734654 [Accessed 27/05/2020]. 
205 Tu, Chang-Ching ‘Lessons from Taiwan’s experience with Covid-19’ New Atlanticist. 7 April 2020. 
Available online: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/lessons-from-taiwans-
experience-with-covid-19/ [Accessed 26/05/2020]. 
206 Executive Yuan (2020a), Secondary legislation for COVID-19 act to ensure public health and 
economic stability’, Press release (12 March 2020). Available online: 
https://english.ey.gov.tw/Page/61BF20C3E89B856/6f306c3f-b3d4-4f07-80e7-6eb77ebc918c 
[Accessed 27/05/2020]. 
207 W. Yang, ‘How Taiwan has kept its coronavirus infection rate so low? Deutsche Welle. 9 April 
2020. Available online: https://www.dw.com/en/taiwan-coronavirus/a-52724523 [Accessed 
26/05/2020]. 
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transportation were also targeted.208 The budget was approved by the cabinet on 
February 27 2020, and of a total of US$2 billion, US$645 million was directed to Covid-
19 response efforts and US$1.33 billion was used to help out businesses.209  
Following this, on March 12, President Tsai issued five directives: 1. To 
implement the US$2 billion special budget to fund disease prevention; 2. All 
government departments to shift spending priorities to concentrate on emergency 
measures to mobilise further US$1.3 billion; 3. To implement government investments 
and procurements to accelerate the expansion of domestic demand; 4. To help 
accelerate private investment to maintain economic momentum and vitality and 5. To 
stabilise financial markets and maintain stability in foreign exchange and the stock 
market.210 
As the pandemic’s grip on the globe tightened, the parliament approved the 
plan to expand the special budget to combat Covid-19 to US$6.9 billion on April 23 
and the bill was sent to the Legislature.211 In providing support for businesses, the 
Taiwanese government is following a similar route to those taken by other countries.  
 
Pure Coincidence 
The then Vice President of the RoC, Chen Chien-jen, is a renowned 
epidemiologist and former health minister. Having a scientist with relevant expertise 
at the heart of policy making has undoubtedly helped. He offers a video entitled ‘the 
coronavirus: a crash course by Vice President Chen’, which gave credence to 
government policy.212  
 
Former Vice President of Taiwan (Republic of China) Chen Chien-jen 
 
208 Executive Yuan (2020b), Government to roll out relieve measures to counter coronavirus impact’, 
Press release (13 February 2020). Available online: 
https://english.ey.gov.tw/Page/61BF20C3E89B856/b9f428fc-820b-4034-a795-673b9f32204b 
[Accessed 27/05/2020]. 
209 Executive Yuan (2020c), Executive Yuan approves special budget to fund COVID-19 response’, 
Press release (27 February 2020). Available online: 
https://english.ey.gov.tw/Page/61BF20C3E89B856/06d49065-d457-41ae-aae1-8a4d3450abcd 
[Accessed 27/05/2020]. 
210 President’s Office, President Tsai announces five proactive measures to boost Taiwan’s economic 
momentum and vitality, Press release (12 March 2020). Available online: 
https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/5984 [Accessed 26/05/2020]. 
211 Executive Yuan (2020d), Cabinet approves special budget plan for extended response program, 
Press release (23 April 2020). Available online: 
https://english.ey.gov.tw/Page/61BF20C3E89B856/943958a8-e42f-49c1-8608-b44ecefaa358 
[Accessed 27/05/2020]. 
212 Republic of China (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Coronavirus: A Crash Course by Vice 
President Chen (2020). Available online: 
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=ED42AB40B929870C&sms=E393523FEBEAD40B&s=5F48
90098CD9164E [Accessed 12/07/2020]. 




Clearly, Taiwan has managed to deal with the pandemic very well. Despite its 
geographical, economic and social proximity with Wuhan, where the outbreak started, 
Taiwan has managed to avoid an overshoot in the infection rate and the number of 
confirmed cases stands below 450 and that of death at 7 as of the end of June 2020. 
Still, the pandemic is expected to inflict severe damage on the Taiwanese economy 
and the IMF projects the Taiwanese economy would shrink by 4% in 2020 due to 
fallouts of the pandemic213 and reviving the economy is now an even more urgent task 
for the government having contained the first and second waves of infection. 
The Taiwanese government’s responses to the Covid-19 pandemic have been 
shaped and framed by a variety of factors, some of them are peculiar to Taiwan and 
some are widely shared. 
 
The Experience of the SARS Outbreak 
This is shared with Hong Kong and South Korea, two other polities widely 
accredited to have coped with the pandemic relatively well. In the case of Taiwan, the 
experience led to the establishment of the CECC, which has clearly contributed to the 
effectiveness of measures put in place to combat the SARS-CoV-2 virus.  
 
The Tense Relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
While there is close business and social connection between Taiwan and the 
PRC, the diplomatic relationship between the two has been fraught with tension. This 
could be a factor enabling the Taiwanese government to take decisive action in 
securing its borders. Taiwan started to screen passengers from Wuhan on 31 January 
2019 and subsequently banned the entry of foreign visitors, which arguably minimised 
the risk of the SARS-CoV-2 virus being brought in. On the other hand, in Hong Kong, 
medical staff went on strike demanding the closure of the border with mainland China 
without achieving their aim.214 An argument can be made that Taiwan benefitted from 
the tricky geopolitical situation in terms of mounting an effective defence against the 
virus. 
 
The Use of Big Data 
As in the case of South Korea, Taiwan appears to make the most of data it has 
collected on its citizens in dealing with the pandemic. In this regard, the small 
population size – 23 million – as well as a well-developed IT industry within its territory 
have constituted an advantage.  
 
 
213 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook 2020 (2020). Available online: 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/04/14/weo-april-2020 [Accessed 27/05/2020]. 
214 BBC, ‘Coronavirus: Hong Kong hospital staff strike to demand closure of Chinese border’ BBC 
News. 3 February 2020. Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-51349154 
[Accessed 27/05/2020]. 




President of Taiwan (Republic of China) Tsai Ing-wen 
 
The Government’s Commitment to Transparency and Popular Perception 
The Taiwanese government has been able to mobilise data it has collected on 
its citizens because there is a high degree of trust in government. This has been 
achieved by the hard work of the party currently in power, the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP), which distinguishes itself from the establishment party, the Chinese 
Nationalist Party (CNP or Kuomintang), which is known for corruption, by insisting on 
the importance of transparency and accountability. The DPP government has stuck 
on the transparency ticket right from the beginning of the pandemic as seen in the fact 
that transparency is defined as a key aspect of the Taiwan Model. The case of Taiwan 
shows that a government can win public trust by being transparent, which in turn feeds 
into the public’s support of the use of big data. 
It would go amiss if the report did not mention the geopolitical factor once again 
as constituting the overall background to Taiwan’s responses to the Covid-19 
pandemic. Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is a state losing recognition in the world 
as the PRC is now the representative of China at the United Nations. The current 
government is seen as pro-independence and has a fraught relationship with the PRC. 
This fact has perhaps contributed to the effectiveness of the measures taken by the 
Taiwanese government as speculated above. At the same time, this has shaped the 
course of diplomacy Taiwan has been pursuing since the beginning of 2020 as the 
SARS-CoV-2 virus started to spread. It craves international recognition and the 
Taiwan Model is officially promoted by the MOFA. It has launched the ‘mask 
diplomacy’ initiative to demonstrate it is a good and responsible member of the 
international community. Above all, the recent disputes about the exclusion of Taiwan 
from the latest World Health Assembly and whether the WHO ignored information 
Taiwan was sending to it about the new virus since the end of 2019 show it is 
impossible to separate Taiwan’s policy responses to Covid-19 from its geopolitical 
position. In short, a country’s policy cannot be isolated from the geopolitical situation 
it finds itself in. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
The case study of Taiwan provides much food for thought in deliberating the 
relationship between Covid-19 and democracy. Taiwan is widely acknowledged as a 
success story in the fight against the SARS-CoV-2 virus and it has managed to avoid 
explosive infection without resorting to lockdown or authoritarian measures. It 
therefore constitutes proof that democracy can deal with a pandemic effectively 
without suspending citizens’ rights. That Taiwan has learned from the 2002-2004 
SARS outbreak, that the current DPP government has been distinguishing itself from 
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the CNP by insisting on a higher degree of transparency and accountability have all 
contributed to this. However, the elephant in the room appears to be its fraught 
relationship with the PRC. Taiwan has been facing an existential threat despite its 
economic prosperity and the current DPP government has, in particular, been working 
on its legitimacy by maintaining a critical stance vis-a-vis the PRC. A case in point is 
President Tsai’s re-election. After losing the local elections in November 2018, she 
resigned as the leader of the DPP whose fortune appeared to be on the decline. 
However, as pro-democracy protest gained momentum in Hong Kong in summer 
2019, her popularity soared as she and her DPP government stood by the protestors 
and offered aid and refuge for many Hongkongers. In a way, the DPP government has 
had to act in the manner they have acted as it has been the only way to enhance their 
legitimacy vis-à-vis the PRC. In this sense, the Taiwanese case highlights the self-
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Chapter 8: United States of America, Dr Peter Finn 
1.Key Facts 
Key Fact Data 
GDP per capita (prior to the pandemic) US$65,280, 2019 
Money spent on health-care per capita 
(prior to the pandemic) 
US$10,246, 2017 
Population (prior to the pandemic) 328.2 million 
Life expectancy (prior to the pandemic) 78.6 
Date of first recorded case January 20 2020 
Date of first recorded death February 6 2020 
Date of 100th recorded death March 17 2020 
Date lockdown entered Varies by state/territory. Began in earnest 
mid-March 2020 
Number of confirmed cases (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
2,575,033 (787.1 per 100,000) 
Number of confirmed deaths (overall and 
per 100,000 population) 
125,803 (38.45 per 100,000) 
When/if lockdown measures were 
significantly eased 
Varies by state/territory. Began in earnest 
late-April 2020, by late-June 2020 
restrictions were starting to be re-imposed 
as cases rose again. 
2. Executive Summary 
● Along with having the highest confirmed Covid-19 death toll in the world, there 
have been issues with testing and medical supplies 
● This death toll and issues with testing and medical supplies have occurred 
despite high proportionate medical spending 
● President Donald Trump has provided mixed, sometimes dangerous, 
messages 
● Some states currently have relatively low infection and death rates, while 
others, particularly in the tri-state-New York area, have had serious outbreaks  
● Since early June, confirmed cases of Covid-19 in some states that fared 
relatively well during the initial stages of the pandemic, such as California, 
Florida, Arizona, and Texas, have risen quickly 
● These rises presaged the significant increases in death tolls currently being 
recorded in these states 
● The economic impact of Covid-19 has been huge, with tens of millions losing 
jobs and health insurance, thus straining an already patchwork social safety net 
● In late-May, the Covid-19 crisis became intermeshed with protests related to 
the death of George Floyd, who died during arrest 
3. Country Intro 
The US political system is complex, with elected officials and power split across 
various levels (federal, state, local). The US has 50 states, along with Washington 
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D.C. and five overseas territories. Washington D.C. houses the federal government 
(President, Congress, Supreme Court).215 States are diverse, with some, such as New 
York, important economic and political actors, and others, such as Vermont, small in 
both geographic and population terms. Moreover, others, like Wyoming, are large 
geographically but have small populations. Each state is governed by its own 
constitution, which is, in turn, subservient to the US Constitution.216 
The US economy, the world’s largest, is diversified, with output in different 
regions and states reflecting geographic, historic, political, and regulatory diversity. 
Health care accounts for around 17% of the US economy and is a major flashpoint 
politically. It is a mainly privatised system that is governed differently in each state and 
territory and encompasses two major federal programs: Medicaid (which caters to 
those on low incomes)217 and Medicare (which mainly caters to those over 65).218 This 
system leaves tens of millions of people uninsured.219 
US politics is dominated by the Republican and Democratic parties. The former 
is associated with right-wing conservative thinking and policies, while the latter 
identifies with more left-wing, socially liberal stances. However, there are big 
differences within and between parties at local, state, and national levels. 
At the outbreak of the Covid-19 Pandemic the presidency (executive branch) 
was held by Donald Trump, a Republican who has challenged norms of behaviour (if 
not necessarily always Republican policies).220 Congress (the legislative branch) was 
split, with the Democrats holding a majority in the House of Representatives and 
Republicans holding a Senate majority, though this Senate majority fell short of the 
two thirds majority needed in some instances.221 A point of tension is where power lies 
between federal, state, and local governments. 
Key Dates 
November 2019: US national military and intelligence services receive reports of a 
pneumonia outbreak in Wuhan, China 
Early-January 2020: Information about the potential outbreak of a contagious disease 
in Wuhan in daily intelligence brief received by President Donald Trump 
January 7: US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) creates a 2019-
nCoV Incident Management Structure 
January 20: First confirmed US case of Covid-19 
January 21: CDC Emergency Operations Center activated 
January 29: Trump launches Coronavirus Task Force 
February 6: First confirmed US death 
March 6: First federal Covid-19 stimulus package passes 
 
215 US Government, Branches of the U.S. Government (2020). Available online: 
https://www.usa.gov/branches-of-government [Accessed 10/7/2020]. 
216 Congressional Research Service, Federalism, State Sovereignty, and the Constitution: Basis and 
Limits of Congressional Power (23 September 2013). 
217 US Government, Medicaid: Program History (2020). Available online: 
https://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/program-history/index.html [Accessed 10/7/2020]. 
218 US Government, What's Medicare? (2020). Available online: https://www.medicare.gov/what-
medicare-covers/your-medicare-coverage-choices/whats-medicare [Accessed 10/7/2020]. 
219 US Census Bureau, Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2018 (November 2019). 
220 J. Herbert,; T. McCrisken,; A. Wroe, The Ordinary Presidency of Donald J. Trump (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2019). 
221 BBC, ‘US mid-term election results 2018: Maps, charts and analysis’, BBC. 28 November 2018. 
Available online: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-46076389 [Accessed 10/7/2020]. 
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March 13: Trump declares National Emergency 
March 15: CDC issues guidance that gatherings of 50 people should not take place 
for two months 
Week of March 15: Large numbers of states and localities issue stay-at-home orders 
March 17: 100th death confirmed  
March 18: Second federal Covid-19 stimulus package passes 
March 27: Third federal Covid-19 stimulus package, the most expensive bill in US 
history, passes 
April 14: Trump suspends US WHO funding 
April 17: Trump administration and CDC release three stage guidelines for re-opening 
that devolve power to governors. Some states begin to loosen some restrictions. 
April 24: Fourth federal Covid-19 stimulus package passes 
May 19: Trump threatens to permanently stop WHO funding 
May 25: George Floyd dies whilst being arrested in Minneapolis after a police officer 
knelt on his neck. The death leads to widespread sustained protests. 
May 27: US passes 100,000 confirmed deaths 
May 29: Trump says he will terminate US relations with WHO 
June 11: US passes 2 million confirmed cases (4 million cases reached July 23) 
4. Political Responses 
The first US Covid-19 case, a 35-year-old male recently returned from Wuhan, 
China, was recorded on January 20 2020 in Snohomish County, Washington State.222 
However, subsequent testing of two residents of the same county who were ill in 
December 2019 with Covid-19 like symptoms showed the presence of Covid-19 
related antibodies, suggesting Covid-19 may have been circulating earlier than 
originally thought.223 The first confirmed US death was a 57-year-old Californian 
female on February 6,224 with the 100th on March 17.225 
Trump’s response to Covid-19 has been characterised by mixed (sometimes 
dangerous) messages. This response included seemingly unsupported claims about 
the eventual death toll, and attacks against political opponents, parts of the federal 
government and members of his Coronavirus Task Force, prominent. Trump initially 
dismissed Covid-19,226 but after the WHO declared a pandemic in mid-March, Trump 
 
222 Seattle Times Staff, ‘Snohomish County man has the United States’ first known case of the new 
coronavirus’, Seattle Times. 11 March 2020. Available online: https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-
news/health/case-of-wuhan-coronavirus-detected-in-washington-state-first-in-united-states/ 
[Accessed 19/05/2020]. 
223 L. Kamb, ’When did coronavirus really hit Washington? 2 Snohomish County residents with 
antibodies were ill in December’, Seattle Times. 16 May 2020. Available online: 
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/antibody-test-results-of-2-snohomish-county-residents-
throw-into-question-timeline-of-coronaviruss-u-s-arrival/ [Accessed 19/05/2020]. 
224 D. Debolt,; T. Peele, ‘Coronavirus: First known victim in U.S. died of ‘‘burst’’ heart, pathologist 
says’, The Mercury News. 26 April 2020. Available online: 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/04/25/coronavirus-first-known-victim-in-u-s-died-of-burst-heart-
pathologist-says/ [Accessed 19/05/2020]. 
225 J. Dupree,; A. Hauslohner; R. Thebault, ‘U.S. coronavirus death toll surpasses 100’, The 
Washington Post. 17 March 2020. Available online: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/us-
coronavirus-death-toll-reaches-100/2020/03/17/f8d770c2-67a8-11ea-b313-df458622c2cc_story.html 
[Accessed 19/05/2020]. 
226 CNBC, ‘CNBC Transcript: President Donald Trump sits down with CNBC's Joe Kernan at the 
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland’, CNBC. 22 January 2020. Available online: 
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/01/22/cnbc-transcript-president-donald-trump-sits-down-with-cnbcs-joe-
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said ‘I've always known [...] this is a pandemic.’227 On April 23 Trump questioned 
whether injecting ultraviolet light or disinfectant could be used to treat Covid-19.228 He 
later claimed he was being sarcastic.229 However, medical professionals, elected 
officials,230 cleaning product manufacturers231 and the US Food and Drug 
Administration Commissioner232 all clarified that cleaning products should not be 
injected or ingested. Trump has also attacked the media,233 offered support to those 
protesting stay-at-home orders,234 contradicted the US's most senior 
epidemiologist235, used racist language to characterize Covid-19236 and criticised the 
response of the CDC, which he oversees.237 
 
 
kernen-at-the-world-economic-forum-in-davos-switzerland.html [Accessed 19/05/2020].; D. Goldberg, 
‘‘It’s going to disappear’: Trump’s changing tone on coronavirus’, Politico. 17 March 2020. Available 
online: https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/17/how-trump-shifted-his-tone-on-coronavirus-134246 
[Accessed 19/05/2020]. 
227 J. Greenberg, ‘Trump says he always felt coronavirus was a pandemic. He didn’t talk that way’, 
Politifact. 18 March 2020. Available online: https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/mar/18/donald-
trump/trump-says-he-always-felt-coronavirus-was-pandemic/ [Accessed 19/05/2020]. 
228 W. Relman, ‘Trump directs experts to see whether they can bring 'light inside the body' to kill the 
coronavirus, even as his own expert shuts him down’, Business Insider. 24 April 2020. Available 
online: https://www.businessinsider.com/trump-wants-bring-light-inside-the-body-to-kill-coronavirus-
2020-4?r=US&IR=T [Accessed 19/05/2020]. 
229 Reuters, ‘Trump made disinfectant comment 'sarcastically'’, Reuters. 24 April 2020. Available 
online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J019d2Cz0jA [Accessed 19/05/2020]. 
230 A. Chiu,; C. Itkowitz,; B. Shammas,; K. Shepherd, ‘Trump claims controversial comment about 




231 The New Indiana Express, ‘‘Disinfectants should not be injected into body': Lyson, Dettol makers 
warn after Trump's comment’, The New Indiana Express.  24 April 2020. Available online: 
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232 Y. Abutaleb,; J. Dawsey,; P. Ruker,; L. Sun, ‘Trump floats another bogus coronavirus cure — and 
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coronavirus-cure--and-his-administration-scrambles-to-stop-people-from-injecting-
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reopening country’, ABC News. 13 April 2020. Available online: 
https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-claims-governors-power-states-deciding-reopening-
country/story?id=70119115 [Accessed 21/05/2020]. 
234 D. Trump, April 17th 2020 LIBERATE MINNESOTA Tweet.  Available online:: 
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235 Associated Press, ‘Trump contradicts Fauci, slams reporter over drug’, Associated Press. 20 
March 2020. Available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYhriqvJMSw [Accessed 
20/05/2020]. 
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times’ Sky News. 24 June 2020. Available online: https://news.sky.com/story/president-trumps-use-of-
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The congressional response has been a mixture of partisan discord and 
bipartisan engagement. Congressional Republicans have generally, though not 
always,238 backed Trump,239 whilst Democrats have criticised Trump and the federal 
response.240 This discord and engagement has, as of early-June, led to the passing 
of four stimulus bills.241 
Governors and mayors have been prominent within states. Noteworthy in this 
regard have been the Democratic New York State Governor Andrew Cuomo and the 
Democratic New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio.242 Cuomo and de Blasio have 
engaged in public recriminations with Trump, with pushback particularly vociferous in 
instances when Trump, and other Republicans, suggested states with Democratic 
governors could see less federal support than Republican controlled states.243 In an 
early-May poll, 49 out of 50 state governors had significantly better (between 11% and 
 
238 M. Raju, ‘Senate GOP breaks with Trump's message on Covid-19 testing: 'We ought to step it up'’, 
CNN. 8 May 2020. Available online: https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/07/politics/republican-reaction-
trump-covid-testing/index.html [Accessed 28/05/2020]. 
239 B. Kobin, ‘Mitch McConnell: Obama 'should have kept his mouth shut' on Trump's handling of 
COVID-19’, Louisville Courier Journal. 13 May 2020. Available online: https://eu.courier-
journal.com/story/news/politics/mitch-mcconnell/2020/05/12/mcconnell-says-obama-should-have-
kept-his-mouth-shut-coronavirus/3114146001/ [Accessed 28/05/2020]. 
240 H. Caygle,; S. Ferris, ‘‘Almost sinful’: Pelosi skewers Trump over threats to reopen country too 
soon’ Politico. 13 April 2020. Available online: https://www.politico.com/news/2020/04/13/senior-
dems-national-plan-reopen-united-states-184135  [Accessed 28/05/2020]. 
241 GovTrack, 2020 H.R. 6201: Families First Coronavirus Response Act GovTrack Summary (14 May 
2020). Available online: https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr6201/summary#oursummary 
[Accessed 27/05/2020]. 
242 A. Cuomo, New York Gov. Andrew Cuomo holds a briefing on the coronavirus outbreak - 
5/20/2020 (Albany, New York) Available online: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EP5IfieXs_o 
[Accessed 21/05/2020].; B. de Blasio, Live: NYC Mayor Bill De Blasio holds coronavirus briefing | 
NBC News (New York, New York) Available online: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZmO17RvxNKw  [Accessed 21/05/2020]. 
243 N. Higgins-Dunn,; J. Kim, ‘NYC Mayor de Blasio says Trump is putting politics first in coronavirus 
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https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/05/coronavirus-nyc-mayor-de-blasio-calls-trump-a-hypocrite-putting-
politics-first.html  [Accessed 20/05/2020].; S. Klebnikov, ‘Cuomo on Trump: ‘He’s doing nothing’’, 
Forbes. 17 April 2020. Available online: 
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42% higher) poll ratings than Trump for their Covid-19 response.244 By June 30, Trump 
had a disapproval rating of 56% and an approval rating of 40.5%.245 
5. Policy Responses 
On January 7, the CDC created a dedicated Incident Management Structure 
and its Emergency Operations Center was ‘activated’ January 21. On January 17, US 
airports receiving significant numbers of travellers from Wuhan, China, had screening 
of travellers from Wuhan progressively introduced. The CDC advised against 
‘nonessential’ travel to China January 27.246  
 
Federal Response 
Trump launched a Coronavirus Task Force on January 29,247 implemented 
restrictions on entry for some who had been in mainland China January 31248 and 
declared a National Emergency, which released ‘$50bn (£40bn) in emergency relief 
funds’,249 March 13.250 On March 15 the CDC issued guidance that gatherings of 50 
people should not take place for two months, though some institutions such as schools 
and colleges were exempt.251 This guidance preceded bipartisan action across 
numerous states and localities over the next week.252 
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On April 13, Trump erroneously claimed he, and not governors, had the power 
to begin opening up the US.253 Though four days later he deferred to governors while 
releasing three stage White House-CDC guidelines for governors to work within.254 
May 1 was slated for the beginning of a phased reopening,255 though the guidelines 
were critiqued by many as scant on details. The Director of the USAID Office of US 
Foreign Disaster Assistance under Barack Obama summed up such concerns by 
stating ‘‘I'm concerned that this plan is laying out what needs to happen, without saying 
how it's going to happen and what the federal role is’’.256 
 
Testing 
As elsewhere, testing has caused controversy. By early-May, almost 250,000 
daily tests were occurring,257 with responsibility for testing largely devolved to 
states.258 On May 7 a Harvard University study projected only 9 states would be 
carrying out enough tests to control Covid-19 by May 15.259 Likewise a May 20 
University of Minnesota report said ‘[c]urrent plans’ did ‘not sufficiently address the 
infrastructure needed’ and argued for federal ‘guidance and coordination’.260 On 
numerous occasions Trump has counterfactually stated ‘[i]f we didn’t do any testing, 
we would have very few cases’261 while also arguing for slowing testing down with the 
goal of finding less cases.262 By late-May, the US was carrying out around 400,000 
daily tests, with around 5% being positive for Covid-19. By June 30 around 600,000 
tests were taking place daily, with around 7% proving positive.263 
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Disagreement exists about testing requirements. Caitlin Rivers of Johns 
Hopkins University, for instance, stated in early-May that 500,000 daily tests would 
help facilitate US contract tracing. The Harvard Global Health Institute, meanwhile, 
argued for a million daily tests, with others urging significantly more testing.264 
Rather than an aberration, problems with testing are emblematic of broader 
issues with medical supplies, with acute shortages of ventilators and personal 
protective equipment developing by April and a lack of coordination similarly 
exacerbating problems. Indeed, a piece in the New England Journal of Medicine in 
late-April asserted that a ‘[f]ailure to act in a coordinated manner’ moving forward 
‘would keep many patients from getting the care they need’.265 Such predictions 
appear prescient, with Deborah Burger, president of National Nurses United, 
highlighting that, as of early-July, there were ‘‘still shortages of gowns, hair covers, 
shoe covers, masks, [and] N95 [surgical] masks’’.266 These failures and lack of 
coordination occurred despite the fact the US spends the highest percentage of its 
GDP on health care, almost 16.9% in 2018, of any developed economy.267 
 
Economic Effects 
The economic impacts of Covid-19 have been huge. By May 21, for instance, 
38.6 million people had filed for federal unemployment insurance since mid-March.268 
Relatedly, one study estimated up to 27 million people lost health insurance linked to 
their employment, or the employment of someone they depend on, by May 2,269 while 
there were protests in numerous states calling for a re-opening, in part due to the 
economic effects of shutdowns.270 
In early-June there were signs a partial recovery had taken hold as states 
began to open up. However, this recovery appears to have faltered as confirmed 
Covid-19 cases began rising steadily in late-June.271 Bipartisan congressional action 
has partly addressed the economic impacts of Covid-19, with four bills signed into law 
by Trump by April 24. 
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The first two bills became law on March 6 and March 18. Among other 
measures, they modestly expanded unemployment insurance and required Medicare 
and private health insurance to cover Covid-19 testing. March 27 saw the third bill, ‘the 
most expensive single spending bill ever enacted in American history’, become law. 
Provisions included direct cash payments to individuals and 'forgivable [small 
business] government loans’. Controversially, these loans have also gone to large 
businesses. A fourth bill, mainly providing further funds to small businesses, was 
enacted April 24.272 As of June 30, a further stimulus bill appears likely at some 
point.273 
Despite their size and scale, the success of these bills is up for debate. 
However, rather than solely reflecting the very real problems with the US’s Covid-19 
response, current events should also be seen in relation to the patchwork nature of 
the US social safety net, the structure of which one commentator labelled a ‘shambles’ 
that ‘barely works in stable times’.274 
 
State Level Differences 
The US passed 100,000 confirmed Covid-19 deaths on May 27.275 However, 
disparities exist between states. On May 28, for example, there had been 144.7 deaths 
per 100,000 people in New York state,276 whilst one study found that, as of early-May, 
between 60-65% of US cases traced back to New York.277 Yet, on May 28 California 
had suffered just 9.9 confirmed deaths per 100,000, and Texas just 5.6 per 100,000.278 
As highlighted above, the governor of New York, Andrew Cuomo, and the 
mayor of New York City, Bill de Blasio, have gained prominence. Cuomo has been 
criticised for initially downplaying Covid-19.279 Moreover, by the time Cuomo issued a 
statewide stay-at-home order March 22, five days after de Blasio first proposed one 
for New York City (a suggestion Cuomo purportedly dismissed), New York already had 
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over 15,000 confirmed cases. San Francisco, meanwhile, issued a stay-at-home order 
on March 16, when the city had under 40 confirmed cases and no deaths. A statewide 
Californian stay-at-home order was issued March 19. Crucially, coordination between 
city level officials, such as Democratic San Francisco Mayor London Breed, and the 
Democratic governor Gavin Newsom appears to have been significant.280 In fairness 
to Cuomo, by the end of March he was clearly taking Covid-19 seriously and issuing 
calls for healthcare professionals from across the US to travel to New York to help if 
they were able.281 However, according to Tom Frieden, former New York City Health 
Commissioner, had New York City imposed stay-at-home orders between one and 
two weeks earlier, its death toll could have been reduced by 50 to 80 per cent.282 
As such, while the human geography and economic stratification of New York 
City mean it was particularly susceptible to a serious outbreak of Covid-19 (especially 
in poorer neighbourhoods), the significant differences between New York and 
California in the early stages of the pandemic demonstrates the importance of acting 
early in stopping face to face interaction, thus reducing transmission. As importantly, 
the Californian experience appears to demonstrate that coordination between different 
levels can bring substantial benefits. 
6. Discussion 
Clear health messages are vital. Such messages need to be delivered 
consistently, with those of most prominence taking the lead. Unfortunately, Trump has 
not provided clear and consistent messages. Similar critiques can also be made of 
some (though certainly not all) Republican politicians at federal and state levels, as 
well as Democrats, such as Cuomo, who initially failed to take Covid-19 seriously. 
 
Moving Early Matters 
As demonstrated by the difference in the New York and Californian death tolls, 
the speed of response matters. Though densely populated neighbourhoods, wealth 
disparities and the continual flow of tourists likely made New York City vulnerable, the 
three-week time-lag between the city’s first confirmed case on March 1 and the 
statewide New York stay-at-home order allowed SARS-CoV-2 to spread unabated. 
Alarmingly, one study estimated that by March 1 there were already 10,700 cases in 
the city.283 Detailing the potential cost of this time lag, another found that had the 
measures in place countrywide by March 15 been implemented a week earlier, 36,000 
fewer deaths may have occurred through May 3, equivalent to around 55% of US 
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deaths at that point.284 More positively, another study estimated that, as of early-June, 
lockdown measures such as stay-at-home orders had prevented 60 million Covid-19 
infections in the US.285 
 
Future Outbreaks 
Despite low death tolls in some states thus far, scope for further outbreaks 
exists, or for slower burn death tolls to lead to significant numbers of deaths, in states 
such as California and Texas. As already stated, on May 28 California and Texas had 
confirmed Covid-19 death rates of 9.9 and 5.6 per 100,000 respectively, with the figure 
144.7 for New York state. However, by June 30 the number of cases in California had 
risen from a 7-day rolling average of around 1,600 new cases per day on May 8, when 
the state began reopening, to around 6,000 new cases per day. Likewise, new cases 
in Texas rose from around 800 new cases per day when the state began reopening 
on April 20 to almost 6,000 new cases per day on June 30. Large rises in confirmed 
cases have also occurred in states such as Florida, Arizona and North and South 
Carolina.286 These numbers did not yet reflect the daily counts of 10,000+ regularly 
reported by New York state in early-April (though Florida has seen a number of days 
with 10,000+ cases reported), and probably also reflect better population knowledge 
and testing. However, they suggest Covid-19 related fatalities in Texas, California, and 
other states, are likely to rise in July, as well as illustrating how quickly infection rates 
can rise if outbreaks are not contained quickly. In short, given the likelihood that those 
planning the US response to Covid-19 moving forward will be faced with either slow 
burn outbreaks continuing for many months, or a large second spike in the fall, or both, 
little room for complacency exists. 
 
Black Lives Matter 
One variable that demonstrates the need to think about politics in its broadest 
sense when discussing policy responses to Covid-19 is protests arising from the death 
of George Floyd, who died during arrest in Minneapolis, Minnesota, after a police 
officer knelt on his neck on May 25.287 The death was filmed and led to condemnation 
of the actions of the arresting officers from many quarters and to large protests in many 
US cities.288 Illuminating how the pandemic became intertwined with the protests 
Eddie S. Glaude Jr eloquently surmised ‘George Floyd’s death brings into view the 
terror and trauma that shadow black people's experiences in this country. COVID-19 
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has not changed that. In fact, terror, trauma and coronavirus are knotted together in a 
thick briar bush with thorns.’289 As protests grew, concerns were voiced about large 
protests leading to spikes in Covid-19 cases,290 whilst the CDC issued guidance on 
June 13 that ‘strongly encourage’ those attending large gatherings involving ‘shouting, 
chanting, [and] singing’ to use a ‘[c]loth face covering’.291 Interestingly, a working paper 
that triangulated data on new cases from the 315 largest US cities found ‘no evidence’ 
that protests had caused spikes in Covid-19 cases. The paper argued this was 




George Floyd memorial in Houston, Texas 
 
Death Toll 
As elsewhere, the US Covid-19 death toll is disputed. Official statistics currently 
show the US reaching 100,000 deaths on May 27. However, a Yale School of Public 
Health study found that, against historical data, the US reached 100,000 excess 
deaths between May 1 and May 9, with around 26,000 excess deaths occurring on top 
of those attributed to Covid-19 between January 4 and May 9, 2020. Not all excess 
deaths are necessarily caused by Covid-19, but could, for instance, include those 
‘afraid to seek medical help for unrelated illnesses’.293 Similarly, in early-June the 
Washington Post found that ‘[f]ewer than half [...] [of US] states are following federal 
recommendations to report probable novel coronavirus cases and deaths’.294 
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An important factor related to death tolls and infection rates in the US is the 
disproportionate effect that Covid-19 has had on communities of colour. Per CDC 
statistics, for instance, as of early-June despite making up 13% of the US population 
African Americans accounted for 22% of those infected and 23% of deaths.295 As such, 
though there are important state level differences shown by the study, on a macro 
level it demonstrates the importance of policy makers taking a holistic view rather than 
just focusing only on deaths and events directly linked to the pandemic.  
7. Concluding Remarks 
 The effects of Covid-19 on the US are likely to be long-term. Most obvious is 
the emotional toll taken by a pandemic that has quickly killed more than 100,000 
people and disproportionately affected communities of colour (a disparity reflecting 
longer term structural problems).296 Economic effects include a huge unemployment 
surge, large numbers of businesses entering administration297 and millions losing 
access to Healthcare.298 Politically, it seems fair to assume the effects will be 
significant and build across time, with concurrent effects on policy being real and long-
lasting. The growth of the Tea Party movement, for instance, arose from the political 
universe created by the 2008 financial crash. Given the size, scale, and response to 
Covid-19, it is likely to feed into the development of political movements in a myriad of 
ways. Indeed, the political convulsions caused by the death of George Floyd have 
become intermingled with the crisis, and the US has a general election in November, 
that will see Trump, a third of the Senate, all members of the House of 
Representatives, and a raft of state level representatives, up for re-election.299 
Moreover, there is at least a possibility that the November election will take place 
during a second surge of US Covid-19 cases. If this transpires, the political and policy 
responses to Covid-19 will surely be an even more important issue than is already 
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